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From the Acting Editor in Chief

elcome to the Winter 2022–23 issue of Parameters. This issue
consists of two In Focus commentaries concerning nuclear power
plants and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, three forums, and the
SRAD Director’s Corner.
As Dr. Echevarria’s temporary replacement as he enjoys his much-deserved
sabbatical, at my first meeting to understand my new duties I found that because
of a paper shortage, we have had to reduce the weight of the paper in our print
edition, and deal with months delay in distribution. I have recently been told
we will also have to reduce the number of printed copies because of rising
costs. For those aspiring authors out there seeking to produce an article for this
journal, I would encourage analysis of the American economy and industrial base.
What has happened so the shutdown of one baby formula factory causes a national
crisis, and our military assistance to Ukraine has caused significant strains in our
own ammunition stocks? Those of us in the military have learned that “just in
time” logistics often is not; it appears we have let economic efficiency override
effectiveness. So, I encourage future submissions looking at such issues.
In our first In Focus essay in this issue, “Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants
in War,” Henry D. Sokolski argues that following Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s
nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States must adjust its military
planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizing,
and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants. Additionally,
US leadership must clarify the policies regarding possible US targeting of such
plants. In our second In Focus essay, “Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad
Options,” Jeffrey D. McCausland analyzes President Vladimir Putin’s decision
to escalate the war in Ukraine. Building on this analysis, he offers insights into
how Putin might further escalate the war using conventional and unconventional
instruments of power, including food, energy, and nuclear weapons. He then
presents strategies for the West and the world to prevent or oppose possible future
escalations. There are two fine podcasts available with these authors.
The issue’s first forum, Indo-Pacific, includes two articles exploring an area
of important strategic concern for the United States. In “Indian Perspectives:
Insights for the Indo-American Partnership,” Tyrell O. Mayfield posits
an understanding of the theories and ideas of Kautilya, a leading but
little-studied Indian philosopher, could provide the United States with insight
into Indian perspectives on strategic partnerships and silent war. In “Security Force
Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition,”
John T. Pelham IV analyzes recent US Army operational experience in security
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force assistance and security cooperation in the region and identifies capability gaps
and opportunities for competition.
Our second forum, Strategy, features two articles proposing new ways to think
about strategy and its implications. In “Planning for Positive Strategic Shock in the
Department of Defense,” Benjamin W. Buchholz argues that a concept of positive
strategic shock would benefit the US Department of Defense’s planning processes
and makes recommendations based on three methods of thinking. In “Cognitive
Performance Enhancement for Multi-domain Operations,” Daniel J. Herlihy explores
the increasing demands on soldier cognition and compares the Army’s current
approach to its adversaries.
The third forum, Leadership, consists of two essays providing important insights
for leadership at all levels. In “Leader Perspectives on Managing Suicide-related
Events in Garrison,” Thomas H. Nassif, George A. Mesias, and Amy B. Adler
provide a thematic analysis of interviews with leaders, chaplains, and behavioral
health providers who responded to garrison suicide-related events and explore
leader decision making. In “Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character?
The Leaky Character Reservoir,” Everett S. P. Spain, Katie E. Matthew, and
Andrew L. Hagemaster claim senior officers may fail in character because their rate
of character development throughout their careers typically decreases as environmental
stressors rise. They conceptualize character as an open system with gains and leaks
over time and integrate existing scholarship on personality and ethical development
to create the Leaky Character Reservoir framework.
Finally, in the fourth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, Colonel
George Shatzer focuses on the relationship between Taiwan and China. He reviews
The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China by Kerry
Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu-hui and Taiwan Straits Standoff: 70 Years of PRC–Taiwan
Cross-Strait Tensions by Bruce A. Elleman. Shatzer shows how these books might
help readers better understand the contentious and violent history of cross-strait
relations between Taiwan and China so they can deal with the problem today and
in the future. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan
for security in the region.
To close, I would like to provide some more guidance for future contributors.
Perusing submissions has reinforced my opinion that the most overused and misused
term in the security studies lexicon is the word “asymmetric.” There are two kinds
of warfare: asymmetric and stupid. All belligerents seek an edge, and no one does
that better than the United States. I have seen the word asymmetric used when
a better term would have been nonmilitary, or non-kinetic, or irregular. So for those
of you who want to write for this journal, be prepared to carefully define that word
if you use it. ~CCC

In Focus

Present Danger:
Nuclear Plants in War
Henry D. Sokolski

©2022 Henry D. Sokolski

ABSTRACT: After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at
Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies
to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed
forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible
US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It
compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and
nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military
measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against
large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military
and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm
to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military
assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Keywords: Zaporizhzhya, nuclear reactors, Law of War Manual, Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan, radiation

Z

aporizhzhya’s nuclear plant, as of this writing, has been placed on cold
shutdown. The plant and its military vulnerabilities, however, have
generated some of the world’s most sensational headlines.1 Earlier this
summer, online reports featured photographs of the plant’s damaged transformer, a
system critical to ensuring a steady supply of electricity to the plant’s all-important
reactor coolant and safety systems. Throughout August and September, news
organizations detailed how the plant’s external main power lines—built to keep
electricity flowing to its reactors—had been cut. Some days, some of the plant’s
six reactors were operating. Other days, none were. Repeatedly, the viability of the
plant’s emergency diesel fuel electrical generators was “Topic A.”
Each of these stories raised the specter of a military-induced Fukushima: strikes
against the plant or the power lines feeding into it that could cut off the electricity
needed to run the reactors’ coolant pumps and safety equipment followed by nuclear
fuel failures and a massive radiological release over Ukraine and its neighbors.
Add to this firsthand accounts of Russian torture, the murder of “disloyal” Ukrainian

1. Wikipedia, s.v. “Crisis at the Zaporizhizhia Nuclear Power Plant,” last modified September 14, 2022,
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis_at_the_Zaporizhzhia_Nuclear_Power_Plant.
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reactor staff, and an emergency International Atomic Energy Agency visit, and
you have everything needed for a Netflix docudrama.
What you would not have, however, and what is still lacking, is a Pentagon
assessment of what all this means militarily.
Close friends have offered hints. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida
called for stationing security forces at each of Japan’s nuclear plants, and
his administration also suggested the possibility of deploying dedicated
missile defense systems (as Belarus has done at its nuclear plant since 2019).2
Seoul crafted military exercises this year with US forces that included
explosives detonating at one or more of South Korea’s civilian reactor sites.3
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russia of turning
Zaporizhzhya into a prepositioned, slow-burning, radiation-dispersing
“nuclear weapon.”4 Meanwhile, Tobias M. Ellwood, the British House of
Common’s Select Committee on Defense chairman, insisted that if Russia
intentionally struck Zaporizhzhya and spread harmful radioactivity to Poland
or Romania, it would trigger NATO’s Article 5.5 Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine
did more than talk. All three countries prepared to distribute iodine pills to their
citizens (to reduce the thyroid cancers radiation might induce if Zaporizhzhya
leaked radiation).6
The following map shows what might happen as a result of a nuclear accident
at the Zaphaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. It shows the spread of simulated
contamination levels after a hypothetical core meltdown at Zaporizhzhya 1.

2. Eric Johnston, “Japan to Discuss Creating New Police Unit to Guard Nuclear Plants,” Japan Times
(website), March 14, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/14/national/nuclear-plant-police
-unit/; and “TOR-M2 Air Defense Missile Systems to Protect Belarus Nuclear Power Plant,” Army Recognition
(website), December 8, 2018, https://www.armyrecognition.com/december_2018_global_defense_security_army
_news_industry/tor-m2_air_defense_missile_systems_to_protect_belarus_nuclear_power_plant.html.
3. Sang-ho Song, “Upcoming S. Korea-U.S. Training Involves Drills on Repelling Attacks,
Staging Counterattacks,” Yonhap News Agency (website), August 1, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view
/AEN20220801004000325.
4. Rebecca Falconer, “Zelensky Says Russian Forces Using Zaporizhzhia Plant as ‘Nuclear Weapon,’ ”
Axios (website), September 4, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/09/05/zelensky-russia-zaporizhzhia-plant
-nuclear-weapon.
5. Article 5 requires NATO members come to the defense of any other member that suffers a military
attack. See Tobias M. Ellwood (@Tobias_Ellwood), “Let’s make it clear: ANY deliberate damage causing
potential radiation leak to a Ukrainian nuclear reactor would be a breach of NATO’s Article 5. @thetimes,”
Twitter, August 19, 2022, 1:55 a.m., https://twitter.com/Tobias_Ellwood/status/1560505699179925509?s=20&
t=FYfhPvuxW0pHm8lwXfe99w.
6. Josh Lederman, “Radiation Tablets Are Handed out near Ukrainian Nuclear Plants as Fears of a Leak
Mount,” NBC News (website), August 26, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-war
-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-radiation-fears-iodine-rcna45041; Ben Turner, “Ukraine War: Moldova Ships
in One Million Iodine Pills amid Fears of Nuclear Disaster,” Euronews (website), August 16, 2022,
https: // www.euronews.com /2022 /08 /15 /moldova-ships-in-radiation-pills-as-fighting-rages-near-zaporizhzhia
-nuclear-power-plant-i; and Helen Collis, “Romania to Issue Iodine Tablets as Russian War Continues in
Neighboring Ukraine,” Politico (website), April 3, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/romania-to-issue
-iodine-tablets-as-russian-aggression-continues-in-bordering-ukraine/.
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Figure 1. Simulation of contamination spread after a hypothetical core meltdown at Zaporizhzhya 1, using weather information
from the third week of March 2021, and simulated contamination levels after a hypothetical core meltdown at Zaporizhzhya 1,
using weather information from the fourth week of March 2021
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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What has the Pentagon made of this? So far, not much. The Department of
Defense’s spokesperson merely observed the danger and “irresponsibility” of
Russian military assaults on the Zaporizhzhya plant.7 But that is it. One might
have expected him to reference assessments the Department might have
made following any of the more than 13 military assaults Iran, Iraq, Israel, the
United Kingdom, or the United States mounted against reactors in Iran,
Iraq, Israel, and Syria. Perhaps no such assessments were undertaken by the
Department. If there were, it would help clarify how the Zaporizhzhya attacks
differ from those made in the Middle East and what those differences portend.
The short answer to the latter question is plenty.
First, none of the Middle Eastern attacks were directed against operating
powered reactors.8 Not so with Zaporizhzhya. Before the war, the plant produced
more nuclear power than any other European plant. With Russia’s assault
on Zaporizhzhya, the drama of a possible massive radiological release is real;
with the previous strikes in the Middle East, it was not.
Second, unlike the attacks on Zaporizhzhya, none of the raids against
Middle Eastern reactors were mounted with long-range precision drones or
missiles. All of them were executed either with attack bombers or inaccurate
Scuds. The Middle Eastern strikes, moreover, were aimed to destroy the entire
nuclear plant, not particular subsystems. Again, not so with Zaporizhzhya.
At different times and separately, the Zaporizhzhya plant’s on-site transformer
was hit, its four inbound power transmission lines felled, and its spent fuel storage
area struck. Each of these separate strikes ratcheted up fears similar to what one
might experience climbing a nuclear escalatory ladder (think: Herman Kahn,
version 2.0). In contrast, past Middle Eastern reactor attacks were binary—
either total hits or relatively harmless misses.
Third, none of the attacked plants in the Middle East were ever seized and
operated by the attacking party. Not so with Zaporizhzhya. The Russians
not only seized Zaporizhzhya and assumed its operation, but they also used it
as a missile and artillery launch site and allowed (or inflicted) damage to the
structure to manipulate how much electricity Ukrainians might get. Russia also
threatened to redirect the plant’s electrical production toward Russia and
7. Paul D. Shinkman, “Pentagon Blasts Russian Provocations at Ukrainian Nuclear Plant as ‘Height of
Irresponsibility,’ ” U.S. News and World Report (website), August 19, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news
/ national-news/ articles/2022-08-19/pentagon-blasts-russian-provocations-at-ukrainian-nuclear-plant-as-height
-of-irresponsibility.
8. Saddam did fire two errant Scuds at Israel’s military small production reactor at Dimona, and the
United States bombed Iraq’s research reactor at Osirak in 1991. Neither unit was a power plant.
See Jonathan Ferziger, “Iraq Lobs Two Scuds at Israel,” United Press International (website),
February 25, 1991, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/02/25/Iraq-lobs-two-Scuds-at-Israel/6123667458000/.
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Russian-held territory to the east and south. Come winter, Russia may literally
be able to freeze out local Ukrainian opposition.
Fourth, none of the Middle Eastern plants were near major urban areas.
Before the war, Zaporizhzhya and the surrounding area had nearly 1.7 million
residents.9 Many hundreds of thousands still live there. Given the risk of
radiological release, Zelensky asked them to evacuate.10 The movement of so many
residents at once, however, could easily complicate local military operations for the
Ukrainians and the Russians. More importantly, the radioactivity the plant might
release could go in several directions. If the winds were to blow west (which they
most often do), then Russia would suffer; east, Ukraine and Romania (a NATO
member); north, Poland and possibly other NATO member states; and south,
Türkiye (another NATO member). A North Korean summertime attack on South
Korean reactors would release more radioactivity over Japan than South Korea.
In the winter, the reverse would occur. None of these considerations were factors
in previous Middle East raids.
Finally, and related, none of the targeted Middle Eastern reactors were
located in or adjacent to states the United States was treaty-bound to defend.
Washington has no treaty security guarantees for any state in the Middle East—
not even Israel. It does, however, have them for NATO in Europe, Japan, and
South Korea. Most NATO members operate large reactors. So do Japan and
South Korea. Taiwan also operates nuclear power plants. Chinese, Russian,
and North Korean authorities (as well as former officials) have suggested
they might strike these facilities. Seoul, Tokyo, Moldova, Romania, and Taipei are
all now considering defensive measures.
What, then, if anything, should the Pentagon do? Three things come to mind.
Assess the military, deterrence, and security alliance implications of waging
war where nuclear plants operate, including in Europe, the Middle East,
and Asia. All of these theaters host American military bases. If reactors in the
region are hit, how vulnerable might US troops be to possible radiation releases?
What active or passive defense measures would be useful for them to take?
What should US troops do if a state whose security the United States
guarantees calls for assistance after one of its reactors has been hit or if its
citizens are irradiated after a strike is made against a neighbor’s nuclear plant?
What assistance, if any, should the Pentagon be prepared to offer to replace
emergency electricity that might be lost after such attacks? In either war or
9. “Population of Zaporizhzhia Oblast,” Google Search, https://www.google.com/search?q=population%20
of%20zaporizhzhia%20oblast.
10. Max Hunde, Conor Humphries, and Alex Richardson, “Ukraine Calls for Evacuation of Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Plant Town,” Reuters (website), September 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine
-calls-evacuation-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-town-2022-09-07/.
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peacetime, should the Pentagon offer air and missile defenses, intelligence, or
first responder assistance to help protect friendly nations’ nuclear plants?
What forms might this assistance take? What counteroffensive actions might
be considered proportionate to strikes made against allied nuclear plants?
The Pentagon’s replies may differ for different countries. Its general
conclusions, however, should be dialed into any future Nuclear Posture
Review and be a part of the Pentagon’s defense guidance. Bureaucratically,
accomplishing this may be difficult. Currently, there is no office responsible
for conducting such analysis. The regional commands may feel uncomfortable
assuming this task unless told to do so. The Pentagon’s Office of Nuclear
Deterrence Policy in Open Supervised Defense Protocol, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Acquisition (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological), and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy are all plausible places
to tangle with these matters; yet, so far, none has taken charge. Another possible
contributor would be the secretary of the Army, whom the secretary of defense
just made the lead proponent for a newly minted Civilian Harm Mitigation
and Response Action Plan.11 Congress could instruct any of these organizations
or individuals to take the lead in producing the needed nuclear plant analysis.
Congress should make this assignment quickly and ensure the analysis is
updated routinely.
Separately, the Pentagon should take a more active role in reviewing
US nuclear export license applications with an eye to how vulnerable such
plants might be to military assaults. The Pentagon already serves as the lead in
identifying the location of potential future war zones. The Pentagon also manages
a military reactor program and says it wants to deploy these reactors overseas.12
As such, it is already on the hook to clarify how safe these plants might be
and where they would be safest to deploy.13 Armed with this information, the
Pentagon should be tapped for any assessment of the vulnerabilities of reactors
private US firms may want to export (and, coincidentally, that American
military forces may be asked to defend). This requirement is hardly a new ask.
It is already required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which

11. US Department of Defense, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP),
August
25,
2022,
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Aug/25/2003064740/-1/-1/1/CIVILIAN-HARM
-MITIGATION-AND-RESPONSE-ACTION-PLAN.PDF.
12. Patrick Tucker, “Defense Department Sets Out to Build Miniature Nuclear Reactor, Again,”
Defense One (website), April 15, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/04/defense-department
-sets-out-build-miniature-nuclear-reactor-again/365766/.
13. Henry D. Sokolski and Bryan Clark, “ ‘Military Micro-Reactors: Waging Yesterday’s Wars while Losing
the Future’s,’ Defense News,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (website), June 15, 2021,
https://npolicy.org/military-micro-reactors-waging-yesterdays-wars-while-losing-the-futures-defense-news/.
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expects the Department of Defense to comment on the national security
implications of US civilian nuclear exports.14
The Defense Department should also clarify and strengthen current
guidance on targeting nuclear plants in war. All the world’s nations except
India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Türkiye, and the United States have ratified the 1977
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention. Chapter III of the protocol strongly
discourages targeting nuclear electrical generating plants.15 Russia withdrew from
the protocol in 2019. Washington signed it in 1977, indicating an intention to
ratify it—which it never did. In the l980s, the Reagan administration opposed
ratification because of concerns about what constituted liberation movements
under the protocol.16 Some may also now believe the United States should do
nothing to restrict its freedom of action to strike nuclear electricity-generating
plants. Even the protocol allows for targeting such plants in extremely rare
cases. Military justifications for such strikes are few and far between: military
forces will hardly want to operate in, or liberate, regions near a plant if it has
irradiated the region after being hit.
Washington wants to condemn Moscow for its strikes against the
plant at Zaporizhzhya. What makes this awkard is the Pentagon’s 2016
Law of War Manual, which ultimately allows US military commanders
to target nuclear power plants if they think doing so is “important.”17
Given the outsized political, diplomatic, and military downsides
of producing a major radiological release, it would be helpful if the Pentagon
could make the presumption against attacking nuclear plants at least as clear
as the protocol makes it. One might want to clarify further that nuclear
electricity-generating stations should include related nuclear facilities, such as
reprocessing plants, spent fuel storage sites, etc.
Another issue worth resolving is what US policy should be regarding
attacks against large research reactors (something the Law of War Manual
does not mention). This clarification could be accomplished by asking the
Pentagon to wire brush its Law of War Manual. It would also make sense
for Congress to elevate any military decision to target such plants to the
commander in chief. Currently, this action is required for the release of nuclear
14. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,” 22 USC § 3201 (1978), https://www.govinfo.gov/content
/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg120.pdf. The Department of Defense may also comment on
intangible nuclear technology transfers (known as Part 810 transfers), including those to China.
15. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Intentional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,” International Committee of the Red
Cross (website), n.d., https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470.
16. Theodor Meron, “The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I,” American
Journal of International Law 88, no. 4 (October 1994), 678–86, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2204135.
17. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, June 2015, updated
December
2016,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20
Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190.
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weapons for use. It would also make sense for any targeting of nuclear plants
in war zones. After what has unfolded at Zaporizhzhya, civilian nuclear plants
must be viewed as prepositioned nuclear weapons that, if hit, could potentially
disperse strategically disruptive amounts of radiation over thousands of square
miles—making the decision to attack them more than a theater or tactical matter.
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Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options
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ABSTR ACT: Now that Vladimir Putin has chosen a path of escalation in
his unnecessary war of aggression against Ukraine, it is imperative Western
policymakers know the consequences and how he might escalate further. This
article examines recent events on the battlefield; the implications of the announced
annexation of territory, mobilization of forces, and threats to employ “all means”
to defend Russian territory; the domestic ramifications and Russian thinking on
“hybrid warfare”; and the possible weaponization of food and energy as Putin
determines future escalatory steps. It will assist American and European leaders in
determining policies to deal with the ongoing crisis at this moment and prepare for
an uncertain future.
K ey words: Russia-U k ra ine wa r, P ut in, esca l at ion, hybr id wa r fa re ,
nuclear weapons

V

ladimir Putin had a very bad September.1 The Ukrainian counteroffensive
in the northeast of the country has been a staggering success, and it
continues. Kyiv liberated more territory in two weeks than Russia seized
in the previous five months.2 Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi during their meetings with Putin in Uzbekistan were
clearly unsupportive of Russia’s aggression.3
The strategy Putin had for this war of aggression is now in tatters. It was based
on two false assumptions. First, he assumed his army would quickly defeat the
Ukrainians, topple Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration, and occupy a sizable
portion of the country. He grossly underestimated the Ukrainians’ ability to resist
and overestimated his own forces. The vaunted Russian Army has suffered from
poor morale, abysmal leadership, and an inability to provide the necessary logistical
support for Putin’s invading force. Second, Putin believed the West would not be
able to mount a unified response. He thought the West’s reaction would be similar to
that of 2014 when he annexed Crimea and fomented a quasi-civil war using
proxy forces in southeastern Ukraine. But Washington and its NATO allies have
1. Phil McCausland, “What Now for Putin? After Russian Retreat, the Kremlin Has Few Good Options
in Ukraine,” NBC News (website), September 16, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-retreats
-ukraine-what-will-putin-do-military-kremlin-rcna47514.
2. Steve Hendrix, Serhii Korolchuk, and Robyn Dixon, “Amid Ukraine’s Startling Gains, Liberated Villages
Describe Russian Troops Dropping Rifles and Fleeing,” Washington Post (website), September 11, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/11/kharkiv-liberated-retreat-izyum-russia/.
3. Mukhammadsharif Mamatkulov, “India’s Modi Assails Putin over Ukraine War,” Reuters (website),
September 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/putin-xi-speak-summit-uzbekistan-2022-09-16/.
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shown surprising unity in their support for Kyiv, and with the addition of
Finland and Sweden the alliance may be stronger now than it was at the onset
of this conflict.
Putin had two options in the aftermath of his most recent military and
diplomatic reversals. He could have cranked up his propaganda machine
and declared his “special military operation” a remarkable success.4 He could
have argued Russia had “denazified” large portions of Ukraine, reduced the
threat Kyiv posed, and sent a clear message to the West. He could have
accompanied these arguments with the announcement of a cease-fire and a
call for negotiations. These actions might have paused the war and offered
him a chance to use the upcoming winter to reorganize his forces. His second
option was escalation. With a speech to the Russian people on September 21,
2022, he chose the latter.5 It is critical to consider what this means and how he
might escalate further.
Putin escalated the war in three ways. First, he announced a partial
mobilization. The Kremlin claimed this mobilization would consist of 300,000
reservists or those with previous military experience.6 As the first Russian
armed forces mobilization since World War II, it underscores the Russian
Army’s desperate need for manpower—especially now: the Pentagon estimates
the Kremlin has suffered around 80,000 casualties since this war began.7 This
desperate gamble is, in part, a response to right-wing hardliners in the Russian
media who have been openly critical after a string of recent defeats.8 But Putin
risks greater social unrest and opposition to the war at home with the decision
to escalate. Unrest and opposition are now occurring in many cities across
Russia.9 A reported minimum of 1,300 people have been arrested following
demonstrations, and thousands of young Russian men have fled the country.10
Up to this point, most Russians have been apathetic about the war, as Putin
4. Bloomberg News, “Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s Televised Address on Ukraine,” Bloomberg (website),
February 24, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s
-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24.
5. Evan Gershkovich, Thomas Grove, and Alan Cullison, “Putin Orders Draft of Reservists for Ukraine War,
Threatens Nuclear Response,” Wall Street Journal (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles
/putin-orders-draft-of-reservists-for-war-in-ukraine-threatens-nuclear-response-11663742871.
6. TASS, Russian News Agency, “Partial Mobilization Applies to Reservists with Military Experience,
Specialty,” TASS, Russian News Agency (website), September 21, 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1511049.
7. Nancy A. Youssef and Evan Gershkovich, “As Many as 80,000 Russian Troops Hurt or Killed in Ukraine,
Pentagon Says,” Wall Street Journal (website), August 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-many-as
-80-000-russian-troops-hurt-or-killed-in-ukraine-pentagon-says-11659989514.
8. Associated Press, “Vladimir Putin Vows to Send More Invaders. The West Should Arm Ukraine Faster,”
Economist (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/09/21/vladimir-putin-vows
-to-send-more-invaders-the-west-should-arm-ukraine-faster; and Mary Ilyushina, “Faced with War Losses,
Russian Propagandists Retreat to Anger and Patriotism,” Washington Post (website), September 12, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/12/russia-losses-propaganda-react-ukraine/.
9. Evan Gershkovich, “Russians Seek to Mount Resistance to Putin as Mobilization Gears Up,” Wall Street
Journal (website), September 24, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russians-seek-to-mount-resistance-to
-putin-as-mobilization-gears-up-11664054571.
10. Gershkovich, Grove, and Cullison, “Putin Orders Draft.”
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sought to insulate the population from its ill effects: while the Ukrainian
counteroffensive was gaining momentum, Putin was dedicating a Ferris wheel
in Moscow and urging the Russian people to enjoy themselves.11
The mobilization will test the loyalty of those born after the demise of the
Soviet Union and those less fond of the Russian strongman. It will have little
significant immediate effect on the battlefield, could backfire, and will likely
fail. It will take weeks, if not months, to identify, organize, train (or retrain),
equip, and deploy these new troops.12 With the impending arrival of winter,
these new forces are unlikely to appear in significant numbers until spring.
There have also been reports that the Russian Army stripped troops from its
training base as the military situation deteriorated, and this will further slow
the training and deployment of new troops. Russia has lost thousands of tanks,
armored vehicles, trucks, and aircraft.13 Consequently, it may be difficult to
equip new units with modern weaponry.
Even from the onset, the Kremlin may intend for this “partial mobilization”
to far exceed the stated goal of 300,000 and has also included many Russian
men who have no prior military experience. The mobilization is also
disproportionately aimed at minority groups, rural areas, and territories in
the Far East rather than large cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. This
disparity has already resulted in unrest in these areas.14 Several experts have
now suggested more Russians have fled the country since the mobilization
announcement than have fought in Ukraine, and some of Putin’s strongest
supporters have been less than enthusiastic. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov
has said recruitment will not be extended to Chechnya since it has already
exceeded its targets for recruitment.15
The mobilization announcement included increased penalties for Russian
soldiers who surrender or desert. It also involuntarily extends the contracts
of soldiers currently serving in Ukraine.16 There were widespread reports of
Russian soldiers fleeing the advance of Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv and
11. Amit Chaturvedi, ed., “Vladimir Putin Opens New Ferris Wheel as Russian Forces Receive Stunning
Setback in Ukraine,” NDTV (website), September 12, 2022, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-ukraine
-war-vladimir-putin-opens-new-ferris-wheel-as-russian-forces-receive-stunning-setback-in-ukraine-3337891.
12. Lawrence Freedman, “All the Tsar’s Men: Why Mobilization Can’t Save Putin’s War,” Foreign Affairs
(website), September 23, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/all-tsars-men.
13. David Axe, “The Russian Army Is Losing a Battalion Every Day as Ukrainian Counterattacks
Accelerate,” Forbes (website), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/11/the-russian-army-is-losing-a
-battalion-every-day-as-ukrainian-counterattacks-accelerate/.
14. Anton Troianovski, “Russia’s Draft Is Drawing Criticism from Far-Flung Regions and Even Pro-War
Hawks,” New York Times (website), September 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/world/europe
/russias-draft-is-drawing-criticism-from-far-flung-regions-and-even-pro-war-hawks.html.
15. Associated Press, “Chechnya Exempts Itself from Russia’s Draft,” Moscow Times (website),
September 23, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/23/chechnya-exempts-itself-from-russias
-draft-a78874.
16. Youssef and Gershkovich, “80,000 Russian Troops Hurt.”
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abandoning massive amounts of equipment.17 Some soldiers even stripped off
their uniforms and attempted to escape in civilian clothes.18 Consequently,
it is hard to believe Russia can succeed—with troops with already sagging
morale and poor leadership, training, and equipment—by forcing more young
Russians to fight in a war they do not support.
Second, Putin described this conflict as primarily between Russia and
the West. He falsely claimed Western leaders threatened the very existence
of the “Motherland.” Consequently, Putin warned he would “use all the
means at [Russia’s] disposal to protect Russia and [its] people,” adding
“[t]his is not a bluff.”19 This obvious threat to employ nuclear weapons comes
at an ironic moment: the 60th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis,
the last time the United States was involved in a crisis that threatened global
nuclear catastrophe.
Putin’s decision to escalate is a blatant attempt to intimidate NATO,
Ukraine, and Washington. But it also represents Putin’s effort to reshape
the narrative. In this case, he appeals to Russian nationalism. Previously, he
falsely described Russia’s very existence as imperiled by outside forces and called
upon the nation to respond as their ancestors did against the Napoleonic
invasion of 1812 or the Germans’ attack in World War II.
Third, he supported the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian
provinces via sham referendums.20 In their aftermath, Putin signed an
annexation decree and delivered a fiery speech assailing the United States for
“satanism.”21 He further argued the West was an “enemy” of Russia that sought
to destroy the nation.22 The forcible seizure of these territories is the largest
land grab in Europe since World War II. It makes a mockery of international
law, and few nations, if any, are likely to accept Russian sovereignty over these
provinces. Furthermore, it makes the possibility of negotiations even more
17. Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Jacobs, and Samy Adghirni, “Ukraine Seizes Dozens of Russian Tanks
Left by Fleeing Forces,” Bloomberg (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2022-09-21/ukraine-seizes-dozens-of-russian-tanks-left-by-fleeing-forces.
18. Sophia Ankel, “They Were Afraid of Being Caught: Russian Soldiers Escaped in Civilian Clothes,”
Business Insider (website), September 12, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-troops-drop-guns-flee
-ukraine-counteroffensive-reports-2022-9.
19. Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin Escalates Ukraine War, Issues Nuclear Threat to West,” Reuters (website),
September 21, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-decree-mobilisation-says-west-wants
-destroy-russia-2022-09-21/.
20. Anton Troianovski, “Russia Signals Annexation of Parts of Ukraine, Raising Stakes in Fighting,”
New York Times (website), September 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/20/world/europe/russia
-annex-ukraine-referendum.html.
21. Associated Press, “Russia-Ukraine War: Putin Frames Illegal Annexation as Part of Existential Battle
with West,” New York Times, September 30, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/09/30/world/russia
-ukraine-war-news.
22. “[Signing of Agreements on the Admission of the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson
Regions to Russia],” Kremlin (website), September 30, 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president
/news/69465.
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remote as Putin described this move as “irreversible.”23 In the same speech,
he called on the Zelensky administration to accept the permanent transfer of
these territories, accept a cease-fire, and enter into talks. In response, the Kyiv
government insisted negotiations will be impossible as long as Putin remains
in power.24
Putin’s speech also will heighten his attempt at nuclear extortion. Moscow
can now claim these areas are Russian territory and use any attacks against
them as a rationale to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in its defense. Still,
it remains to be seen if Putin is willing to do so. Only a day after Putin’s
speech, Ukrainian forces captured the strategic city of Lyman in the Donbas
region and part of the territory that Moscow now claims is Russian territory.25
It is reported many Russian soldiers fled the city in disorder while thousands
may have been captured. This major setback for Putin could be followed in the
coming weeks by further setbacks, including the possible loss of Kherson in
southern Ukraine.
Since Putin has chosen a path of escalation, what might he do in the future?
He has further escalatory options. He can threaten nuclear catastrophe with
missile and artillery strikes to disable or damage a Ukrainian nuclear power
plant and create a Chernobyl-like disaster. Recently, a missile struck less than
1,000 feet from the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant.26 External power to
the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant—the largest in Europe—has been shut
off several times, forcing the staff to use emergency power to cool the reactors.
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has described the
Zaporizhzhya situation as “untenable” and “playing with fire.”27 This is a classic
example of “hybrid warfare,” the fusion of conventional and unconventional
instruments of power and tools of subversion. Moscow has employed hybrid
warfare in the past—with the invasion of Crimea in 2014, interference in
Western elections or the Brexit vote, the assassination of Putin’s opponents,
and the dissemination of misinformation. Putin can threaten nuclear facilities
at times of his choosing, which provides him the intimidating effect of nuclear
23. Lawrence Freedman, “Putin’s Annexation and Lyman’s Encirclement,” Comment is Freed (blog),
October 1, 2022, https://samf.substack.com/p/putins-annexation-and-lymans-encirclement?utm_source
=twitter&sd=pf.
24. Mykhailo Podolyak (@Podolyak_M), “Negotiations are possible, but with the new president of Russia,”
Twitter (website), October 1, 2022, 7:00 a.m., https://twitter.com/ConanOBrien/status/590940792967016448.
25. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Andrew E. Kramer, Anton Troianovski, and Catherine Porter, “Ukraine
Forces Retake Lyman, a Strategic City, as Russians Retreat,” New York Times (website), October 1, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/world/europe/lyman-ukraine-russia.html.
26. Dan Ladden-Hall, “Russian Missile Strikes within 1,000 Feet of Ukrainian Nuclear Reactors,”
Daily Beast (website), September 19, 2022, https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-missile-strikes-within
-1000-feet-of-ukrainian-nuclear-reactors.
27. Joanne Liou, “Situation at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant ‘Untenable,’ Protection Zone Needed,
IAEA’s Grossi Tells Board,” International Atomic Energy Agency (website), September 12, 2022,
https: / / www.iaea.org / newscenter / news / situation-at-zaporizhzhya-nuclear-power-plant-untenable-protectionzone-needed-iaeas-grossi-tells-board.
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weapons without potential international blowback. Such threats are actually
criminal, as they endanger the staff and innocent civilians in Ukraine and
beyond. Finally, they also divert media attention away from reports on war
crimes, Russian failures on the battlefield, and other setbacks.
Putin could also further employ his energy weapon. He has already ended
the export of natural gas to Europe and could seek to do more damage.28 The
recent attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline are likely an example.29 European
and NATO leaders have described them as “sabotage,” but so far there has
been no formal allegation that Moscow perpetrated them.30 Still, these attacks
are consistent with the Russian hybrid warfare thinking previously mentioned.
Such attacks would require the Russian Navy to possess sophisticated
capabilities such as divers or undersea drones. The attacks occurred in
international waters and, consequently, could not be construed as attacks on a
NATO member’s territory that might elicit an Article 5 response.
The attacks are also clouded in plausible deniability. As a result, the Kremlin
has described any accusation against Russia as “stupid and absurd” and blamed
the United States.31 The attacks are also an implicit threat against the new
Baltic Pipeline connecting Poland and Norway, which opened at the same
time the attacks occurred.32 Finally, the attacks clearly underscore the ongoing
uncertainty around European energy supplies as winter approaches. Putin
obviously hopes skyrocketing energy costs coupled with the arrival of winter
energy demands will result in social unrest in Europe. Social unrest might
force European leaders to reduce their support for Ukraine and put pressure
on Kyiv to accept negotiations on Putin’s terms.
Putin’s expanded attacks on the Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure and
the closure of nuclear power plants already belong to this effort. His attacks
have reduced the availability of energy to Ukraine and will likely result in more
Ukrainian refugees as winter arrives. Putin’s action renews pressure on NATO

28. Sam Meredith, “Russia Has Cut Off Gas Supplies to Europe Indefinitely. Here’s What You Need
to Know,” CNBC (website), September 6, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/06/energy-crisis-why-has
-russia-cut-off-gas-supplies-to-europe.html.
29. Jen Kirby, “The Nord Stream Pipeline Sabotage, Explained,” Vox (website), September 28, 2022,
https://www.vox.com/world/2022/9/28/23376356/nord-stream-pipeline-russia-explosions-sabotage.
30. Merlyn Thompson and Elsa Maishman, “Nord Stream Leaks: Sabotage to Blame, Says EU,” BBC News
(website), September 28, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63057966.
31. Thompson and Maishman, “Sabotage to Blame”; and Reuters Staff, “Putin Says ‘Anglo-Saxon’ Powers Blew
up Nord Stream Pipelines,” Reuters (website), September 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine
-crisis-putin-nordstream-idAFS8N2Z80FZ.
32. Anna Wlodarczak-Semczuk and Kirsten Donovan, “Gas Starts Flowing to Poland through New Baltic
Pipe Pipeline,” Reuters (website), October 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/gas-starts
-flowing-poland-through-new-baltic-pipe-pipeline-2022-10-01/.
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countries, discourages them from maintaining their existing nuclear facilities,
and forces them to consider sharing limited supplies with Kyiv.
Moscow could use the “food weapon” and once again halt the export of
Ukrainian grain from its Black Sea ports. In July 2022, an agreement signed
by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine, and the United Nations allowed for the export
of millions of tons of Ukrainian and Russian grain and fertilizer.33 Ukraine
and Russia provide roughly 30 percent of the world’s grain, and the failure to
deliver these commodities to global markets may well result in famine in many
parts of the world.34 Some have claimed Russia is waging a campaign of “theft
and destruction” of Ukrainian agriculture reminiscent of the famines caused by
Joseph Stalin in the 1930s.35
Finally, Putin could escalate militarily through further force mobilizations,
strikes on NATO locations important to the flow of military assistance to
Ukraine, or expanded cyberattacks. The use of nuclear weapons, as Putin
threatened, could also be an option. Graham T. Allison, author of the celebrated
book on the Cuban missile crisis Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Little, Brown, 1971), observed that the possibility of Russian
nuclear use clearly increases if Russia perceives a growing existential threat
to itself or its rule. Allison recounted that in 1962 President John F. Kennedy
believed the possible use of nuclear weapons became a “more plausible scenario
if a leader is forced to choose between catastrophic humiliation and a roll
of the dice that might yield success.”36 Should Putin decide to use nuclear
weapons, the system used would likely be a tactical nuclear weapon, of which
Russia is believed to have 2,000. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed with
a nuclear yield below 100 kilotons and delivered by short-range aircraft,
artillery, or missiles.37
While the West cannot ignore the possibility of expanded military threats,
the probability of Putin using nuclear weapons appears low at this moment

33. Associated Press, “Ukraine, Russia Agree to Export Grain, Ending a Standoff That Threatened Food
Supply,” NPR (website), July 22, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/22/1112880942/ukraine-grain-exports
-deal.
34. Heinz Strubenhoff, “The War in Ukraine Triggered a Global Food Shortage,” Brookings (website),
June 14, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2022/06/14/the-war-in-ukraine-triggered
-a-global-food-shortage/.
35. Lyudmyla Pavlyuk, “Kennan Cable No. 79: Russia Is Looting Ukraine’s Breadbasket . . . Again,”
Kennan Cable 79 (September 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-79-russia
-looting-ukraines-breadbasketagain.
36. David E. Sanger, Anton Troianovski, and Julian E. Barnes, “In Washington, Putin’s Nuclear Threats
Stir Growing Alarm,” New York Times, October 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/world/europe
/washington-putin-nuclear-threats.html.
37. “Reports & Multimedia/Explainer: What Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons?,” Union of Concerned
Scientists (website), June 1, 2022, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/tactical-nuclear-weapons.
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for several reasons.38 First, Russian military doctrine calls for the use of such
weapons primarily to create conditions on the battlefield that can then be
rapidly exploited by conventional forces. But Moscow no longer has readily
available forces to exploit opportunities any such employment might offer.
Russia has failed to demonstrate the ability to conduct large-scale offensive
operations effectively for the past seven months in a nonnuclear environment.
It is hard to imagine how reinforcing Russian forces, in their state of
degradation, with poorly trained conscripts could possibly allow for successful
operations in a nuclear environment demanding a much more sophisticated
level of training, equipment, and command and control.
Second, Putin would become even more of an international pariah. The
tepid support he now receives from China, India, and other countries in the
Global South would likely evaporate.39 Third, he would have to consider the
response by the West. This could include the imposition of a no-fly zone over
Ukraine, expanded military assistance, and even the direct involvement of
Western ground forces. Washington has already sent private warnings about
the grave consequences to follow should Moscow cross the nuclear threshold.40
Fourth, the employment of such weapons in eastern Ukraine would result in
a radiation pattern that would threaten areas occupied by Putin’s forces or
existing Russian territory.
Putin’s threats of escalation have not had the immediate effect he hoped
for, and Western countries have announced their continued support for
Ukraine.41 But there is no denying the world faces extreme danger at the
moment. It is critical the West adopt policies to deter or respond to potential
future escalation by Moscow. These policies must include several important
considerations. Washington and its European allies’ greatest strength against
Russian aggression has been their unity of policy and effort in response to that
aggression. Unity must continue, but it may grow more complicated in the
aftermath of recent elections in Italy and Sweden, which seem likely to result
in the far right’s return to power.42 It may also become increasingly difficult
38. Mason Clark, Katherine Lawlor, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “SPECIAL REPORT: ASSESSING
PUTIN’S IMPLICIT NUCLEAR THREATS AFTER ANNEXATION,” Institute for the Study of War
(website), September 30, 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-assessing
-putin%E2%80%99s-implicit-nuclear-threats-after-annexation.
39. Happymon Jacob, “Russia Is Losing India: How Putin’s Ukraine Gambit Doomed a Long Partnership,”
Foreign Affairs (website), September 22, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/russia-losing-india.
40. Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “U.S. Has Sent Private Warnings to Russia against Using a Nuclear
Weapon,” Washington Post (website), September 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national
-security/2022/09/22/russia-nuclear-threat-us-options/.
41. Anton Troianovski and Valerie Hopkins, “Putin Raises Stakes in the War, with Direct Challenge to the
West,” New York Times (website), September 21, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/21/world/europe
/putin-ukraine-russia-nuclear.html.
42. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, “The Return of Fascism in Italy,” Atlantic (website), September 23, 2022, https://www
.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/09/giorgia-meloni-italy-election-fascism-mussolini/671515/.
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to find alliance agreement on future policy with Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán or Turkish President Recep Erdoğan as the war continues.
Military support for Ukraine must continue and expand. As the war has
continued, NATO has created a sophisticated coordinating effort designed
to meet changing requirements and avoid the duplication of efforts to ensure
the delivery of equipment from donor nations to Kyiv.43 The level of military
assistance to Ukraine has been enormous. As of the end of September, the
Biden-Harris administration has provided nearly $17 billion in weapons,
ammunition, and equipment.44 Washington will need to increase its industrial
capacity dramatically to produce artillery rounds, rockets, anti-tank weapons,
and air defense needed to support Ukraine, refurbish wartime stocks, and
prepare for future conflicts.45
There is also a growing need to expand logistical and training assistance
to Ukraine, which should include contractor support in the future. These
efforts must be forward deployed to repair and maintain sophisticated military
equipment for its rapid return to the battlefield. The West will also need
to continue its economic and financial assistance to Ukraine to buttress its
economy and deal with even larger requirements for humanitarian assistance
to Ukraine and NATO frontline states.
Ukraine can attribute its success in its recent counteroffensive to the
acquisition of more sophisticated military hardware, such as the High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System, and to the integration of real-time intelligence
from Washington and NATO, the latter of which has dramatically improved
targeting, with devastating effects.46 Washington and NATO must maintain
and improve the provision of real-time intelligence, as it is essential to
Ukraine’s future military success on the battlefield.
Finally, the West’s diplomatic and information efforts should be expanded.
Putin’s recent escalation of the war was roundly condemned by the vast
majority of nations at the recent UN General Assembly meeting in New
43. Vivienne Machi, “Inside the Multinational Logistics Cell Coordinating Military Aid for Ukraine,”
Defense News (website), July 21, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/07/21/inside-the
-multinational-logistics-cell-coordinating-military-aid-for-ukraine/.
44. Department of Defense (DoD), “Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” September 28, 2022,
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/28/2003087045/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-SEP-28.PDF.
45. Caitlin M. Kenney, “Army Wants to Double or Triple Some Arms Production as Ukraine War
Continues,” Defense One (website), September 15, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/09
/army-wants-double-or-triple-some-arms-production-ukraine-war-continues/377225/.
46. C. Todd Lopez, “U.S.-Provided HIMARS Effective in Ukraine,” DoD (website), July 15, 2022, https://
www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/; and
Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Ukrainian Officials Drew on U.S. Intelligence to Plan Counteroffensive,”
New York Times (website), September 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/us/politics/ukraine
-military-intelligence.html.
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York.47 Evidence of war crimes should be vigorously pursued and the results
of the investigations widely disseminated. Washington and its allies must seek
to further isolate Moscow diplomatically and convince countries in the Global
South to participate in economic sanctions.
The information tool of so-called soft power is also crucially important.
Every effort should be made to use the Internet and traditional means, such as
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, to inform the people of Russia and Belarus
of the lies Moscow continues to propagate about the conflict, war crimes, sham
referendums, the flight of Russian youths, etc.
Fred C. Iklé observed in his book Every War Must End (Columbia University
Press, 1971) that wars end when one side changes its objectives—by choice or
by force. Putin’s objectives have changed multiple times. He initially sought
to capture Kyiv and topple the Zelensky administration. He then pursued the
capture of Odesa and the occupation of Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline. Putin
has now settled on an attempt to annex the Donbas in southeastern Ukraine
and portions of the coast.48 All his efforts have failed, and his September 21,
2022, speech is a clear admission of failure. His continued description of his
aggression as a “special military operation” is absurd in the aftermath of more
than half a year of war and the deaths of thousands of young Russian soldiers.
Still, Putin believes the overlapping goals of the United States, NATO,
and Ukraine are not necessarily coincident. Kyiv cannot accomplish its goal
of driving Russian forces from its territory—including Crimea—if its Western
allies are willing to accept a negotiated settlement that allows a return to the
status quo ante. Consequently, Putin still believes he can win, so to speak,
and his success will be defined by the shattering of the long-term unity of the
West. He is convinced, at this moment, at least, that his willpower is superior
to Western determination to resist.
Time will tell whether he is correct.

47. “At UN General Assembly, Leaders Condemn Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Al Jazeera (website),
September 21, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/21/at-un-general-assembly-leaders-condemns
-russias-war-in-ukraine.
48. Paul Kirby, “Why Has Russia Invaded Ukraine and What Does Putin Want?,” BBC News (website),
May 9, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589.
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ABSTRACT: To buttress stability in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must
understand how India sees the region and the world. The theories and ideas
of Kautilya, a leading but little-studied Indian philosopher, provide significant
insight into Indian perspectives on strategic partnerships and silent war.
India has lived out Kautilyan perspectives in its recent foreign policy;
therefore, a US understanding of the Indian perspective could advance the national
security interests of both countries, clarify recent Indian security responses
around the world, and provide a basis for the mutually beneficial pursuit of a free
and open Indo-Pacific.
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hina’s rapid and aggressive expansion has led India to increase its security
cooperation efforts with Australia, Japan, and the United States, a grouping
of likeminded states known as the Quad.1 One sign of the Quad’s growing
influence was the first in-person meeting of its four leaders in September 2021;
they met again in May 2022.2 The Quad is a powerful diplomatic tool for addressing
shared concerns in the Indo-Pacific, and the same grouping of states also has a history
of combined military exercises. The United States recognized the importance of
the Quad in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, and the 2021 Interim National

1. Stephen F. Burgess and Janet Beilstein, “Multilateral Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region:
Tentative Steps toward a Regional NATO?,” Contemporary Security Policy 39, no. 2 (2018): 273; Oliver Stuenkel,
“India’s National Interests and Diplomatic Activism: Towards Global Leadership?,” LSE IDEAS, IDEAS Report
(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, May 2012), 36, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43446/1/India
_India%27s%20national%20interests%20and%20diplomatic%20activism%28lsero%29.pdf; and Mark Beeson and
Troy Lee-Brown, “The Future of Asian Regionalism: Not What It Used to Be?,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 4,
no. 2 (2017): 198.
2. “Media Center: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government
of India (website), September 24, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34318/Joint_Statement
_from_Quad_Leaders; “Briefing Room: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” White House (website),
September 24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement
-from-quad-leaders/; “Media Center:Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government
of India (website), May 24, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35357/Quad_Joint_Leaders
_Statement; and “Briefing Room: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” White House (website), May 24, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/.
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Security Strategic Guidance further reinforces the importance of strengthening the
US-Indian relationship.3
Stability in the Indo-Pacific will define American security interests
for the foreseeable future. An understanding of how India’s national
interests and regional perspectives inform its foreign policy points to the
confluence of Indo-American national security interests. This alignment
offers unique opportunities for both countries and sets the stage in favor
of Indo-American interests for decades to come. If the United States
is to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific, it must gain the complete
partnership of India. To do so, US leadership must understand how India
sees itself, the region, and its place in the world. A review of India’s strategic
partnership agreements with Afghanistan, its Maritime Security Strategy,
and the revitalization of the Quad can draw out contemporary examples
of Indian decision making and improve the United States’ understanding
of Indian foreign policy.4
The writings of Kautilya, a leading Indian philosopher, best explain
India’s pursuit of its national security interests. This Indian statesman
and political adviser emerged around 300 BCE and provided a realist
outlook on geopolitics through the Artha-shastra, his foundational work.5
The treatise outlined a classical vision of political wisdom and guided the
creation of the Mauryan Empire. Importantly, Kautilyan theory provides
a culturally and historically informed construct for assessing Indian
behavior. Kautilyan logic continues to influence Indian strategic thought
and is manifest in India’s national security interests and assessment
of regional and international relations.

3. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017
(Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 46, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp–content/uploads/2017/12
/NSS–Final–12–18–2017–0905.pdf; and Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance:
March 2021 (Washington, DC: White House, 2021), 10, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp–content/uploads/2021/03
/NSC–1v2.pdf.
4. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security
Strategy – 2015, October 2015, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/indian-maritime-security-strategy-2015.
5. Kautilya, The Arthashastra, trans. L. N. Rangarajan (Haryana: Penguin Random House India, 1992);
Roger Boesche, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2002), 8; and Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,”
Journal of Military History 67, no. 1 (2003): 16.
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Indian Interests and Perspectives
While India is not often recognized as a great power, there is a compelling
argument that it has arrived, and India certainly sees itself as a foundational
world civilization and a great power.6 In sheer mass, India is a cornerstone
of Asia, with 1.3 billion people, the world’s sixth-largest economy with a
gross domestic product of $2.66 trillion, and the world’s second-largest
army.7 Additionally, India is home to great schools of thought and an
enduring cultural legacy. A key player in South Asia, India possesses clear
extra-regional economic and security interests and the resources and will to
pursue them.8
Evaluating Indian national security interests is not as straightforward
as it is for Western powers. Unlike the United States, the United
Kingdom, or France, India has not published a national security strategy.
India’s regional approach and foreign policy, however, reflect its decision
to act like a great power in pursuing national security interests and reveal
the nature of these interests.9 The country’s economic expansion and
military aid to Afghanistan, paired with a convergence of strategic interests
with the United States, point to interests and influence that extend
beyond the region. 10 India is recognized within the international system
as a force to be considered.11
Through Indian Eyes: National Security Interests
Although India has long presented itself as a nonaligned state,
its emergence as a great power has driven it toward a more active role in the
international system. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s shift in Indian foreign
policy reveals three core national interests. The first is a desire to sustain the
international system, which helped give rise to Indian power and influence
and allows India to address internal economic and societal development

6. Trump, National Security Strategy, 46; and Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Is India a Great Power? Understanding
Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations,” Asian Security 11, no. 1 (2015): 1, 23.
7. “GDP–India,” World Bank: Data (website), n.d., accessed October 22, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org
/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN; “India: Military and Security,” Central Intelligence Agency
World Factbook (website), updated September 1, 2022, accessed January 7, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the
–world–factbook/countries/india/#military–and–security.
8. Pardesi, “Is India a Great Power?,” 1, 23.
9. Rory Medcalf, “Imagining an Indian National Security Strategy: The Sum of Its Parts,” Australian Journal
of International Affairs 71, no. 5 (2017): 517.
10. Vinay Kaura, “Grading India’s Neighborhood Diplomacy,” Diplomat (website), January 1, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/grading–indias–neighborhood–diplomacy/.
11. Pardesi, “Is India a Great Power?” 1, 23; and Trump, National Security Strategy, 46.
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through cultivating foreign investment, implementing infrastructure projects,
and securing the energy resources necessary for growth.12
A second national interest is to deter Pakistan without escalating
armed conflict between these two nuclear states beyond the conventional
threshold.13 This objective requires India to manage its relationships
with Pakistan and China, two actors whose fates are increasingly linked.
A decline in US-Pakistani relations, coupled with China’s One Belt One
Road and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiatives, have deepened
Sino-Pakistani relations.
A third national interest is maintaining Indian hegemony in its traditional
sphere of influence. Chinese encroachment into the Indian Ocean region
is a complex issue marred by a history of mutual mistrust.14 China’s outreach
to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar improves Chinese access to ports
in the Indian Ocean and positions it to compete in India’s traditional
sphere of influence. India perceives China’s attempts to expand its foothold
in Southeast Asia as slow encirclement by an adversary and therefore
approaches the situation as a zero-sum game of influence and access,
which will either be won by China or by India.15
The Indian Neighborhood: Kautilya’s Mandala Assessment
India seeks to maintain hegemony in its traditional sphere of influence.
Kautilya described this area as emanating from the Indian subcontinent
west to Persia, north to Bactria (modern-day Afghanistan), and east
to Bengal. 16 Today this region is roughly composed of the eight member states
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 17
India dominates this area, possessing over 80 percent of the association’s
landmass, population, and gross domestic product.18
Assessing India’s regional neighborhood through the lens of Kautilya’s
Mandala theory can help the United States understand Indian actions
and intentions. Kautilya’s tool for assessing geopolitics assumed bordering
12. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 520.
13. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 520.
14. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 520.
15. Kaura, “Grading India’s Neighborhood”; and Stephen Burgess, “The U.S. Pivot to Asia and Renewal
of the U.S.–India Strategic Partnership,” Comparative Strategy 34, no. 4 (2015): 369.
16. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 28, 507.
17. Breffni O’Rourke, “South Asia: Afghanistan Joins World’s Largest Regional Grouping,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (website), April 3, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1075660.html.
18. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, “India’s Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood,” Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal 9, no. 2 (2014): 144.
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kingdoms were inherently hostile and those nations immediately beyond,
or opposite a neighboring state, were potential allies.19 Although Kautilya
used this model to describe smaller, warring kingdoms and not modern
nation-states, the model offers insight into the current Indian perspective.20
Applying the Mandala theory clarifies Indian relationships in South
Asia through a country’s position relative to India. The model places
Pakistan and India at odds as bordering states and makes Afghanistan
a potential Indian ally. As other states within India’s traditional sphere of
influence, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka are seen as potential
adversaries that may also be threatened by a shared enemy and bordering
state—China.21 At the strategic level, the Mandala theory adds China as a
potential adversary and Iran as a potential ally. 22 China has reaffirmed its
patron-client relationship with Pakistan and advanced port projects
across the Indian Ocean region with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,
and Djibouti. Thus, Mandala theory reflects the current state of relations
within the traditional Indian sphere of influence and at the strategic level.

Attributes of Indian Statecraft
Viewed through the Mandala theory, two attributes of India’s statecraft
emerge as vectors for understanding its approach to national security—
strategic partnership and silent war. Strategic partnership agreements
(SPAs) are policy positions consistent with Kautilyan thought regarding
a preference for alignment over alliances.23 Kautilya’s concept of silent
war encourages nations to weaken and harass adversaries through means
below the threshold of overt hostilities. 24 India uses strategic partnerships
to exert influence through foreign policy with friendly states and uses silent
war, which emphasizes competition over conflict, to pursue its interests
vis-à-vis Pakistan and China.
Strategic Partnerships: Kautilyan Alignment
Strategic partnership agreements began as a Soviet approach to bilateral
relations during the Cold War. The Soviets pursued bilateral agreements
to establish patron-client relationships, avoid the constraints of multistate
19. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 506–7; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 18.
20. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 507; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 18.
21. Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 16;
and Kautilya, Arthashastra, 521–22.
22. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 16.
23. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 103, 511, 544, 566, 571, 576; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 17, 21.
24. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 513, 533; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 22, 23.
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alliances, and operate outside the construct of the international system. 25
India’s preference for these behaviors is evident in its historical policy
of nonalignment and is supported by Kautilyan thought on joint
undertakings, which describes the importance of cooperation with other states
for access to resources, trade routes, and military basing.26 India sees
strategic partnerships from a Kautilyan perspective: it avoids entangling
alliances while providing a means to pursue its national interests through
“access to markets, finance, technology, arms, intelligence, and other
commodities that it does not possess.”27 India has increased the use of SPAs,
signing at least 28 agreements since 1998 with countries as varied as the
United States, China, and Afghanistan.28 Raju G. C. Thomas identifies these
maneuvers as alignment strategies and argues they have served India as well
as or better than alliances that could compel India to act militarily.29
India’s agreements with Afghanistan demonstrate New Delhi’s preference
for alignment over alliance in its statecraft. India signed the original
Treaty of Friendship with Afghanistan in 1950, one year after the conclusion
of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 and three years after partition.
The agreement accorded each state the right to establish embassies and
conduct diplomatic activities, manage trade, emphasize cultural exchanges,
and assist each other in industrial and agricultural development. 30
The agreement displayed India’s Kautilyan grasp of influence and focused
on applying diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power.
Notably, the agreement lacked any mention of military cooperation: it was
a policy of alignment, not an alliance. The 1950 Treaty of Friendship was
interrupted by Afghanistan’s 1978 Saur Revolution and subsequent civil
war. In Kautilyan fashion, when the nonbinding agreement no longer suited
India’s interests, New Delhi abandoned it.
Over 60 years later, the two nations signed the Strategic Partnership
between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
in October 2011. 31 This agreement referenced the democratic nature
of the two states, a desire to see the entire region prosper, and a shared
adherence to international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter.
25. Ian Hall, “Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi,” Round Table 105, no. 3
(2016): 277.
26. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 582–85.
27. Hall, “Multialignment,” 282.
28. Hall, “Multialignment,” 277–78.
29. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 16–17.
30. “Media Center: Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government
of Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India (website), January 4, 1950,
https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6584/Treaty+of+Friendship.
31. “Media Center: Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership Between the Republic of India and the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India (website), October 4, 2011,
https://mea.gov.in/bilateral–documents.htm?dtl/5383/.
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Diplomatically, it required Afghanistan to support India’s pursuit of a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The SPA also outlined a
robust agenda of social, cultural, academic, and intellectual exchanges to
bolster historical and cultural links between the two states.32 Trade and
economic cooperation focused on regional interaction with other countries,
envisioning Afghanistan “as a trade, transportation and energy hub
connecting Central and South Asia.” 33 Additionally, it allowed India
to “assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity
building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces.”34 In a foreign
policy shift, this SPA changed India’s long-held stance of noninvolvement
in the Afghan conflict.
The Indo-Afghan SPA embraced all three of India’s national security
interests: sustaining the international system, deterring Pakistan,
and containing Chinese expansion. The SPA expanded India’s regional
influence by connecting it to a democratizing Afghanistan and secured one
more vote in India’s pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), a position India believes commensurate with its role in the
international system. Furthermore, it indicated India’s policy of alignment
is not limited to benign approaches, as demonstrated by the introduction
of lethal aid. India’s outreach to Afghanistan, coupled with its Chabahar Port
initiative in Iran, showed a determination to open Central Asian markets
to India’s economy and ensure its energy security, directly supporting India’s
national security objectives of deterring Pakistan and countering Chinese
expansionism by maintaining its regional hegemony. It also demonstrates
India’s conceptual alignment with Afghanistan and its posturing to thwart
its nuclear armed neighbors, Pakistan and China, by seeking first-mover
economic and security advantages.
Kautilyan Silent War
Kautilya was a classical realist, given his assertion that states must seek
or suffer conquest. 35 India sees itself in realist terms relative to Pakistan and
China while acknowledging the modern constraints placed on nation-state
behavior. Following the founding of the United Nations, state sovereignty
became closely guarded and wars of aggression became unlawful. 36
India’s ability to counter Pakistan and China is complicated by the
32. Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement.”
33. Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement.”
34. Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement.”
35. Boesche, First Great Political Realist, 78.
36. United Nations Charter, United Nations (website), n.d., accessed January 5, 2022, https://www.un.org/en
/about-us/un-charter; and 3314 (XXIX). Definition of Aggression, Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the
Sixth Committee, United Nations (1974), 143, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/3314(XXIX).
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stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, which drive states to avoid conflict.
Although Kautilya did not have to consider the constraints of an international
system and nuclear weapons, the Artha-shastra provides applicable
guidance. Kautilya believed kings would face two types of rivals: weak ones
to be exterminated (conquered) and strong ones requiring a long-term
approach of steady harassment and weakening.37 Facing nuclear-armed
and belligerent neighbors, which India views as strong states, Kautilyan
thought steers India away from direct confrontation and toward a strategy
of harassment and weakening through the application of soft and nonmilitary
instruments of power.
Pakistan remains a nuclear-armed garrison state which oscillates in
and out of pseudo-democratic status and runs the gamut of state behavior
from supporting terrorism to nuclear brinksmanship. 38 Kautilyan success
in a modern context is the avoidance of large-scale conventional conflict
with Pakistan and the denial of Afghanistan as strategic depth to the
Pakistani military. India’s persistent diplomatic, economic, and cultural
support for the government of Afghanistan demonstrated a foreign policy
informed by Kautilyan logic, specifically the support of “the [vulnerable]
enemy-in-the-rear of a strong king.”39 India saw opportunity in Afghanistan
and became the fifth-largest direct donor of economic support, pledging
over $3 billion. 40 India also gradually increased support for the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces.
The impact of Afghanistan’s deepening relationship with India on the
Pakistani psyche should not be underestimated, nor should India’s aggressive
response to Pakistani-sponsored terrorist attacks on Indian military targets
launched into Pakistan.41 Afghanistan’s refusal to accept Pakistani military
aid provided India an opportunity to support a Mandalan ally while
harassing a Mandalan foe. Within months of signing the SPA, India outlined
a program to train over 25,000 Afghan officers and soldiers. 42 By 2014,
37. Kautilya, Arthashastra, xiv, 514–15, 520, 530; and Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” 20–21.
38. Thomas Bruneau et al., “Civil-Military Relations in Muslim Countries. The Cases of Egypt, Pakistan,
and Turkey,” Journal of Defense Resources Management 4, no. 2 (2013): 5–36, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream
/handle/10945/37500/01_bruneau_mayfield_mccaskey_weece_matei.pdf.
39. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 523.
40. Alyssa Ayres, “How India Can Help in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound
(blog), April 14, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/how–india–can–help–afghanistan; and “Media Center:
Q.NO.282. Indian Aid to Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India, February 25, 2015,
http://www.mea.gov.in/lok–sabha.htm?dtl/24811/qno282+indian+aid+to+afghanistan; and “Media Center:
Q.NO.506. Indian Investments in Afghanistan,” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India,
February 4, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/34803/question+no506+indian+investments+in
+afghanistan.
41. “Special Report: Hissing Cousins – Why India and Pakistan Hate Each Other,” Economist (website),
July 22, 2017, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/07/24/why-india-and-pakistan-hate-each-other.
42. Nitin Gokhale, “India Boosts Afghan Military Role,” Diplomat (website), December 7, 2017,
http://thediplomat.com/2011/12/india–boosts–afghan–military–role/.
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the program evolved beyond commissioning and initial-entry programs to
the training of Afghan commandos.43 Indian support expanded to nonlethal
aid with the delivery of three light utility helicopters in 2015. 44 A significant
shift in Indian policy came in 2016 with the delivery of four Mi-35 attack
helicopters to the Afghan Air Force, India’s first foray into lethal aid.45
India’s delivery of lethal aid, widely considered by Afghans a positive
development was quietly acknowledged by the US-led Resolute Support
Mission in Kabul. Both actions carry the hallmarks of Kautilya’s concept
of silent war, competing with adversaries indirectly through actions that
harass and weaken their position militarily.46
From an Indian perspective, a stable and Indian-friendly Afghanistan
would have required Pakistan to rethink its concept of strategic depth and
its continued indifference to, if not overt support for, violent-extremist
organizations within its borders. Despite the Taliban’s return to power
following the US withdrawal, the Afghan-Pakistani relationship remains
uncertain. Without an American-led military structure in Afghanistan
for violent-extremist organizations to oppose, Pakistan may be forced either
to address its policy of supporting these proxies or to allow itself to be
threatened by them. Either outcome suits India’s interests.
Opportunity in the Indo-Pacific
While Afghanistan provided India an opportunity to harass and
weaken Pakistan, China presents a larger and more capable problem.
Relative to China, India is at a military and economic disadvantage—
the “weak king,” in Kautilyan parlance—which limits its means to manage
Chinese encroachment. 47 Historically, India has firmly maintained its status
as a nonaligned state, partly to avoid provoking China militarily. This concept
is central to India’s foreign policy as New Delhi seeks to delay conflict
with China and build capability, congruent with Kautilyan thought
on a state’s fluctuating power over time. 48 India’s efforts to harass and weaken
Pakistan were land centric. Future strategic competition with China will take
43. Sanjeev Miglani, “India Begins Training Afghan Commandos as Ties Deepen Ahead of 2014,”
Reuters (website), December 20, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/india–afghanistan/india–begins
–training–afghan–commandos–as–ties–deepen–ahead–of–2014–idINDEE9BJ05E20131220.
44. “Media Statement by Prime Minister during the Visit of President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
to India (April 28, 2015),” Ministry of External Affairs/Government of India (website), April 28, 2015,
http://mea.gov.in/Speeches–Statements.htm?dtl/25136.
45. Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Delivers 4th Combat Helicopter to Afghanistan,” Diplomat (website),
December 1, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/india-delivers-4th-combat-helicopter-to-afghanistan/.
46. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 505, 513, 533, 630.
47. Burgess, “U.S. Pivot to Asia,” 369–70; and Kautilya, Arthashastra, 622–23.
48. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 507–9; and Burgess, “U.S. Pivot to Asia,” 372.
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place where India’s economic, energy, and national security must be ensured
and where the geography and international law enable competition: at sea.49
As India’s power grows, its idealistic approach of nonalignment has
yielded to expanding national security interests. Since independence,
India has modified its foreign policy, moving through periods of nonalignment,
strategic autonomy, “multi-alignment,” and now into an approach known as
“neo-Curzonian” foreign policy. 50 This new Indian policy represents increased
cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the United States. 51 India’s clear-eyed
emphasis on revitalizing its economy while deepening its regional security
ties reflects this new reality.52 Current US policy for the Indo-Pacific aligns
with Indian interests, a point made clear in Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s
December 2021 speech on a free and open Indo-Pacific and reinforced
in his May 2022 speech on the United States’ approach to the
People’s Republic of China. 53 The convergence of American and Indian
national security interests in containing Chinese encroachment and
complementary long-term regional policies creates the opportunity to secure
Indian partnership.

The Quad: Kautilyan Alignment and Silent War
Persuading India into a full security partnership with the United States
will not be easy, and may not be necessary. India’s use of bilateral SPAs
is consistent with Kautilyan foreign policy concepts and congruent with the
alignment of like-minded states. Therefore, it is unsurprising the Quad rests
at the center of India’s foreign policy under Modi.
Born in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Quad rose
and foundered as it drifted toward a security-focused organization. 54
Revitalized in 2017, the Quad focused on a clear nonsecurity mandate:
diplomatic, information, and economic alignment. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,
India’s minister for external affairs, hailed the Quad’s revitalization
as a major diplomatic accomplishment of Modi’s administration, adding,
49. Navy, Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 5.
50. Hall, “Multialignment,” 271, 273, 275, 282; and C. Raja Mohan, “The Return of the Raj,” American Interest
Online 5, no. 5 (2010), https://www.the-american–interest.com/2010/05/01/the–return–of–the–raj/.
51. Medcalf, “Indian National Security Strategy,” 517–18.
52. C. Raja Mohan and Parag Khanna, “Getting India Right: Mutual Interests and Democratic Affinity,”
Hoover Institution (website), February 1, 2006, https://www.hoover.org/research/getting–india–right.
53. Trump, National Security Strategy, 46; Antony J. Blinken, “Speech: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”
US Department of State (website), December 14, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a–free–and–open–indo
–pacific/; and Antony J. Blinken, “Speech: The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,”
US Department of State (website), May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to
-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
54. Associated Press, “What’s the 4-Nation Quad, and Where Did It Come From?” Economic Times (website),
May 24, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/whats-the-4-nation-quad-and-where-did
-it-come-from/articleshow/91772674.cms.
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“it is also a statement of [India’s] growing interests beyond the Indian
Ocean.”55 Jaishankar describes India as “overcoming the hesitations
of history” and the Quad as developing relationships that align with India’s
national interests and vision “of shaping the region and the world.”56
The Quad leaders did not meet in person until September 2021.
When they reconvened in May 2022, they delivered a true development:
the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.57
This partnership enables Quad members to share information and deliver
real-time maritime data to existing information-sharing centers in India,
Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. 58 Maritime Domain
Awareness, is a dual-use capability that allows nations to access shared data
to combat illegal fishing, piracy, and dark shipping. Additionally, it allows
the Quad to monitor the hallmarks of Chinese encroachment—incursions
into economic exclusion zones and the persistent violation of maritime
boundaries. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness
deftly addressed economic and sovereignty issues without naming China as
an adversary or labeling the Quad as a security organization.
The Quad and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain
Awareness demonstrate the Kautilyan influence of alignment and silent
warfare on Indian foreign policy. The Indian Maritime Security Strategy
identifies Maritime Domain Awareness as a task that supports responding to
nontraditional threats at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, upholding the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, deterring adversaries, and
managing conflict. 59 India’s strategy points directly to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, leveraging the international system and
courts that would subsequently rule in favor of the Philippines and against
Chinese claims in the South China Sea.60 India draws strength and authority
from the international system. India’s Maritime Security Strategy and
the contemporary foreign policy focus on the Quad demonstrate support

55. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, “Opinion: Quad Validates PM’s India-First Approach, Writes S Jaishankar”
Hindustan Times (website), May 25, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/quad-validates-pm-s-india
-first-approach-101653498815738.html.
56. Jaishankar, “PM’s India-First Approach.”
57. “Media Center: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders”; “Briefing Room: Joint Statement from Quad Leaders”;
“Media Center: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement”; and “Briefing Room: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement.”
58. “Media Center: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement”; “Briefing Room: Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement”;
and “Briefing Room FACT SHEET: Quad Leaders’ Tokyo Summit 2022,” May 23, 2022, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/.
59. Navy, Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 6–7, 50, 64.
60. In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, Permanent Court of Arbitration, case no.
2013-19 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Hague 2016), https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712
-Award.pdf.
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for Indian national interests of sustaining the international system and
maintaining regional hegemony.

Mandalan Motives
Approaching India requires deft regional realism and careful international
diplomacy. India’s desire for strategic autonomy, paired with its assessment
of the region and national security objectives, has resulted in some
alignments that give the United States pause. Specifically, US leadership
questions India’s economic alignment with Iran, its dependency on Russia
for defense-related articles, its participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa), and its problematic voting record in the UN.
The US-Iranian relationship impacts India’s ability to advance its national
security objectives, specifically the maintenance of the regional hegemony and
management of Chinese encroachment. The withdrawal of the United States
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action resulted in the collapse
of Indian oil imports—Iran’s second largest market—and a boon for China,
which became the near-exclusive export destination for Iranian oil. 61
The collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action also highlighted
the Chinese-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed
in 2016, which called for Chinese-Iranian cooperation on issues ranging
from defense and security to energy, ports, and other infrastructure projects. 62
These outcomes did not advance American interests and jeopardized Indian
economic and national security interests while bolstering Chinese influence
and access in Iran.
Indian dependence on Russian defense articles is another point
of potential contention. From 2018 to 2021, India was the world’s
largest importer of defense items, and from 2012 to 2016, over 68 percent
of India’s defense imports came from Russia.63 The 2022 Russian invasion
of Ukraine has highlighted India’s dependency, which runs counter to India’s
pursuit of strategic autonomy. Similarly, India would see dependence on the
61. Nidhi Verma and Julia Payne, “Indian, European Refiners Get Ready to Buy Iranian Oil,” Reuters
(website), May 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-refiners-set-curb-spot-buying-make
-room-iranian-oil-2021-05-19/.
62. Hassan Rouhani, “Full Text of Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between I.R.
Iran, P.R. China,” January 23, 2016, https://www.president.ir/EN/91435; and Reuters Staff, “Iran and China
Sign 25-Year Cooperation Agreement,” Reuters (website), March 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-iran-china/iran-and-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement-idUSKBN2BJ0AD.
63. “TIV of Arms Imports to the Top 50 Largest Importers, 2018-2021,” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) (website), accessed July 10, 2022, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist
.php; and Kate Blanchfield, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezman, “The State of Major Arms Transfers
in 8 Graphics,” SIPRI WritePeace (blog), February 22, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017
/state-major-arms-transfers-8-graphics.
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United States, whose weapons sales come with many more restrictions and
caveats, as equally disadvantageous.
India’s membership in BRICS, a grouping of five major emerging
economies, indicates some economic alignment with China and Russia.
More importantly, from an Indian perspective, membership bolsters India’s
international status, provides economic access to the global south, and
balances its increasing connectedness to the West—all three of which serve
to advance India’s desire for strategic autonomy.64 In the United Nations,
India abstained on 2022 votes condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine
and its removal from the Human Rights Commission.65 These abstentions
must be considered in the context of India’s desire to obtain a permanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council, a foreign policy objective only
achievable through a reformation of the UNSC, with China and Russia’s
consent. By not voting with the West on Ukraine, India avoided antagonizing
China and protected access to logistical support for its inventory of Russian
military equipment.

Conclusion
Kautilyan logic drives India to avoid alliances and seek alignment
with countries that can advance its interests. Through an understanding
of India’s perspective and Kautilya’s influence on Indian foreign policy
and strategy, the United States can take several actions to gain Indian
partnership and address US national security interests of managing
a rising China.
The United States must take a more deliberate approach to its diplomatic
relationship with India than with other Asian actors. A permanent seat
on the UNSC is high on India’s priority list, and the United States has
supported this objective. Revisiting this issue formally in the UN would
bolster India’s stature on the global stage. Importantly, it would send
a clear message to China and Pakistan regarding democratic values in the
furtherance of the international system. Additionally, it would provide
India equal footing with China on the UNSC, a position that could bolster
US efforts to steer China toward peaceful growth. Sustaining the rules-based

64. Michael Kugelman, “India Plays BRICS to Its Interests,” Foreign Policy (website), June 23, 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/23/brics-summit-india-russia-china-quad/.
65. “UN News: Russia Blocks Security Council Action on Ukraine,” United Nations (website),
February 26, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802; and “UN News: UN General Assembly
Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” United Nations (website), April 7, 2022,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.
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international system is a clear area of Kautilyan alignment for India and the
United States and would further balance the influence of China and Russia.
The United States must resist the urge to militarize the Quad lest it lose
the Indo-Pacific’s most powerful diplomatic tool of the twenty-first century.
The Quad states’ diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments
of national power are aligned. Every deliverable the Quad produces
advances the sustainment of the international system and pushes back
on Chinese encroachment—two of India’s identified vital national interests
in complete alignment with those of the United States. The United States
must recognize that while India did not vote in support of the US position
in the United Nations, India’s abstentions were made to manage the timing
and conditions for what the Indians believe is the coming Sino-Indian
conflict. Finally, the United States should continue to encourage Indian
defense relationships with like-minded states and support Indian decisions
to move away from Russian equipment, even if these actions do not result
in American sales.
Policies of nonalignment and strategic independence saw India
through multiple conflicts with Pakistan and China, but today these
adversaries are effectively aligned nuclear powers, and their management
requires a different approach. 66 The operationalization of India’s foreign
policy through the Quad demonstrates India’s recognition of the
changing environment.67
The United States must break its reactive approach to South Asian
policy and proactively pursue opportunities in the region.68 Securing India’s
partnership is a logical next step for the United States in pursuing a free
and open Indo-Pacific. A strong and US-aligned India will bolster the
rules-based international order, encourage Pakistani compliance
with international norms, and steer China toward a path of peaceful
prosperity by changing the calculus of confrontation.

66. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 21.
67. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Next Steps in the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership: Defense Cooperation Must Be
Taken to a Higher Trajectory,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), October 8, 2015, https://
www.csis.org/analysis/next-steps-us-india-strategic-partnership-defense-cooperation-must-be-taken-higher.
68. Burgess and Beilstein, “Multilateral Defense Cooperation,” 4.
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ABSTRACT: Security force assistance brigades can enable multi-domain
convergence in competition in the US Indo-Pacific Command. Rather than
focusing on conventional Joint force capabilities, this article analyzes recent
US Army operational experience in security force assistance and security
cooperation in US Indo-Pacific Command and identifies capability gaps and
opportunities for competition. Finally, military leadership and policymakers
will f ind recommendations on how US Army security force assistance
and security cooperation can shape environments and deter conflict in the
US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.
K e y w o r d s : S FA B , m u l t i - d o m a i n , c o m p e t i t i o n , d e t e r r e n c e ,
USINDOPACOM

T

he US Indo-Pacific website states, “USINDOPACOM
is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region
by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful
development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when
necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence,
and military readiness.” 1 In 2021, in the Interim United States National
Security Strategic Guidance, President Joe Biden elevated the People’s
Republic of China as the primary military threat to the United States.2
Consequently, the US military renewed its emphasis on competition
within
the
US
Indo-Pacific
Command
(USINDOPACOM)
area of responsibility (AOR). As US strategic focus moves away
from US Central Command following the conclusion of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, the US Army must reassess its roles and look beyond its
combat capabilities to aid in the success of the Joint force mission, specifically
the operating environment of Indo-Pacific Command, to retain its relevance
in the shifting strategic environment.
Security force assistance brigades (SFABs) can play a crucial role due
to doctrinal, organizational, and extensive specialized training capabilities
1. “About United States Indo-Pacific Command,” PACOM, n.d., accessed October 23, 2022,
https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/.
2. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021 (Washington, DC:
White House, 2021): 8.

44

Parameters 52(4) Winter 2022–23

in partner integration. Since the Indo-Pacific’s strategic and operational
environments lie primarily in the air and maritime domains, security force
assistance brigades could play a vital role in enabling convergence and
synchronizing cross-domain effects by cognition and effort beyond physical
mass within multi-domain competition. Integrating brigades with partnered
foreign security forces will allow the US Army to leverage partner
multi-domain capabilities in complementary ways to US Joint and interagency
capabilities and achieve a relative advantage in regional competition.
This article considers roles security force assistance brigades can fill
to enable combined multi-domain convergence in competition below
the threshold of armed conflict. It examines current military problems in
the Indo-Pacific, discusses how the brigades can address these problems,
and provides recommendations for how to enable multi-domain competition.

The Indo-Pacific Problem
The central military problem in the Indo-Pacific Command is determining
how the Joint force can maintain freedom of action and impose its will
against peer adversaries in all domains to deter conflict while reestablishing
a position of strategic advantage. The most effective and efficient way
to do so is by retaining existing positions of advantage. While the air and
maritime domains remain the main areas of focus in the Indo-Pacific,
naval theorist Julian S. Corbett’s emphasis on the interdependence of the
land and maritime domains suggests that retaining a Landpower advantage
remains vital.3
The second military problem to avoid is losing the first battle of the next
conflict.4 If North Korea attacked either Japan or South Korea, the Joint
force would need to secure a swift initial victory to maintain its Landpower
advantage. Chief of Staff of the Army General James C. McConville defines
Landpower advantage as sustaining the fight, expanding the battlespace,
striking in-depth across domains, gaining and maintaining decision
dominance, creating overmatch, and prevailing in large-scale ground conflict.5
Given the Army’s considerable executive agent responsibilities in sustaining

3. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).
First published in 1918 by Longmans, Green.
4. Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win
in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2021), 5.
5. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 6.
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the Joint force, integrating partner sustainment capabilities toward the goal
of convergence is beneficial and critical to success.
In Asia-Pacif ic: A Strategic Assessment, David Lai warns of the danger of
overplaying the “U.S. card” in pursuing an over-militarized strategy to influence
territorial interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and Lai underscores the peril
of provoking China into reckless actions that risk moving from competition
into open conflict.6 To mitigate this risk and achieve bilateral solutions,
Lai recommends a strategic approach that reinforces the diplomatic and
economic elements of national power coupled with a smaller military
footprint.7 Large, conventional forward-postured US forces could have
a provocative rather than coercive or deterrent strategic effect. Embedded
adviser forces partnered with East Asian security forces can enable similar
combined multi-domain convergence and keep efforts in the competition
sphere instead of conflict.
A RAND Corporation study on security force assistance brigades
in Afghanistan conducted by Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg illustrates
potential capability gaps in the Indo-Pacific and highlights issues that could
result from employing conventional Joint forces trained and organized
for “highly-kinetic” operations in advise and assist roles.8 The employment
of large, conventional forces in adviser roles violates economy of force
by compelling a unit to execute a mission for which it is not equipped,
organized, or trained while underutilizing its capabilities. Instead, Payne
and Osburg recommend using specifically trained conventional advisers
to assist forces in enabling partner contribution. They note US operations
in Afghanistan caused a marked increase in “morale and enthusiasm”
among partnered forces operating with dedicated adviser forces rather than
conventional advisers.9
Payne and Osburg also underscore the importance of influencing two
to three countries at once by employing dispersed military organizations more
efficiently than conventional Joint forces.10 The ability to influence multiple
actors across a large, noncontiguous area of responsibility like the Indo-Pacific
is necessary for maximizing Army support to the air and maritime domains.
Also, Payne and Osburg suggest that, while it is sensible to align adviser
forces regionally for continuity of partner relationships, conventional Joint
6. David Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013), iv,
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/527/.
7. Lai, Asia-Pacific, v.
8. Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg, Leveraging Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan
for Global Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 12.
9. Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 12.
10. Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 14.
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forces are ill-suited for perpetual regional alignment due to global demand
for their aid and their limited multi-domain capabilities.11

Applicability to the Indo-Pacific Problem
The idea of the US Army reexamining roles in anticipation of a strategic
and operational shift from counterinsurgency operations originating
in US Central Command to competing with the People’s Republic of China,
Russia, and other global powers in the Indo-Pacific region is not a recent
development. As early as 2006, the US Army strategic planning guidance
outlined the need to prepare for a post-global war on terrorism strategic
and operational environment shift: “We must immediately begin the process
of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions,
organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve
our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready
force—a campaign quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.”12
To maintain the Army’s competitive advantage in the Indo-Pacific, leadership
must recognize the importance of enduring partner integration.13 Security
force assistance brigades represent a tailored, specifically trained unit large
enough to manifest the full range of partner capability. At the same time, they
are small enough to avoid strategically provocative connotations associated
with larger forward-postured conventional forces, making the brigades ideal
for the Army’s shift to the Indo-Pacific and supporting partners to compete
below the threshold of armed conflict.
Given that “joint interdependence is potentially the Joint Team’s greatest
asset,” the Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023 suggests the best
opportunity to support the Joint force in the Indo-Pacific lies in “reassuring
friends, allies, and coalition partners” to dissuade and deter adversaries.14
In preserving a rules-based international order favorable to the United States
and its allies, the Army possesses the unique ability to build cohesive and
enduring teams among allies and partners. Integrating partner capabilities
to “sense, understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary in any situation”
requires Army adviser forces to enable the execution of “simultaneous and
sequential operations distributed throughout a non-linear battlespace
and conducted in close coordination with interagency and multinational
partners,” synchronizing effects across all domains.15 Executing such
a mission requires an understanding of the multi-domain operational concept
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 34.
HQDA, The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2006), 4.
HQDA, Military Competition, fig. E2, viii.
HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 4.
HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 5.
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and an ability to apply this understanding to complex, complicated, and
“wicked” problem sets without final solutions.16
Maintaining “favorable regional alliances” in the USINDOPACOM
area of operations hinges upon two critical regions: Northeast Asia and the
East Asian littoral.17 The fact that US strategic ends do not always directly
align with our partners’ and allies’ goals often complicates efforts to compete
with and deter adversaries. Deterrence can be achieved through synchronizing
partnered efforts in competition by shaping environments with Army special
operations forces (SOFs) and security force assistance brigades.18 Since
2013, conventional forces have played a significant role in competition
with non-allied great powers via brigade combat teams regionally aligned
force deterrent rotations to the Republic of Korea. Integrating special
operations forces and security force assistance brigades into the permanent
United Nations and Republic of Korea/US Coalition command-and-control
structures in doctrinal liaison roles would provide significant opportunities
to achieve unity of effort across all domains and establish the potential of the
United States’ East Asian littoral partners. It would also allow the embedded
brigades to shape the information space through interoperability and strategic
and operational messaging.19 Given most allies and partners in the East Asian
littorals possess a relative local advantage in the land domain, the brigades
could be the link in amplifying local advantage into a theater advantage.
While direct competition is distinct from conflict, it still risks using armed
force—mainly through proxies to gain or maintain advantage. Adversaries
in the Indo-Pacific, (such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea),
already use proxies, shell corporations, and Islamic extremist organizations
in the Philippines. Since Army special operations forces and security
force assistance brigades are task-organized to win through partners, not
by closing with the enemy personally and directly, this focus makes them
appropriate and necessary to assist regional partners in neutralizing direct
adversary competition.
Indirect competition occurs when national interests are not directly
involved but actors pursue different aims within a similar environment.20
Maintaining relative advantage in indirect competition may involve averting
escalation to direct competition or conflict more than the pursuit or denial
16. Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” in Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared
Understanding of Wicked Problems (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2006).
17. HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 14.
18. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004).
19. Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age
(New York: Frank Cass, 2005).
20. HQDA, Military Competition, vi.
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of an objective. Employing brigades in emerging sub-theaters (like Vietnam,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia) could preempt Russian and Chinese attempts
to reassert influence over Southeast Asia. Brigades could leverage historical
animosity toward China and build enduring relationships with regional
security forces. By fostering and integrating partner capabilities across all
domains with US Joint capabilities, brigades have the potential to “preserve
and expand friendly (US, allies, and partners) advantages while limiting
or eroding adversary options, imposing costs, and increasing adversary doubts.
They can establish deterrence and set the conditions for military success
when deterrence fails.”21
To succeed in multi-domain competition in the Indo-Pacific, allies and
partners must be kept free from adversary coercion.22 The Indo-Pacific
Command should ensure the means employed are neither coercive
nor escalatory.23 To that end, the brigades can signal a willingness
for interoperability with Pacific allies and partners without the potentially
provocative act of increasing conventional ground-maneuver forces, naval
forces, and theater missile defense forces. Even if the Indo-Pacific Command
decided against that course of action, the brigades’ mere presence counters
adversary narratives that the United States is withdrawing from its role
as a global leader and creating a strategic power vacuum. Additionally, they
can, and should, be used to support foreign information warfare capabilities
to confront Russian and Chinese malign-information operations in the region.
Populous nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam maintain strong land component security forces, creating
an opportunity to embed US adviser forces and achieve greater synergy
in the land, cyber, information, and space domains. Although allied and
partner capabilities in the space and cyber domains lack the sophistication
of US capabilities, there are opportunities for the United States to foster
partnered integration in the space and cyber domains for competitive advantage
in ways that benefit partners without compromising US morals and ethics.
Nations like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are strategically located
within the layers of China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) network.
Furthermore, these nations have legal, political, strategic, and operational
caveats different from those of the United States, enabling the US military
to leverage these differences to advance US strategic interests where the
interests of our allies and partners do not align with the People’s Republic of
China. By partnering with the US military, nations in the Indo-Pacific would
21. HQDA, Military Competition, 2.
22. HQDA, Military Competition, ii.
23. Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American
Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 151,123.
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have opportunities for defense and security alliances; access to US resources,
military technology, and materiel; and the possibility of greater financial,
information, and economic cooperation.
Integration in these domains could create a relative advantage in preventing
the first potential battle of the next war (if it were to happen in the cyber
domain). While competition in the Indo-Pacific aims to avoid escalating
crisis into conflict, limiting a conflict’s scale and returning to competition
as rapidly as possible represents USINDOPACOM’s second concern.
To facilitate a return to competition from conflict, McConville asserts the
Army must maintain contact in all domains, hold adversary interests at risk,
impose costs on malign actions, enhance assurance, persist inside threat
systems (such as anti-access and area denial), and facilitate the transition
to competition.24 The embedded adviser forces of the security force assistance
brigades could serve as the connectors for maintaining contact across domains
while holding adversary interests at risk and imposing costs on malign actions
through partner interoperability.
The presence of adviser forces enhances the strategic position of East
Asian partners and enables continuous operations within adversary A2AD
zones. By bridging the range of operations throughout escalation to conflict,
embedded security force assistance brigades could present a unique
opportunity to facilitate the transition back to competition, as the bulk
of security cooperation and assistance operations remain in the competition
space, regardless. Moreover, enduring SFAB presence could create friendly
forward positions within Indo-Pacific threat A2AD networks. The brigades
distributed organization across echelons could mitigate the risk of isolation
within Chinese or Russian Indo-Pacific A2AD networks by creating a smaller
target than conventional forces.25
Despite their small size, the ongoing presence of security force
assistance brigades would support deterrence by providing a constant
reminder the United States could respond quickly to escalatory actions.
The 2006–23 Army strategic planning guidance suggests successful competition
in the Indo-Pacific relies upon “deterring aggression and countering coercion
against the U.S., its forces, allies and friends in critical areas of the world
by developing and maintaining the capability to swiftly defeat attacks
with only modest reinforcements.”26 Through enduring integration of security
force assistance brigades with partnered foreign-land component security
24. HQDA, Military Competition, 10.
25. US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018), x.
26. HQDA, “Army Strategic Planning Guidance,” 14.
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forces in the East Asian littorals, the United States reduces the potential
for more extensive force commitments should competition transition
to conflict. Effectively “dissuading adversaries from developing threatening
forces or ambitions, shaping the future military competition in ways that
are advantageous to the U.S. and complicating the planning and operations
of adversaries” would preempt more coercive forms of deterrence.27
Consequently, enduring SFAB integration with East Asian partnered land
components creates a deterrent in being with a lower risk of conflict escalation
across domains than other joint formations. Before partnered forces can
effectively dissuade adversaries as part of Joint and multinational competition
efforts, US forces must reassure partners “by demonstrating U.S. steadiness
of purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance
common interests, and by strengthening and expanding alliances and security
relationships.”28 The brigades’ presence in the Indo-Pacific provides assurance
at a low risk and materiel cost compared to other joint capabilities.
If the first military problem presented by competition is how the
Joint forces prevent escalation from competition to conflict, then
successful security force assistance and security cooperation are critical.
Countering adversary competition actions in the USINDOPACOM area
of operation, US Army forces “as an element of the Joint force, conduct
Multi-Domain Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary,
Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial
systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic
objectives (win), and force a return to competition on favorable terms.”29
Crucial tenets of multi-domain competition include having forward-postured
expeditionary forces, massing cross-domain fires, maximizing human
potential, and layering options. Army special operations forces and security
force assistance brigades possess organic doctrine, organization, training, and
equipment to execute security force assistance and security cooperation across
each tenet.30
Building partner capacity is critical to succeeding in multi-domain
competition; therefore, the security force assistance brigade should play
a significant role. The brigades meet critical requirements for success
in multi-domain competition, including “[p]reparing the operational
environment by building partner capacity and interoperability and setting
the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights,
27. HQDA, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 14.
28. HQDA, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 14.
29. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, vii.
30. HQDA, Military Competition, iv.
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prepositioning equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence
activities, and mapping EMS and computer networks.” Likewise, they help
with, “[b]uilding partners’ and allies’ capacities and capabilities to defeat
increasingly sophisticated Chinese and Russian-sponsored unconventional
and information warfare,” further emphasizing the criticality of combined,
partnered, and allied contributions to competition. Consequently, dedicated
adviser forces are critical to enabling partner capabilities in facilitating
successful multi-domain convergence.
Additionally, employing security force assistance brigades could effectively
mitigate the military risks posed by China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific
region. The Army multi-domain operating concept highlights that, while
Chinese and Russian military systems in the Indo-Pacific are robust, they
depend on a predictable, pattern-bound enemy. Beyond simply alternating
US Joint force posture, embedding adviser units with East Asian partnered
security forces generates more options and increases the width and depth
of the battlefield across domains for potential threat actors. Combined (that
is, multinational) rather than US-only force posture alternation enables
strategic and operational deception efforts across domains.31
As China and Russia have developed “space, cyber, information, and
electronic warfare (EW ) capabilities that can halt American power
projection before it begins,” the need to augment partnered land capabilities
in achieving convergence will only increase. Partnered security forces in the
USINDOPACOM area of operations represent forward-postured allied
capabilities within Chinese and Russian A2AD zones. Brigades can leverage
partners already present in theater (like Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan)
to compete in the land, air, and maritime domains other US forces cannot
enter without escalating to conflict. In the multi-domain operating concept,
security force assistance brigades competing through partners provide
“overmatch through speed and range at the point of need.”32
McConville explains how the Army’s contribution to multi-domain
competition rests on three lines of effort—engaging and training, equipping
and enabling, and advising and assisting to “[e]xpand the [l]andpower
[n]etwork.”33 The security force assistance brigade is currently the only
Army formation doctrinally trained and equipped to execute each line
of effort simultaneously for itself and a partnered force. While McConville’s
white paper specifies competing in the land domain, the contribution of
East Asian littoral land component security forces to air, littoral, cyber,
31. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 29.
32. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 1.
33. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 2.
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space, and information operations suggests an expanded role in achieving
convergence through partners.
Security force assistance brigades could play a vital role in countering Russia
and China’s attempts to “outflank” US partnerships and alliances using the
space, cyber, and information domains to fracture alliances below the threshold
of armed conflict.34 While some scholars question the efficacy of Westphalian
alliance systems, the presence of brigades in the theater with partnered forces
represents a clear assurance of the United States’ commitment to partner
defense. The brigades’ presence also disrupts Russian and Chinese coercion
attempts by physically emplacing forces within the competition space,
which forces adversaries to account for them in their decision calculus.35
Beyond enabling partnered contributions in the land domain, brigades could
assist partners in deterring attempts to fracture allied command-and-control
architecture in the cyber, space, and information domains in a foreign internal
defense capacity.36
Embedding security force assistance brigades with East Asian partners
raises the stakes of fait accompli attacks while extending operational
reach. Brigades can advise foreign security force fires while simultaneously
integrating US joint fires in-depth across domains. Their integration into
allied command-and-control architecture in East Asia flattens organizational
hierarchies while reducing friction. Although not organically organized
to prevail in large-scale ground combat, SFAB-partnered interoperability
in competition dramatically reduces the risk of large-scale ground combat
in the first place.
Security force assistance brigades in allied and partnered nations will
provide many of the same capabilities as conventional forces and reduce
the burden on host nations. Brigades possess the same communication
systems as conventional Army forces, in addition to others found only in the
special operations community. They possess the ability to clear joint fires
at the brigade and battalion levels and within the fires battalion and joint fires
observers in the infantry battalion and cavalry squadron. They are also capable
of executing the operations process like conventional brigades and battalions.
The smaller scale of the brigade staffs, however, requires careful allocation
of resources and efforts to balance advise, assist, support, liaise (with), and

34. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 3.
35. Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (July 2003): 427ff.
36. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 3.
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enable (AASLE) operations to coordinate with conventional operations,
depending on the mission and operating environment.
One of the chief areas where a brigade’s smaller scale could and should be
employed is in synchronization efforts with allies and partners in the cyber
domain. The US Army cyberspace operations concept describes how China
and Russia attempt to “capitalize on emerging technologies to establish and
maintain a cultural and social advantage; leveraging these new capabilities
for command and control, recruiting, coordinating logistics, raising funds,
and propagandizing their message” in the Indo-Pacific.37 A foundational
dimension of the Joint and Army cyber approach in countering Chinese
and Russian competition in cyberspace relies upon “strategic engagement,
which involves keeping friends at home, gaining allies abroad, and generating
support or empathy for the mission.”38 Understanding that the maintenance
of competitive advantage in cyberspace relies on coordinating all combinedforce capabilities, since the cyber domain pervades all others, the need to
synchronize allied and partnered cyber efforts in Indo-Pacific competition
will only increase.
While the current SFAB organization does not contain dedicated cyber
forces, signal capabilities within headquarters adviser teams and the SFAB
signal company are capable of augmenting US Cyber Command cyber combat
mission teams. The Army cyberspace operations concept defines the cyber
domain as a “global domain within the information environment consisting
of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems,
and embedded processors and controllers.”39 The brigades have recognized
the cyber domain’s influence on the information domain. Consequently, they
have sought to contribute to convergence through operational messaging
and dedicated support to partner information operations to counter malign
Chinese and Russian information campaigns.
The SFAB’s robust organic signal capabilities create opportunities to link
less secure or sophisticated allied and partnered networks to the Department
of Defense networks at a lower cost and risk than directly linking foreign
networks. The same logic theoretically applies to the space domain.
Although most East Asian littoral allies and partners possess limited
space capabilities, a brigade’s ability to provide a secure coupling between
foreign and US networks allows partners to benefit from the full range
37. TRADOC, The U.S. Army Concept Capability Plan for Cyberspace Operations, 2016-2028 TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-7-8 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2010), i.
38. TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, i.
39. TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 68.
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of US space capabilities, including navigation and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance.
Given the unprecedented speed with which adversaries can seize
positions of advantage in cyberspace, having security force assistance
brigades on-site and operating with partnered cyber forces would create
an improved, competitive deterrent complex.40 A brigade’s role as an adviser
on foreign military sales could aid East Asian littoral partners with the
constantly evolving hardware and software necessary to compete in the cyber,
information, and space domains.41 Given that an increasing amount of cyber
equipment acquisition comes from foreign vendors, the ability of brigades
to influence investment in software and hardware for partners and the Joint
force is potentially considerable.42
Adversaries employ “sponsorship, training, education, skills, motivation,
or tools” competing via proxies in the space, cyber, and information domains.
Therefore, embedded adviser forces with East Asian partners executing such
lines of effort could preempt Chinese and Russian attempts to gain relative
advantage in the cyber domain within the Indo-Pacific.43 The Joint force
currently possesses limited forces in the Indo-Pacific theater to liaise with
or train foreign security forces in cyber, space, and information operations.44
Additional training or organizational changes would be necessary for brigades
to provide training, education, and skills to East Asian partnered cyber forces.
The presence of regionally aligned brigade forces in the Indo-Pacific creates
an opportunity to bridge time delays in deploying combat cyber support teams
to the theater. It also supports the Army cyberspace operating requirement
that “the Army’s battle command system must be able to exchange relevant
operational information with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental
multinational partners, nongovernmental organizations and contractors.”45
Furthermore, embedding brigade advisers enables the subsequent cyberspace
operating requirement of integrating “coalition partner(s) and other specified
networks during garrison and deployed operations, including the capability
to integrate into the networks of coalition partners with different
intelligence-sharing relationships in order to enable effective Joint
and/or multinational operations and ensure freedom of action.”46

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 10.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 11.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 12.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 13.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 39.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 48.
TRADOC, Cyberspace Operations, 48.
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Realistically, supplemental training on cyber operations would be necessary
for most existing brigade advisers.

Conclusion
Security force assistance brigades represent the connective tissue or hub
necessary to enable unified action and unity of effort across the multinational
command-and-control architecture in the Indo-Pacific Command. A first step the
Army can take to make full use of a brigade’s capabilities would be to embed
SFAB advisers beyond the tactical level. Building on this step, the Army,
in conjunction with the Indo-Pacific Command and grand strategic command
authorities, must seek opportunities to integrate security force assistance
brigades with regional allies and partners whom the United States does not
historically possess enduring peacetime security agreements (such as Vietnam,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malyasia).
In addition, the Army must seek opportunities to employ brigades
in lieu of conventional ground-combat formations, where appropriate,
to enable cooperation, retain relative advantage in competition,
and maintain competition below the threshold of armed conflict. The presence
of embedded SFAB advisers with East Asian allied and partnered
multi-domain components links partnered capabilities to the US Indo-Pacific
Command Joint multi-domain convergence effort. Furthermore, the brigades’
small organizational profile allows them to embed with East Asian allies
and partners and passively penetrate threat A2AD networks, circumventing
the military problem of power projection in a denied environment.
By integrating security force assistance brigades with partnered foreign
security forces, the US Army can leverage partner multi-domain capabilities
in ways that complement US Joint and interagency capabilities,
deter adversaries, and create relative advantage, enabling successful
competition for the United States and allies across domains.
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ABSTR ACT: A concept of positive strategic shock would benef it the
US Department of Defense’s planning processes. Some US doctrine
demonstrates awareness of the need to plan for negative strategic
shocks but lacks consideration of positive strategic shock—any shock
with a non-zero-sum outcome—which could create a situation where
the Department of Defense misses opportunities. This article clarif ies
the term positive strategic shock, provides a brief review of where and
how planning for any sort of strategic shock currently occurs, and
makes recommendations based on three methods for think ing about
strategic shock.
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lthough US doctrine demonstrates awareness of the need
to plan for negative strategic shocks, the lack of consideration
of disruptive effects caused by positive strategic shocks could
leave the Department of Defense (DoD) in a position where it misses the
benefits of such shocks.1 Advocacy for incorporating positive strategic
shock in DoD planning processes first requires clarification of the term.
Negative strategic shock refers to the deleterious facet of “unknown unknowns”
and more practical “known unknowns” mentioned by the then Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and later analyzed by Nathan Freier and
others, but positive strategic shock must be more ambiguously defined.
After establishing a working definition of negative and positive strategic
shock, the article explores existing processes for responding to strategic shock.
Finally, three methods for thinking about strategic shock in planning—
those of reframing, horizon scanning, and the “barbell” approach—
form a basis for recommendations on how to consider incorporating a concept
of positive strategic shock in DoD planning processes.
1. Paul Austin Murphy, “Rumsfeld’s Logic of Known Knowns, Known Unknowns and Unknown
Unknowns,” A Philosopher’s Stone (blog), December 12, 2020, https://medium.com/the-philosophers-stone
/rumsfelds-logic-of-known-knowns-known-unknowns-and-unknown-unknowns-f506db31ac74; Nathan Freier,
Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a489100.pdf; and Nathan Freier, Robert Hume,
and John Schaus, “Special Commentary: Memorandum for SECDEF: Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,”
May 5, 2020, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-19-Shocks_Freier_Hume
_Schaus_v1.3_post.pdf.
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Coming to Terms with Strategic Shock
Positive strategic shock, and strategic shock more generally, require
clarification before proceeding. First, it is important to note that a parallel
exists between defense-related strategic shock and the concept of disruption
in business models. Former Harvard Business School professor Clark Gilbert
observes that, like strategic shock, the concept of disruption “has usually
been considered by established businesses as an attack that must be met
through defensive measures.” Gilbert also points out, however, that “the
real story behind disruptive innovation is not one of destruction, but of its
opposite: In every industry changed by disruption, the net effect has been
total market growth.”2 This initial tendency within established businesses
to frame disruption negatively provides a starting point for a critique of
defense-related strategic shock. Is only the negative aspect considered? If so,
is it because only negative strategic shocks exist or because threat perceptions
within the Department of Defense choose to focus on the negative?
Before focusing specifically on positive strategic shock, strategic shock
should be understood more generally. Freier links “defense-relevant” strategic
shock to the same forces operating in business when he characterizes strategic
shocks as “disruptive, transformational events for DOD [Department
of Defense].”3 Freier explains that, despite some degree of uncertainty
in origin and exact nature, his work considers only shocks that display clear,
promulgating trends. This means the shock experienced could have been
recognized and accounted for in advance if not for the decisions to ignore
certain data and analysis.4 Rumsfeld advocated a more complete framework for
shock, events deriving from both unknown unknowns and known unknowns.5
Freier considers only the known unknowns while relegating the unknown
unknowns to a domain too speculative to bear consideration in DoD resource
allocation or planning.6 This dismissal of the unknown unknown is precipitous,
however, as possibilities exist for the Department of Defense to posture itself
vis-à-vis unknown unknowns without overcommitting resources.
Although Rumsfeld’s quote popularized these terms, had been in
use in strategic planning and project management since the late 1990s.7
A known unknown is an anticipated gap, which, according to Rumsfeld,
2. Clark Gilbert, “The Disruption Opportunity,” MIT Sloan Management Review, July 15, 2003,
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-disruption-opportunity/.
3. Freier, Hume, and Schaus, “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 1.
4. Freier, Hume, and Schaus, “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 1.
5. Donald H. Rumsfeld and Richard B. Myers, “DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen.
Myers,” (briefing, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC: February 12, 2022), https://archive.today
/20180320091111/http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
6. Freier, Known Unknowns, 11.
7. Murphy, “Rumsfeld’s Logic.”
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can eventually be made a “known known” through “[asking] the right questions.”8
Therefore, known unknowns do not necessarily portend strategic shock,
except in instances when an organization fails to ask the right questions.
Conversely, unknown unknowns, unanticipated gaps in knowledge,
are what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls “Black Swans” in his metaphor
for events characterized by “rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective
(though not prospective) predictability.”9 Unlike Taleb, Freier does not address
the potential for such unpredictable events to exhibit positive potentiality,
but he does capture the importance of examining a gap in defense strategy
that does not address the known unknown as “unconventional ground
where irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid ‘threats of purpose’ and ‘threats of
context’ rise and mix in complex combinations to challenge core interests.”10
Freier provides a model for thinking about shock in DoD planning, but
his model is limited to the known unknown and negative strategic shock.
Expanding Freier’s thinking to consider the Black Swan and the
known unknown as they relate to planning in the Department of Defense
and to incorporate the possibility of positive strategic shock provides
a more complete framework. Whether in utter surprise at a Black Swan
or in a situation where blindness compounds the effect of a known
unknown, shock will disrupt the Department of Defense if the institution
has not developed a process allowing it to anticipate and implement policy
before experiencing shock.11 Again, that shock could be negative or positive,
and the ways an organization thinks about and responds will—or at least
should—differ on a case-by-case basis. This is why an expansion of Freier’s
thinking, and the work to define that expansion, is important.
The term positive strategic shock has already been used in strategic
planning literature, albeit with a meaning slightly divergent from the
beneficial Black Swan or known unknown. Colin S. Gray has extrapolated
a positive outcome can be obtained when negative shocks force an enterprise
to recognize a deficiency and play catch-up. Gray writes, “Considered
positively, national security challenges may well lend themselves persuasively
to identification of opportunities.”12 Like Freier’s phrasing, Gray’s phrasing
precludes a positive event. Instead, Gray focuses on the idea that even
negative shocks have the potential for positive benefits. By Gray’s definition,
8. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), xiv.
9. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House,
2007), xviii.
10. Freier, Known Unknowns, 13.
11. Freier, Known Unknowns, 7.
12. Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either
as Irregular or Traditional (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2012), 20, https://ssi.armywarcollege
.edu/2012/pubs/categorical-confusion-the-strategic-implications-of-recognizing-challenges-either-as-irregularor-traditional/.
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positive strategic shock is merely dependent on negative strategic shock and
not considered an independent occurrence.
Adding additional confusion, Peter Schwartz, in Inevitable Surprises
(Gotham Books, 2003), takes a more nuanced approach to describing the
same process of achieving positive results from a negative shock. He reframes
the perspective taken on a negative strategic shock, such as that of mass
immigration to Europe, as a positive shock, or positive when viewed
from a different perspective.13 This case would require Europe to reframe its
stance on immigration with a more inclusive and therefore entrepreneurial
spirit along the lines of what Schwartz asserts has been a historical strength
for America.14 This process of reframing bears further consideration
as a recommendation for how the Department of Defense might better plan
for strategic shock. Differentiating and recognizing the past usage by Gray and
Schwartz of the term positive strategic shock helps frame a more complete set
of recommendations.
Finally, for clarity, a few additional terms require further discussion.
First, the gravity of labeling a shock as strategic should not be ignored, nor
should the occasional overuse of the term strategy dilute its connotations.
According to Freier, shocks of this magnitude “jolt convention to such an
extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department
of Defense’s (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic
response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise
to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected
ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those
routinely considered in defense calculations.”15
Working from this definition, many historical examples of shock appear
insufficiently disruptive, and many scanning processes for shock are ineffective.
Whether an event is truly strategic in nature matters because issues below the
strategic level tend not to disrupt the Department of Defense as an institution
and pose less of an existential threat. For example, while the advent
of hypersonic missiles is sometimes labeled a strategic issue, it has not created

13. Peter Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises: Thinking ahead in a Time of Turbulence (New York: Gotham Books, 2003),
49, 67–69. See also p. 12 for similar reframing of IBM’s transition from mainframe to services business model.
14. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 49, 67–69.
15. Freier, Known Unknowns, vii.
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a need for restructuring institutions, only additional research and perhaps
some technological one-upmanship at the operational level.16
Due to its highly subjective nature, “positive” also risks being misused
in discussions of strategic shock. One way to overcome that subjectivity
is to equate positivity with the concept of a non-zero-sum game.
Unlike most sports where one competitor loses as a condition of the other
winning, in a non-zero-sum (also win-win) scenario both parties win because
the activity creates aggregate growth.17 They often avoid direct confrontation
in favor of approaches and actions that at least fractionally align and thus
mutually reinforce one another.18 The definition of positive strategic shock
used here, therefore, does not equate to positive gain contingent on negative
shock, nor does it involve reframing a negative event as a positive one.
The definition avoids a consideration of shock that occurs at a lower
(perhaps operational or tactical) level. Instead, positive strategic shock
represents a non-zero-sum occurrence requiring significant institutional
reorientation. It falls within either the category of unknown unknowns or the
known unknowns for which the Department of Defense has not adequately
planned. The defining characteristic of positivity becomes its non-zerosum orientation. Based on this definition, shocks that are positive for the
United States but negative for its competitors or partners are still considered
negative strategic shocks.
Here, a few concrete examples will help ground the discussion and clarify
how certain past shocks were both strategic and non-zero-sum. Although
not exhaustive, these examples display varying degrees of import to the
military industrial capability of the Department of Defense. They include the
discovery and proliferation of vaccines, the widespread ability to refrigerate
food, and the development of the Internet. These are non-zero-sum because
they benefit most, if not everyone, and operate at the strategic level rather
than the operational or tactical levels. Looking to the future, the Department
of Defense should anticipate the possibilities of cold fusion and asteroid
mining as potentially non-zero-sum and strategically significant.
Unknown unknowns, however, are by definition unpredictable. The
very act of attempting to predict a Black Swan goes against Taleb’s model,
which he calls the “ ‘barbell’ strategy,” for how best to prepare.19 Discussion
16. David Axe, “Wrong: Why Hypersonic Weapons Aren’t Even Really a Real Weapon (Yet),” Buzz (blog),
March 18, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/wrong-why-hypersonic-missiles-arent-even-really-real
-weapon-yet-134322.
17. Business Terms Editors, “Non-Zero Sum Game,” Business Terms (website), n.d., accessed January 16, 2022,
https://businessterms.org/non-zero-sum-game/.
18. Business Terms Editors, “Non-Zero Sum Game.”
19. Taleb, Black Swan, 205, 207.
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of concrete unknown unknown examples becomes counterproductive,
though recommendations for how to prepare still contain valuable insights
for the Department of Defense and will be covered later in this article.

Processing Strategic Shock
One significant obstacle in responding to positive strategic shock is the
near absence of a planning methodology around shock of any sort. A review
of US military doctrinal guidance yields no mention of positive strategic shock
and little on strategic shock of any sort.20 The Joint Operating Environment
2035 (JOE 2035) contains only five references to shock, four that are not
germane to a discussion of positive strategic shock and one that recognizes
overemphasis of traditional planning as a negative but depreciates shock
as “low-end.”21 JOE 2035’s one nod to shock states, “Placing too much
emphasis on contested norms—particularly those high-tech and expensive
capabilities geared to contain or disrupt an expansionist state power—
may discount potentially disruptive low-end threats, which have demonstrated
a troubling tendency to fester and emerge as surprise or strategic shock
for the United States.”22
This statement is neither prescriptive nor comprehensive with respect
to shock. Unlike Taleb’s or Freier’s works, JOE 2035 does not approach shock
for what it is: a force of uncertainty with which senior DoD leaders should
most closely contend, and the mechanism that accounts for most growth and
change in the world.23 Even more troubling, many erstwhile strategic think
pieces in the defense space do not consider shock at all; instead they only
speculate on relatively noncontroversial and predictable known unknowns.

20. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017 (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), 14, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf; and US Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2019), 18, https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil
/pamphlets/TP525-92.pdf.
21. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS), Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested
and Disordered World (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016), iii, 55, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents
/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917.
22. JCS, JOE 2035, 51.
23. Freier, Known Unknowns, 3; and Taleb, Black Swan, 134.
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These pieces include efforts by large organizations, like the RAND
Corporation’s predictive work, and publications by independent analysts.24
The lack of consideration for strategic shock in strategic thinking
and DoD planning processes leaves the Department of Defense open
to criticism that it is reactive, lacking in imagination, and vulnerable
to surprise.25 Freier explains that “[s]hocks . . . undermine prevailing
strategy and planning assumptions.” Shocks also often lie outside what
Sam J. Tangredi refers to as “traditional or permitted” areas of defense
inquiry.26 Freier also cites two positive developments in incorporating
strategic shock into planning processes. The first is the “Strategic Trends
and Shocks” project that began in 2008 in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense as a response to a lack of warning around the insurrection after
Operation Iraqi Freedom.27 The second is the awareness of shock’s absence
in planning processes demonstrated in the National Defense Strategy:
“The Department should also develop the military capability and capacity
to hedge against uncertainty, and the institutional agility and flexibility
to plan early and respond effectively alongside interdepartmental,
non-governmental and international partners.”28 This statement does not
mention shock specifically, but it can be read as an acknowledgment of, and
a directive to employ agility and flexibility to, the great uncertainty of shock.
One additional attempt at institutionalizing planning for strategic shock
is the State Department’s “Project Horizon.” This project demonstrates how
the issue of shock, as mentioned in the National Defense Strategy, affects
national strategy across interdepartmental lines.29
That the Department of Defense has not formalized a planning process
even for the negative aspect of known unknown strategic shock likely
stems from a conservative mindset.30 Conservatism of this sort leaves the
24. Raphael S. Cohen et al., Peering into the Crystal Ball: Holistically Assessing the Future of Warfare
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10073.
html; Raphael S. Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2849z1.html;
James M. Dubik, “No Guarantees When It Comes to War,” Association of the United States Army (website),
August 22, 2018, https://www.ausa.org/articles/no-guarantees-when-it-comes-war; Kimberly Amerson
and Spencer B. Meredith III, “The Future Operating Environment 2050: Chaos, Complexity and Competition,”
Small Wars Journal (website), July 31, 2016, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-future-operating-environment
-2050-chaos-complexity-and-competition; and Anja Kaspersen, Espen Barth Eide, and Philip Shelter-Jones,
“10 Trends for the Future of Warfare,” World Economic Forum (website), November 3, 2016, https://www
.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/the-4th-industrial-revolution-and-international-security/.
25. Freier, Known Unknowns, 1.
26. Freier, Known Unknowns, 4; Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View
of the Future Security Environment, 2001-2025, McNair Paper 63 (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 2000), 119.
27. Freier, Known Unknowns, 38, 10n.
28. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
June 2008), 5, https://nssarchive.us/national-defense-strategy/national-defense-strategy-2008/.
29. Freier, Known Unknowns, 25.
30. Freier, Known Unknowns, 13, 20, 27.
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organization and the nation open to strategic surprise.31 Furthermore, the
presence of this conservative mindset demonstrates that the consideration
of unknown unknowns and positive strategic shock must first overcome
the Department of Defense’s more basic resistance to planning for shock.
This conservatism and institutional inertia may be factors leading the
Department to keep to the status quo—a good thing in the case of a negative
strategic shock, but potentially not when confronted with non-zero-sum
sea change.32

Methods to Prepare for Shock
While organizations struggle to anticipate and plan for the risks
or rewards of shock, three methodologies suggest ways the Department
of Defense should prepare and position itself to adapt and respond to positive
shock. These methodologies are the process of horizon scanning as advocated
by Freier, the reframing technique demonstrated by Schwartz, and Taleb’s
barbell approach. While only Taleb specifically considers and proposes
techniques anticipating positive strategic shock, all three methodologies offer
insights and ideas useful for DoD planners to consider.
Freier’s horizon-scanning technique responds to the DoD’s perceived
hesitancy to engage in speculation and commit resources based on such
speculation.33 This horizon-scanning technique bridges the gap between
the areas of “prudent hedging,” analogous to the known unknown, and
highly speculative, extreme scenarios that could prove disruptive but cannot
be accommodated in planning activities because the almost unlimited range
of futuristic, low-probability challenges does not warrant the expenditure
of resources or brainpower.34 While this is a step in the right direction,
Freier’s application of the technique still considers only the negative aspect
of shock, where other nations or forces gain an advantage that requires the
United States to catch up.
In another work on the subject of shock, Freier encourages a process
of horizon scanning as a low-cost solution to address this planning gap.35
He proposes the Department of Defense and its components engage outside
entities to identify disruptive shocks in a way that focuses on the competitive
domains unique to each component.36 Strategic planning processes
31. Freier, Known Unknowns, 1, 14, 20.
32. M. Chris Mason, “Strategic Insights: Better Late than Never,” Strategic Studies Institute (website),
October 23, 2018, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/articles/articles-2018/better-late-than-never/.
33. Freier, Known Unknowns, 20.
34. Freier, Known Unknowns, 11.
35. Freier et al., “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 2.
36. Freier et al., “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 6.
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incorporating such horizon scanning can at least make the known unknown
foreseeable with enough detail that planners and leaders can justify devoting
resources to the consideration of branches and sequels to the main plan.37
Beyond the fiscal hesitancy surrounding attempts to put planning
rigor around speculation, Freier asserts “curiosity about and investigation
into the unconventional and the unknown” are somewhat countercultural
for the Department of Defense.38 Advocacy for consideration of positive
strategic shock in DoD planning represents a more speculative and less
obviously urgent need than anticipating an adversary’s shocking, zero-sum
technological advances. As such, and as with any idea that requires fiscal
input and a change of thinking, the consideration of positive strategic shock
will meet with more resistance from the Department of Defense, even though
it does form a logical extension of Freier’s proposition.
Two points from Schwartz’s Inevitable Surprises add rigor and criteria
for positivity to this approach to framing a process for thinking
about positive strategic shock. First, Schwartz identifies four conditions
stemming from science and technology that contribute to strategic change.
If applied to the third-party competitive analysis recommended by Freier,
a process watching for the convergence of these conditions could help the
Department of Defense identify at an early stage potential domains
within which to expect positive strategic shock. Passive scanning of this
sort would also prevent early and speculative commitment of resources.
The conditions Schwartz identifies are: the emergence of scientific
anomalies, the development of new instruments that detect phenomena never
before observed, comparatively rapid and effective communication
among scientists, and a culture that values and rewards scientific and
technological research.39
Oddly enough, earlier in Inevitable Surprises, Schwartz points out a fifth
condition (omitted from his later list) that is an even better indicator of
a non-zero-sum or positive situation—the presence of trust. It should
therefore represent a way to distinguish positive shock from a negative one
early in the horizon-scanning process. Schwartz mentions trust in the context
of globalization, venturing the quantity of technological advancement and
the quality of it depends on trust and mistrust at several levels: between
businesses, at the level of individual investors and financial institutions,
at the consumer level, and between governments. Trust creates the
possibility of greater connectivity that supports at least two of the bullets
37. Freier, Hume, and Schaus, “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 5.
38. Freier, Known Unknowns, 27.
39. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 162–65.
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in Schwartz’s four-point science and technology scanning criteria: rapid and
effective communication and the presence of a culture that values science
and technology.40
A competitive and cooperative horizon-scanning analysis using all
five of these conditions can identify hotspots for positive strategic shock.
It should watch for scientific anomalies, new instruments for phenomena
detection, rapid and effective communication, the presence of a political
and economic culture rewarding science and research, and a high degree
of trust among organizations and individuals. Whether a shock is an unknown
unknown or can be extrapolated based on emerging trend lines making
it a known unknown matters less than embracing a process that watches for
these developments.
The DoD operational-design methodology is the obvious candidate
for incorporating Freier’s horizon scanning and Schwartz’s conditions.
Operational design already involves reviewing and reframing based
on evolving conditions, though it neither excludes nor requires consideration
of strategic shock.41 The addition of a step in which planners scan the
operational environment for potential strategic shock using Schwartz’s criteria
could become a simple and cost-effective way to formalize consideration
of strategic shock in the DoD’s current processes.
In addition to contributing this useful set of conditions to the horizonscanning methodology, Schwartz proposes the previously discussed
methodology of reframing a problem set to account for shock. He explains
reframing through the examples of immigration in Europe and IBM’s
reorientation away from selling mainframe systems to providing consultative
services.42 Although this technique does not assist planning efforts in
the same way as horizon scanning or the barbell method, DoD strategists
should consider reframing as a useful way to recover from strategic shock.
More specifically, reframing brings non-zero-sum thinking into play
by looking for ways to create a win-win situation from a shock. What
Schwartz extrapolates from both the immigration scenario and the IBM
business model is the tendency to return to the status quo and the flexibility
and adaptability within an organization to take a shock, view it in retrospect,
and find and maximize the non-zero-sum potential of the new paradigm.
In the immigration scenario, Schwartz articulates the zero-sum and
non-zero-sum perspectives by juxtaposing and correlating the consequences
40. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 83.
41. JCS, Joint Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2020), iv, 5, https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf.
42. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 12, 49, 67–69.
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of one’s beliefs about immigration with one’s beliefs in the limits, or lack
thereof, of societal wealth.43
Rather than forcing itself back to status quo, Schwartz advocates for
Europe to adopt the second non-zero-sum perspective, which he models
on the then US policy. He thereafter uses the United States’ edge in creativity
and entrepreneurship as proof that such reorientation would “solve” the
strategic shock of the European immigration issue.44 This reorientation
turns negative shock into positive shock and provides a model DoD strategic
planners could use, rather than attempting to anticipate shock, to build
positive shock-aware branches and sequels.
Earlier, several examples of positive strategic shock (vaccines, the Internet,
and refrigeration) were mentioned to ground the discussion and show how
shocks can be strategic and non-zero-sum. The fact that vaccines, the Internet,
and refrigeration became positive is clear in hindsight but may not have been
clear at the moment of their invention. These innovations may not have been
adopted and their impact may not have been so significant and strategic
without some of Schwartz’s conditions for adaptation being operative,
especially the conditions of trust, rapid communication, and a culture that
rewards scientific and technological achievement. Uneven implementation
rates and the impact of these examples and other such positive strategic
shocks across cultures and communities support this supposition.
Similarly, IBM was able to use a shift to non-zero-sum thinking to solve
the problems it faced at the advent of the personal-computing revolution.
The inherently positive shock of powerful home- and desktop-computing
options changed the nature of work. Rather than trying to force those consumers
into a model that had worked previously for IBM, the company survived as
a business because it recognized the non-zero-sum nature of the change.
It understood it might lose market share overall, but the aggregate size
of the computing industry would grow to such a degree that its profits
could increase even with a more modest and specific slice of the market.45
The same dynamic is operative for the Department of Defense, but it is not
a one-to-one comparison. The dynamic manifests differently because
the connection between the Department of Defense’s constituency and

43. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 49.
44. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 49.
45. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 12.
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its problem set is less immediate than the one between a business and
its customers.
In business, clearly understanding the customer is a critical component
of success, extending deeply into any successful company’s processes and
products, since customers can rapidly vote (so to speak) on such processes and
products with their purchasing power.46 While the Department of Defense
clearly knows its customers, the business model by which those customers
dictate their interests is not as straightforward as an exchange of capital.
The DoD’s process involves translating guidance and strategic direction
through the slow filter of representative democracy where outcomes can
become muddied as they compete with values, debates, and forces other
than voters’ direct input.47 Additionally, the Department of Defense does
not enjoy the luxury of new customers in the same way a business might,
were it to innovate. Instead, the Department of Defense has the same
customers who engage in an ongoing reassessment of their values.
Reframing, for the Department of Defense, becomes a unidirectional
endeavor because it lacks the feedback loop of customers voting with their
purchasing power. It is reactive to national-level strategic guidance and,
thereafter, communicates its direction and actions to its customers when
those customers cannot use their purchasing power in as unambiguous a way
as they would in a business matter.
One speculative scenario for the Department of Defense that could
benefit from a similar reframing approach might be movement into what
some economists call a “post-scarcity economy,” one where advances in
critical economic drivers, such as energy and food production, make possible
a non-zero-sum economic system.48 In this situation, one indicator
of aggression might be the incitement to a false sense of scarcity.
While economic or production measures could deflate such a false
proposition in a whole-of-government approach, security structures like
the Department of Defense could also prepare branches and sequels with
flexibility and adaptability that recognize the positive, non-zero-sum nature
of such a development and actively oppose the aggression of false incitement.
This example of anticipating and reframing a potential shock could help the
Department of Defense tailor its reactions in a way that supports the emerging
shock and contributes to the non-zero-sum phenomena. Yet, to do so,
46. Gilbert, “Disruption Opportunity.”
47. Erik Olin Wright, How to Be an Anticapitalist in the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso, 2019), 8.
48. Philip Sadler, Sustainable Growth in a Post-Scarcity World: Consumption, Demand, and the Poverty
Penalty (Surrey, UK: Gower Publishing, 2010), 7.
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the Department of Defense would first need to be aware of the shock,
recognize it as potentially or likely positive, and then act accordingly.
The third methodology, the barbell in Taleb’s The Black Swan, accounts
for the negative and positive ends of the spectrum. In its simplest format,
Taleb frames the barbell approach as the need to be “robust to negative
Black Swans and exposed to positive ones.”49 Robustness combats negative
strategic shock by building redundancy and survivability for systems
in an organization, so when a negative shock occurs, those systems survive
and help the organization recover toward the status quo. On the other end
of the spectrum, Taleb recommends organizations maximize and optimize
exposure to positive strategic shock, given the unpredictable and temporal
nature of Black Swans.50 This call to create a diversity of opportunity on the
positive end of the spectrum dovetails well with Freier’s advocacy for horizon
scanning but goes beyond it in its encouragement of bottom-up awareness
mechanisms. In fact, horizon scanning and the barbell method complement
one another; horizon scanning works for the known unknown because
it begins with identification of a trend line, and the barbell method applies to
the unknown unknown where trend lines remain speculative.
An example of a process already employed within the Department
of Defense involving scanning and exposure at the operational level fitting
within Taleb’s barbell approach is the effort of the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL). The center provides a bottom-up funnel for ideas at
the tactical and operational levels.51 Taleb’s concept of exposure is closer
to what the Center for Army Lessons Learned does than Freier’s chartered
third-party competitive analysis, though the two models likely would support
each other in practice.
Pushing the identification of new, potentially shocking technological and
organizational solutions down to the user level allows the process to iterate
more quickly, reducing costs and risks and facilitating a propagation of the
best ideas without committing institutional weight. Rather than looking
at technology as determinant, which would be easier from a predictive
standpoint, the Department of Defense should recognize that most
organizations are unsure of what to do with a particular piece of technology
until it undergoes a period of experimentation and adaptation by end users.52
49. Taleb, Black Swan, 48.
50. Taleb, Black Swan, 337.
51. Michael Benvenuto, “Why the Center for Army Lessons Learned Is More Relevant than Ever
(and How NCOs Can Harness This Resource),” NCO Journal (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press,
September 2018), 1–3, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/nco-journal/docs/CALL.pdf.
52. Greg Satell, “4 Innovation Lessons from the History of Warfare,” Forbes (website),
March
14,
2015,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2015/03/14/4-innovation-lessons-from-the
-history-of-warfare/?sh=2987828573f3.
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Maximum exposure of end users to new technology allows them to determine
its best value, which lies at the heart of Taleb’s barbell approach. This approach
is more cost-effective than speculative top-level DoD endeavors to anticipate
technological and organizational shock.
The third portion of Taleb’s barbell model applies to the middle area,
the handle of the barbell figure. He radically de-emphasizes the so-called
safe middle ground, which he asserts is rife with prediction errors.53 Since
more conservative investors or organizations feel safest with risk measures
developed within—and therefore only applicable to—this middle ground,
they leave themselves exposed to extreme fluctuations of risk on either end
of the barbell—negative and positive shocks.54 Taleb further asserts that almost
all change and growth occur due to shocks on either end of this spectrum, not
just known unknowns but the truly unanticipated Black Swans.55 If, as Freier
says, the Department of Defense operates almost exclusively within the safe
middle area, then it misses both areas of learning.56 The DoD’s robustness—
that is, its redundancy and survivability—is a product of an environment
of ongoing reactivity to negative strategic shock. While that robustness
is good, it misses the other end of the learning spectrum by overlooking the
possibility of intentional orientation toward positive strategic shock.
Taleb puts an exclamation point on this theory when he discusses the
strategy he employs for investment. This strategy involves taking risks
when he anticipates exposure to positive Black Swans, being conservative
around negative Black Swans, and ignoring the flawed middle. It seems
simple enough, yet he demonstrates that it is the exact opposite of what
other investors do. They use “flimsy theories to manage their risks and
put wild ideas under ‘rational’ scrutiny.”57 Whether this method extends
to decision making in the Department of Defense would form a good subject
for follow-on analysis. Based on Freier’s assessment of the DoD’s lack
of incorporation of strategic shock in planning, it seems the
Department of Defense follows a logic similarly biased toward known risks
extrapolated from models of linear rather than shock-based learning.
Antulio J. Echevarria II and Huba Wass de Czege advocate for the
Department of Defense to orient itself toward positive ends while recognizing
the pursuit of positive opportunities will require more short-term costs

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Taleb, Black Swan, 333–34.
Taleb, Black Swan, 333.
Taleb, Black Swan, 451.
Freier, Known Unknowns, 13.
Taleb, Black Swan, 451.
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in terms of resources and planning.58 Their advocacy complements Freier’s
case for considering shock more fully, though Freier does not specify the
need to account for shock’s positive aspect. Combining these positions,
the need for relatively low-cost planning methodologies that allow the
Department of Defense to posture for strategic shock and prepare for both its
positive and negative aspects becomes apparent. Horizon scanning, reframing,
and the dual ends of the barbell of exposure and robustness are all low-cost
methods to incorporate positive strategic shock into DoD planning processes.
The Department of Defense can quickly and efficiently adopt these
processes by taking the following steps. First, it should incorporate a few key
indicators of potential shock (such as certain convergences of scientific and
technological indicators) in chartered third-party competitive analyses and
operational design. Second, it should actively plan branches and sequels that
give leaders time and space to reframe shocks in a non-zero-sum manner.
Third, the Department of Defense should leverage and create capabilities
similar to CALL to reward the “up-funneling” of strategically shocking
innovation for quick and wide adoption in an iterative, entrepreneurial
manner. These measures should be taken while continuing to build robust
systems through traditional means to prepare for the negative aspects
of shock. Finally, incorporating scanning, framing, and methods for exposure
to positive strategic shock would form useful additions to existing educational
programs at the strategic level (such as Joint Professional Military Education
Phases I and II) and within lower levels of military education where
frontline leaders should be exposed to indicators of emerging strategic shock.
These recommendations will encourage leaders and planners to embrace
the idea that the unknown and its environment of negative and positive

58. Antulio J. Echevarria II and Huba Wass de Czege, Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends (Carlisle, PA:
US Army War College Press, 2001), ix, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/105.
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uncertainty are the world’s, and hence the Department of Defense’s,
predominant vehicle of change.

Conclusion
Challenges that the Department of Defense would face when implementing
some or all of these recommendations could include the following.

•

First, a small budgetary and administrative burden would accrue
in order to create CALL-like capabilities or programs to sense
and reward the “up-funneling” of innovation.

•

Second, educational programs have finite bandwidth and
many competing priorities for the attention and instruction
of students, fitting in blocks of theory around shock in all its
forms should not be problematic except insofar as it would
require reprioritization of other material.

•

The third, and easiest, would be to include a requirement
in future horizon-scanning third-party analyses and in the
operational-design process for a consideration of the elements
that could indicate upcoming disruption—trust within
scientific communities, the emergence of scientific anomalies,
the development of new instrumentation, increases in effective
communication, and the presence of political and economic
culture valuing science and research.

These recommendations offer a range of approaches that avoid futile efforts
to predict the unknown unknown while posturing the Department of Defense
to take advantage of the positive and negative aspects of shock.
The implication of not adopting a mindset oriented to shock, of which
positive strategic shock is an overlooked subset, is that decisions will derive
from safe and predictable, but incorrect prognoses based on trend lines and
other flawed statistical approaches. Shock on both ends of the spectrum,
negative and positive, creates the greatest opportunities for growth and
success. Embracing methods to deal with shock (such as the barbell approach,
the horizon-scanning methodology, and educational improvements to teach
shock in existing curricula) will be healthy for the Department of Defense’s
planning processes and provide a competitive advantage over enemies who
think more linearly in a less revolutionary manner.
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Cognitive Performance Enhancement
for Multi-domain Operations
Daniel J. Herlihy

A BSTR ACT: Despite its desire to achieve cognitive dominance
for multi-domain operations, the Army has yet to develop fully and adopt
the concept of cognitive performance enhancement. This article provides
a comprehensive assessment of the Army’s efforts in this area, explores
increasing demands on soldier cognition, and compares the Army’s current
approach to its adversaries. Its conclusions will help US military and policy
practitioners establish the culture and behaviors that promote cognitive
dominance and success across multiple domains.
Key words: cognitive performance, resilience, neuroethics, human
performance, information overload

C

ognitive capability is the critical variable supporting all soldier
performance: physical, mental, and emotional. US Army doctrine
recognizes the importance of cognitive dominance, or gaining intellectual
advantage over the enemy. It even features prominently in several recent publications,
including the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) and the U.S. Army
in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 2028 concept.1 Despite advances in cognitive
science and recognition of the importance of cognitive overmatch in multi-domain
operations, however, the US Army has not fully embraced the concept of cognitive
performance optimization. The US National Institutes of Health have invested
over $53.5 billion in brain research in the past decade, but soldiers and leaders
train and operate inside an “always on” culture of multitasking and connectivity
with habits ultimately degradative of cognitive performance.2 Both at home station
and when deployed, leaders attempt to filter dozens of streams of information and
make rapid decisions while operating on inadequate sleep and a limited understanding
of the principles of cognitive performance optimization.3
1. Department of the Army (DA), 2019 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS): Investing in the Future (Washington,
DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 8, accessed October 21, 2020, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads
/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf; and Department of the Army (DA), TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 2028 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing
Office, November 2018), C–10, https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf.
2. National Institute of Health, “Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and Disease Categories
(RCDC),” NIH RePORT research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (website), last modified February 24, 2020,
https://report.nih.gov/funding/categorical-spending#/.
3. Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, “WRAIR Investigator’s Dispatch: Sleep Dispatch: Fighting Soldier
Fatigue & Enhancing Cognitive Dominance” (Fort Detrick, MD: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,
June 2019), 3, https://www.wrair.army.mil/sites/default/files/2019-06/Behavioral_Health_and_Sleep.pdf; and
Andrew C. Steadman, Applying Neuroscience to Enhance Tactical Leader Cognitive Performance in Combat, (master’s
thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 6, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA556552.pdf.
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Meanwhile, China and Russia have pursued biotechnical, neuroscientific,
and artificial intelligence (AI) solutions to enhance human cognition and gain
an asymmetric operational advantage over the United States and its allies.4 Unfettered
by the ethical norms of Western society, China and Russia actively leverage dual-use
civilian and military research to achieve this end.5 Both nations see the mind as the
main battlespace in future warfare and are taking steps to dominate there.6
To meet this challenge, the US Army must remain aligned with Department
of Defense cognitive performance research and development efforts. Science alone,
however, will not be enough. The Army must also evolve its culture to recognize
the importance of ethical, science-based methods to ensure cognitive dominance
in ways that drive competition and innovation across the force. A deliberate
approach to behavior modification rooted in education, training, and technology
is needed to replace outdated cognitive performance myths that ultimately degrade
cognitive function through multitasking, sleep deprivation, and information
overload. Otherwise, our adversaries may find the asymmetric advantage they need
to dominate the US Joint force.

Multi-domain Operations and the Cognitive Domain
Cognitive performance is the ability to observe, orient, decide, and act to produce
the best possible outcome.7 Cognitive skill has always been important to success on
the battlefield and plays a critical role in deciding battles and campaigns. The future
will offer similar opportunities but with greater complexity, fog, and friction as the
battlefield expands into space and cyberspace. The 2019 AMS addresses this evolving
environment and introduces the concept of multi-domain operations.8 The 2019
AMS outlines how the MDO concept differs from previous operational concepts and
requires higher levels of cognitive performance of its practitioners.
The MDO concept presents a cognitive challenge as it requires leaders to recognize
and exploit fleeting opportunities to achieve cross-domain convergence of effects
4. Elsa B. Kania, “Minds at War: China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage through Cognitive Science and
Biotechnology,” Prism 8, no. 3 (2019): 84, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-3
/prism_8-3_Kania_82-101.pdf; and Lindsay Gorman “A Silicon Curtain Is Descending: Technological Perils
of the Next 30 Years,” in Reassessing 1989, edited by Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff (German Marshall Fund of the
United States, 2019), 74, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21249.16.
5. Guillermo Palchik, Celeste Chen, and James Giordano, “Monkey Business? Development, Influence, and
Ethics of Potentially Dual-Use Brain Science on the World Stage,” Neuroethics 11 (February 11, 2017): 112;
and Royal Society, Brain Waves Module 3, technical report, RS Policy Document 06/11 (London: Royal Society
Science Policy Centre, 2012) 7–9.
6. Kania, “Minds at War,” 85; and Jānis Bērziņš, “The West Is Russia’s Main Adversary, and the Answer Is New
Generation Warfare,” Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace 34, no. 3 (2016): 173, https://www.jstor
.org/stable/26428998.
7. John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, ed. Grant T. Hammond (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:
Air University Press, 2018), 384, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0151_Boyd
_Discourse_Winning_Losing.PDF.
8. DA, 2019 AMS, 4–5.
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against advanced adversary capabilities in a complex operational environment.9 To
win in multi-domain operations, the US Army fields increasingly sophisticated
systems along six modernization priorities that cut across all domains.10 Not only do
these advanced systems require higher intelligence and technical skill to operate and
maintain, but when combined with improved digital communication and networking
capabilities, leaders can also access more real-time data than ever before. Finally, the
MDO 2028 concept and the “Army People Strategy” place the American soldier
at the center of the multi-domain operations concept.11 Indeed, “[t]he Army’s greatest
strength and most important weapon system,” soldiers will operate at the nexus
of a myriad of real-time data and information sources and face increasing pressure
to multitask, prioritize, assess, decide, and act as opportunities and threats arise. 12
It is tempting to dismiss these challenges on the promise of advances in AI, humanmachine interfaces, and other technologies.13 Many of these capabilities remain
hypothetical, however, even as the cognitive demands on soldiers continue to rise.
Even when they become available, AI and other technologies will complement human
decision making, but the human brain will likely remain the critical node in the near
term. As such, achieving cognitive dominance starts with developing an understanding
of the basic capabilities and limitations of the human brain. Cognitive scientists such
as David Rock insist understanding brain function is one of the best ways to improve
cognitive performance.14 The concepts of optimal arousal, multitasking, cognitive
endurance, and decision quality offer a framework for understanding and provide
opportunities for performance enhancement.

Optimal Arousal
Levels of emotional arousal directly impact cognitive performance. The YerkesDodson Law, first hypothesized in 1908, provides a basic model for this phenomenon
and describes a sweet spot of cognitive arousal associated with peak performance.15
The right level of arousal, or stress, causes the brain to release just the right mix
of neurochemicals to generate the alertness and focus required for optimal
performance.16 Good coaches recognize how arousal levels impact performance
9. DA, MDO 2028, iii.
10. DA, 2019 AMS, 6.
11. DA, MDO 2028, iv; and Department of the Army, “The Army People Strategy,” (October 2019) 3, https://
www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_people_strategy_2019_10_11_signed_final.pdf.
12. Department of the Army, “The Army People Strategy,” (October 2019) 3, https://www.army.mil/e2/down
loads/rv7/the_army_people_strategy_2019_10_11_signed_final.pdf.
13. Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, “Research Report: The Artificial Intelligence Revolution,” from
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: What Every Policymaker Needs to Know, report (Washington, DC: Center for a
New American Security, 2018), 3–4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20447.4.
14. David Rock, Your Brain at Work, Revised and Updated: Strategies for Overcoming Distraction, Regaining Focus,
and Working Smarter All Day Long (New York: Harper Business, 2020), 1.
15. Rock, Your Brain at Work, 62; and Diane Pomeroy, The Impact of Stressors on Military Performance (Fishermans
Bend, Australia: Land Division, DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation, December 2013), 6–7.
16. Rock, Your Brain at Work, 64.
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and succeed in calming or pumping up a team as needed during competition.17
Too little leaves us flat, and too much creates counterproductive levels of stress,
anxiety, or disengagement.18 Army leaders may be familiar with this phenomenon
in combat situations where physical threats incite powerful reactions, but similar
states can occur under conditions of work stress and information overload.19

Figure 1. Yerkes-Dodson Law visualization

Although challenging to limit stress and anxiety in combat, monitoring
and managing soldier emotional arousal levels can provide immediate
opportunities for cognitive performance enhancement. One novel solution
described by the UK Royal Society suggests military and law enforcement
use cognitive overload monitoring systems to alert individuals when
they show signs of cognitive overload. This awareness would allow users
to consciously alter their states of emotional arousal and behavior to focus on
the most critical problems.20 Similarly, the Monitoring and Assessing Soldier
Tactical Readiness and Effectiveness pilot research study conducted by the
US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center
focused on the optimization of individual soldier and small-unit perception,
cognition, and interaction through innovative science and technology.
17. Phil Stieg and Marvin Chung, “Information Overload,” April 3, 2020, This Is Your Brain with Dr. Phil Stieg,
podcast, 5:50, https://thisisyourbrainwithdrphilstieg.libsyn.com/information-overload.
18. Rock, Your Brain at Work, 62.
19. Mark Goulston, Just Listen: Discover the Secret to Getting through to Absolutely Anyone, (New York: American
Management Association, 2010) 16; and Rock, Your Brain at Work, 67.
20. Royal Society, Brain Waves, 38–39.
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By analyzing data collected through body-worn and laboratory sensors
during sustained training, the study identified opportunities for additional
research that could help soldiers and leaders identify, predict, and sustain
optimal arousal and tactical performance levels affecting decision quality,
marksmanship accuracy, and attentional control.21

Multitasking
Military leaders are expected to develop an ability to juggle multiple
balls—to respond immediately to texts, chats, and e-mails and to maintain
situational awareness while solving problems in a rapidly changing
environment. Unfortunately, the very tools Army leaders use and the methods
of their use thicken the “fog of war” in combat as well as in garrison. Despite
the demands of an increasingly connected society, science shows there are
limitations to the number and complexity of operations the brain can process
at any given time. Focusing our attention requires allocation of neural
resources in the prefrontal cortex that prevents the brain from effectively
focusing on two things at once.22 When multitasking, our brains are instead
forced to transition rapidly from topic to topic. Switching between tasks
requires high amounts of metabolic resources such as oxygenated glucose; once
depleted, both cognitive and physical performance decline.23 Multitasking
also produces the stress hormone cortisol and affects both adrenaline and
dopamine levels in ways that scramble our thinking.24 The profundity of the
impact of multitasking has convinced some researchers a constant string
of interruptions—through text, email, radio traffic, and chat windows—may
produce an effect similar to temporarily lowering your IQ.25
Additionally, research demonstrates that multitasking increases
decision-making risk. A 2009 Stanford University study claims heavy media
multitaskers suffer degraded memory, learning, and cognitive function.
The study compared the cognitive abilities of groups identified as heavy
and light multitaskers.26 While other factors could contribute to this
degradation, the study suggests habitual multitasking may ironically impair
21. Erika Hussey and John Ramsay, Monitoring and Assessing Soldier Tactical Readiness and Effectiveness
(MASTR-E): Identifying the Readiness States and Traits of Tactical Mastery (Natick, MA: US Army Combat
Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center, April 27, 2020), 5.
22. Daniel Levitin, The Organized Mind: Thinking Straight in the Age of Information Overload (New York: Dutton,
2014), 39.
23. Levitin, The Organized Mind, 98.
24. Christine Rosen, “The Myth of Multitasking: How Intentional Self-Distraction Hurts Us,” The New
Atlantis, no. 20 (Spring 2008): 107; and Levitin, The Organized Mind, 96–98.
25. Rosen, “Multitasking,” 36.
26. Eyal Ophir, Clifford Nass, and Anthony D. Wagner and Michael I. Posner, ed., “Cognitive Control in
Media Multitaskers,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 37 (September 15, 2009): 15,583–87.
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an individual’s ability to accomplish occasional multitasking.27 Consider,
for example, a driver in an unfamiliar part of town holding a conversation
with a passenger while listening to the radio. After a missed turn, the driver
instinctively pauses the conversation and turns down the radio to focus
on correcting course. The driver’s actions show an intuitive awareness of the
challenges of doing two things at once.28 By choosing to multitask we accept
degraded performance, formally known as “dual task interference” or the
“psychological refractory effect.”29
As part of an Army-wide brain science education initiative, early career
education could provide a meaningful first step toward reducing the culture
of multitasking, distraction, frequent interruption, and information overload.
Techniques such as meditation, deliberate reflection, metacognition,
mindfulness, and mindful awareness offer accessible, low-cost ways to build
better cognitive habits across the force by enhancing focus and performance
to meet training and mission requirements.30

Cognitive Endurance
Army brain science education could also help leaders understand the
cumulative toll of decision making and attentional filtering on cognitive
performance. The brain has limited resources available for data processing,
and actions such as making a decision, resisting an impulse, or ignoring
a distraction drain our cognitive energy over time.31 Environments filled with
trivial choices and distracting information exhaust our minds and dull our
cognitive abilities, as the brain does not distinguish or prioritize decisions
by level of importance.32 Said differently, our decision-making ability is subject
to the limits of cognitive endurance and degrades over time.
Despite an innate awareness of the limits of cognitive endurance,
many military leaders do not structure their schedules and battle rhythms
to account for this. For example, commanders who hold “night court” nonjudicial
punishment hearings at the end of the duty day may make important decisions
when the cumulative effects of daily decision making have rendered
their cognitive abilities problematic and unreliable. Conversely, leaders
may spend their most productive hours answering emails or executing
27. Ophir et al., “Cognitive Control,” 15,585.
28. Levitin, The Organized Mind, 11.
29. Harold Pashler, “Attentional Limitations in Doing Two Tasks at the Same Time,” Current Directions in
Psychological Science 1, no. 2 (April 1992): 45.
30. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Field Manual (FM) 7-22, Holistic Health and
Fitness (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2020), 13-3.
31. Rock, Your Brain at Work, 8–9.
32. Levitin, The Organized Mind, 6–7.
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low-level tasks instead of maximizing their cognitive resources to
accomplish complex tasks and decision making. These basic examples
illustrate why the Army must include time management education and
training in its cognitive dominance efforts.

Decision Quality
Even while considering the limits of cognitive endurance our brains are
often inundated with information that must be synthesized before being
acted upon. Studies of optimal complexity theory indicate there is an optimal
number of factors to be considered when making a decision and that too few
or too many degrade performance.33 Just like studies on computers, these
studies reveal the limits on the working memory of humans. We struggle
to hold more than three to five pieces of knowledge in mind while synthesizing
understanding.34 Furthermore, attempting to consider more than 10 factors
significantly degrades performance.35 Understanding this phenomenon could
help facilitate better decisions, particularly when time is of the essence.
Many believe more inputs will lead to optimal decision making.
In decision-making experiments where subjects requested more information
after exceeding the optimal level of complexity, the subjects’ performance
degraded through information overload.36 This trend is of particular concern
to the military, where information supremacy in Iraq and Afghanistan now
conditions senior leaders to expect an abundance of information to support
their decision making. Information addiction may delay commanders
waiting for more information that, ironically, would degrade the quality
of their decisions.37
The military recognizes this challenge and is leveraging AI to develop
improved information-filtering and decision-support algorithms to enable
leaders to make better, faster decisions.38 While promising, these efforts
will be limited in the near future and will not fully alleviate the cognitive
challenges associated with modern warfare. Once again, education on the
33. Levitin, The Organized Mind, 308.
34. Nelson Cowan, “The Magical Mystery Four: How Is Working Memory Capacity Limited, and Why?,”
Current Directions in Psychological Science 19, no. 1 (2010): 56.
35. Naresh K. Malhotra, “Information Load and Consumer Decision Making,” Journal of Consumer Research 8,
no. 4 (March 1982): 427.
36. Levitin, The Organized Mind, 310.
37. Alexander Kott, Battle of Cognition: The Future Information-Rich Warfare and the Mind of the Commander
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 205.
38. Mark Pomerleau, “Can the Intel and Defense Community Conquer Data Overload?,” C4ISRNET
(website), September 5, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2018/09/05/can-the-intel-and-defense
-community-conquer-data-overload/; and Jane Edwards, “Army Seeks to Encourage Troops to Trust AI Through
Project Ridgway; Col. Dan Kearney Quoted,” ExecutiveGov (website), last modified September 24, 2021, https://
executivegov.com/2021/09/army-seeks-to-encourage-troops-to-trust-ai-through-project-ridgway/.
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negative effects of information overload as part of an Army-wide brain
science education initiative can drive cultural change and improve decision
making—with and without AI augmentation.

Adversaries
While the US military slowly integrates cognitive performance
enhancement into its culture, China and Russia have made troubling advances
in the cognitive domain. China emphasizes research and development aimed
at creating an operational advantage in neuroscience, AI, and biotechnology
as part of ongoing military-civil fusion efforts.39 Influential People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) leaders, including Major General He Fuchu, vice president
of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, emphasize military preparation
for a future operating environment extending into virtual domains. According
to He, these domains include the information domain and the “domain
of consciousness” and require “mental/cognitive dominance” for success.40
Elsa B. Kania, a senior fellow and China expert at the Center for a New
American Security, observes that these concepts are now frequently
discussed in PLA writings, along with the concept of human and artificial
intelligence fusion.41
This interest is backed by billions of renminbi to fund research as part of the
“China Brain Project” launched in 2016—a prime example of civil-military
fusion efforts.42 The project focuses on research into cognitive function
with applied science in the areas of treating neurodegenerative diseases
and the integration of the brain with artificial intelligence.43 Participants’
efforts include significant research into clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats (CRISPR) gene editing in both animals and humans.44
While the use of CRISPR remains a topic of global ethical debate largely
due to its unknown consequences, Chinese scientists have already taken the

39. Kania, “Minds at War,” 83.
40. Kania, “Minds at War,” 85.
41. Kania, “Minds at War,” 85–86.
42. Kania, “Minds at War,” 85.
43. Olivier Dessibourg, “Primate Labs Give Us an Edge, Says China’s Brain Project Chief,” NewScientist
(website), September 7, 2016, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23130900-800-primate-labs-give-us-an
-edge-says-chinas-brain-project-chief/.
44. Elsa B. Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion,
and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Brief 19, no. 18 (October 2019), https://jamestown.org/program
/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/.
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unprecedented step of editing human embryos in ways that may enhance
cognitive function.45
The lack of adherence to Western standards of ethical research features
prominently in attempts to attract international neuroscientists to work in and
for China.46 Poo Mu-ming, chief of the China Brain Project, openly touts
the large-scale use of nonhuman primates for brain research as an advantage
over Europe, Japan, and the United States in an attempt to lure international
scientists for seemingly cutting-edge research.47 The direct involvement
of the Chinese Communist Party in brain research ensures scientists studying
neurological disease in China’s aging population also provide People’s
Liberation Army leaders with the scientific horsepower to pursue their
strategy of cognitive dominance.48 Together these factors create a looselyregulated, well-funded research environment with a national sense of urgency
for dual-use neurological research breakthroughs that could be readily
exploited by the PLA to enhance soldier cognitive performance.
Similarly, Russia sees the mind as the main battlefield in modern
warfare where “wars are to be dominated by information and psychological
warfare.”49 Russia mimics China’s questionable adherence to ethical norms in
cognitive dominance research, but the Russian approach relies more heavily
on undermining adversary cognitive processes through psychological warfare
and other means.50 Ubiquitous false Russian narratives place high cognitive
loads on their adversaries and require increased information filtering, which
consumes cognitive resources and degrades the speed and quality of decisions
over time. Numerous examples of this exist in the first six months of the
2022 Russian War on Ukraine. Dehumanizing rhetoric, acts of illegitimate
annexation, and false claims about Ukrainians’ affinity for Russia are narratives
meant to obfuscate Russian aggression and create confusion.51 By sowing
doubt and creating confusion, Russian misinformation need only temporarily

45. Antonio Regalado, “China’s CRISPR Twins Might Have Had Their Brains Inadvertently Enhanced,”
MIT Technology Review, February 21, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/21/137309/the-crispr
-twins-had-their-brains-altered/.
46. Palchik et al., “Dual-Use Brain Science,” 112.
47. Dessibourg, “Primate Labs.”
48. Palchik et al., “Dual-Use Brain Science,” 112–13; and Kania, “Minds at War,” 86.
49. Bērziņš, “New Generation Warfare,” 173.
50. Gorman et al., Silicon Curtain, 78; and Bērziņš, “New Generation Warfare,” 173.
51. U.S. Department of State, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Six Months of Lies, Implemented,” 24 August 2022,
www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/russias-war-on-ukraine-six-months-of-lies-implemented/, accessed 16
October 2022.
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cloud an enemy’s judgment to cause hesitation and provide an advantage for
Russian activities.52
Additionally, Russian forces show continued interest in using
incapacitating agents to degrade their adversaries’ cognitive function.
During the 2002 Dubrovka Theater hostage situation, Russian special forces
released a fentanyl derivative into the ventilation system to manipulate the
consciousness of approximately 50 Chechen separatists and 750 Russian
hostages. While their action caused separatists to lose consciousness, it also
resulted in the overdose deaths of approximately 125 hostages and permanent
debilitation of others.53 Although Russian officials largely viewed the
operation as a success, their actions drew international condemnation and
renewed debate over the effectiveness and applicability of international law,
such as the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.54
Neurology and biochemistry experts such as James Giordano, chief
of neuroethics at Georgetown University Medical Center, fear advances
in neuroscience and technology provide opportunities to exploit gaps
in existing treaties, international laws, and supranational conventions
governing the use of chemical and biological agents.55 This includes the use
of CRISPR gene editing and nanotechnology to enhance neural structures
in soldiers while creating novel neuroweapons to degrade the cognitive
function of their adversaries.56

Opportunities for the US Army
As Russia and China continue to ignore ethical boundaries related
to human performance, the allure of leap-ahead technology and advances
in neuroscience also garner much of the domestic media attention related
to cognitive performance initiatives.57 While these efforts are important and
should continue, the US military must capitalize on practical, near-term
opportunities to achieve cognitive dominance now.
Indirect and direct approaches to cognitive performance enhancement
and optimization can provide quick wins for the Army at modest
52. James K. Wither, “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare,” Connections 15, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 82.
53. Mark Wheelis, “ ‘Nonlethal’ Chemical Weapons: A Faustian Bargain,” Issues in Science and Technology 19,
no. 3 (Spring 2003): 74.
54. Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, “90 Hostages Killed in Moscow Theater,” Washington Post (website),
October 26, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/articles/A21613-2002Oct26.html.
55. Joseph DeFranco, Diane DiEuliis, and James Giordano, “Redefining Neuroweapons: Emerging Capabilities
in Neuroscience and Neurotechnology,” Prism 8, no. 3 (2019): 51.
56. DeFranco et al., “Redefining Neuroweapons,” 52–53.
57. Antonio Regalado, “Elon Musk’s Neuralink Is Neuroscience Theater,” MIT Technology Review (website),
August 30, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/30/1007786/elon-musks-neuralink-demo-up
date-neuroscience-theater/.
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costs. Understanding that the direct-indirect dichotomy involves some
oversimplification of complex cognitive and neuroscience concepts, these
categories nevertheless provide a framework for discussion. Indirect
approaches to cognitive performance enhancement affect cognition through
dietary intervention, sleep modification, physical exercise, pharmacology,
and resilience training. Direct approaches “immediately target the structural
or functional mechanisms and processes underlying learning, perception,
cognition, or emotion” and include methods such as transcranial electrical
brain stimulation or reality augmentation.58 In practice, no boundaries
separate the two approaches, and both are required to effectively enhance and
optimize cognitive performance.

Figure 2. Integrated approach to cognitive dominance

Cognitive Hardware Upgrades – An Indirect Approach
Using a computer analogy helps visualize cognitive enhancement
while building on the concepts of indirect and direct approaches. Cognitive
performance optimization implies we maximize our software (cognitive
abilities, or how we think) within existing limitations of our hardware
(or physiology). In this context, both hardware and software upgrades can
provide opportunities for cognitive enhancement. Hardware upgrades provide
58. Tad T. Brunyé et al., “A Review of US Army Research Contributing to Cognitive Enhancement in Military
Contexts,” Journal of Cognitive Enhancement 4 (February 2020): 3; and Wade Elmore, discussion with author,
December 9, 2020.
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an indirect approach through talent management, physiological interventions,
pharmacological interventions, and technological enhancements.

Talent Management
In Good to Great (Harper Business, 2001), James C. Collins describes the
first step to building a winning organization through the metaphor of “getting
the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right
people in the right seats.”59 Similarly, the Army’s best opportunity to increase
the collective cognitive operating capacity of the force may be in identifying,
recruiting, assessing, and retaining the right people.
Studies show cognitive ability is partly hereditary, and identifying traits such
as neural flexibility and skill expertise is possible by combining neuroimaging
technologies, statistical tools, and traditional cognitive assessments.60
These tools provide the Army with an opportunity to identify and optimize
the application of individual cognitive traits as part of an Information
Age recruiting and talent management program, promoting cognitive
diversity to improve creativity and decision making. Cognitive diversity is
defined as “differences in perspective or information processing styles.”61
Recent research indicates that cognitive diversity accelerates learning
and enhances team performance in uncertain, complex scenarios.62
Increased cognitive diversity on military teams could be enabled through
an effective assessment and talent management program. Initiatives such
as Project Athena offer a promising model for applying assessments
as a self-development tool, but Army-wide implementation requires increased
funding for research, development, and application.63 In today’s competitive
job market, the Army must build on current assessment and talent

59. James C. Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap…and Others Don’t (New York:
Harper Business, 2001), 13.
60. Robert Plomin, John C. DeFries, Valerie S. Knopik, and Jenae M. Neiderhiser, “Top 10 Replicated
Findings from Behavioral Genetics,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 11, no. 1 (2016): 4–5; and Leonard Wong
and Stephen Gerras, Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What to Do about It (Carlisle, PA:
US Army War College Press, October 2013), 9, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1514&context=monographs; and Royal Society, Brain Waves, 29–30.
61. Alison Reynolds and David Lewis, “Teams Solve Problems Faster When They’re More Cognitively Diverse,”
Harvard Business Review (website), March 30, 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/03/teams-solve-problems-faster-when
-theyre-more-cognitively-diverse.
62. Anita Williams Woolley, Ishani Aggarwal, and Thomas W. Malone, “Collective Intelligence and Group
Performance,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 24, no. 6 (2015): 422; and Reynolds and Lewis,
“Cognitively Diverse.”
63. Department of the Army, “Center for the Army Profession and Leadership: Project Athena Leader
Self-Development Tool,” Center for the Army Profession and Leadership (website), n.d., accessed
January 17, 2022, https://capl.army.mil/athena/#/.
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management efforts to recruit and retain the talent required to optimize its
cognitive potential and outpace near-peer competitors.

Physiological Interventions
Numerous studies show that physical training, proper nutrition, and sleep
management are clearly linked to cognitive capacity. The Army has long
championed the psychological and physiological benefits of physical exercise,
and studies confirm neurochemicals produced during endurance exercise
have neuroprotective effects and can improve learning and memory.64 Sleep
management and nutrition guidelines are also reflected in the US Army’s
“Holistic Health and Fitness” (H2F) doctrine and its “Performance Triad
Strategy,” yet lack wide acceptance across the force.65 Even though the Army
recognizes the importance of proper nutrition in support of “optimal physical
and cognitive function, soldiers often associate Army nutritional concepts
with physical strength, body mass, and energy levels instead of mental
function or mood.”66 For example, leaders are familiar with the physical
effects of dehydration. The cognitive effects of dehydration, however, are
less commonly known outside the medical and research communities.
Of the physiological interventions available to enhance cognitive
performance, sleep management may hold the most untapped potential
for Army application. Army H2F doctrine states that “[c]ognitive ability
and readiness vary as direct function of the amount of sleep obtained” and
numerous studies directly link sleep to cognitive function and operational
readiness in the Army.67 Even so, research suggests over 62 percent of soldiers
suffer chronic sleep deficits, averaging fewer than six hours sleep per night,
whether in garrison or deployed.68 Deliberate cultural change through brain
education during accessions training and all phases of professional military
education is required for the Army to make meaningful progress on sleep
management.69 Education must be coupled with programs that recognize

64. Christopher Bergland, “Scientists Discover Why Exercise Makes You Smarter,” Athlete’s Way (blog),
October 11, 2013, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletes-way/201310/scientists-discover-why
-exercise-makes-you-smarter.
65. Department of the Army, The Performance Triad Guide: Sleep, Activity, and Nutrition (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office), https://ireland.tricare.mil/Portals/66/P3%20Guide.pdf.
66. Rosa María Martínez García, Ana Isabel Jiménez Ortega, Ana M. López-Sobaler, and Rosa María Ortega,
“Nutritional Strategies That Improve Cognitive Function,” Nutricion Hospitalaria 35, no. 6 (2018): 16–19; and
HQDA, FM 7-22, 8-1.
67. HQDA, FM 7-22, 11-1; and Troxel et al., Sleep in the Military, 15–18.
68. DA, “Sleep Dispatch,” 3.
69. Troxel et al., Sleep in the Military, 103.
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and reward soldiers for establishing healthy sleep habits as part of a lifestyle
of cognitive performance enhancement.
As the Army seeks to alter its culture, wider adoption of wearable
technology could increase soldier and leader awareness, build desirable
habits and practices, and alter mindsets. All three will be required to initiate
enduring enhanced performance in the cognitive and physical domains.
Studies by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and the
US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center
involving hundreds of 10th Mountain Division soldiers show commercial
off-the-shelf wearable technology such as watches, rings, or bands can drive
behavioral changes at the individual and organizational level.70 For instance,
monitoring sleep habits and off-duty physical activity levels can help leaders
coach their soldiers to establish healthy habits using personalized data. The
Army should prioritize near-term investments in this area as quick and visible
means to demonstrate commitment to enhancing cognitive performance.
Combined with education and emphasis from leadership, the use of wearables
could provide a powerful catalyst toward widespread cultural change.

Pharmacological Interventions
Similar to physiological interventions, pharmacological interventions
offer opportunities for enhanced cognitive capacity. Stimulant use is one
such intervention that is already pervasive in the Army. At the high end,
medical providers prescribe drugs such as dextroamphetamine to aviators
for sustaining cognitive performance and alertness on long missions. More
commonly, soldiers consume caffeine to aid their individual performance.71
While opportunities exist for further research and ethical debate on the
use of cognitive performance-enhancing drugs such as modafinil (Provigil),
methylphenidate (Ritalin), and various amphetamine mixes (Adderall),
caffeine use is largely uncontroversial in Western society.72 Even so, excessive
caffeine consumption produces unwanted side effects, including insomnia,
anxiety, increased blood pressure, and heart palpitations.73 To reliably enhance

70. Adam Cucchiara, Project Polar Unit Report, (Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan, 4-31 Infantry Battalion,
November 2, 2020), 3.
71. Paul Scharre and Lauren Fish, Human Performance Enhancement (Center for a New American Security,
2018), 7–9, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20411.
72. Scharre and Fish, Human Performance Enhancement, 8.
73. Yolanda R. Arrington, “The Science behind Why You Should Stop Chugging So Many Energy Drinks,”
Department of Defense News (website), December 28, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/180140/the_science
_behind_why_you_should_stop_chugging_so_many_energy_drinks.

Strategy

Herlihy

89

cognitive performance, a deliberate approach to stimulant use is required
to achieve optimal levels of arousal without negative health consequences.
The 2B-Alert application is one novel approach to optimizing caffeine
usage with potential for use Army-wide. Currently in development by Walter
Reed Army Institute of Research in collaboration with the Biotechnology
High Performance Computing Software Applications Institute, 2B-Alert
uses machine learning, sleep history, and personal data to predict cognitive
function during periods of sleep loss and develops a caffeine-dosing
schedule to maximize alertness during desired time windows.74 If integrated
with wearable technology, incorporated into all training, and made a part
of everyday military culture, applications like 2B-Alert could provide safe and
cost-effective cognitive enhancement across the Joint force.

Technological Enhancements
Multiple efforts across the DoD explore technology-based means
of cognitive enhancement. These techniques vary widely in terms
of development, methods of application, and cost but should be considered part
of an overall cognitive dominance strategy. For example, transcranial electrical
stimulation (TES) enhances brain signals to mimic brain waves found during
deep, restorative sleep to improve sleep quality.75 Thus, use of TES in a sleepdeprived environment could allow soldiers to gain more restorative effects
from brief periods of sleep to enhance cognition. Ongoing studies by the
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Sleep Research Center, partnered
with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and
Teledyne Scientific, are assessing the effectiveness of a fieldable TES device
to make the most of limited sleep periods and improve fatigue management.76
Transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) is already in use by Olympic
athletes and undergoing testing within the Department of Defense. Unlike
transcranial electrical stimulation, tDCS works by increasing energy in the
brain to promote neural activity and alter brain connections to improve
motor performance and cognition. Initial testing by Navy special operators
shows tDCS can improve training efficiency, and Air Force studies show

74. DA, Sleep Dispatch, 6; and Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, Military Operational
Medicine Research Program, and US Army Medical Research and Development Command, “2B-Alert Web:
Predictions on the Effects of Sleep/Wake and Caffeine on Alertness,” Biotechnology HPC Software Applications
Institute (website), https://2b-alert-web.bhsai.org/2b-alert-web/login.xhtml.
75. Tina Burke, discussion with author, December 10, 2020.
76. DA, Sleep Dispatch, 9.
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increased vigilance and enhanced cognition under fatigue using transcranial
direct-current stimulation.77
Biotechnological and pharmacological cognitive enhancement is sparking
ethical debate regarding the liberty of soldiers to consent to enhancement
and the long-term repercussions of enhancing a segment of society.78 The
Army should engage in this debate as it continues its enhancement research
efforts to keep pace with near-peer competitors. Recognizing these ethical
limitations and budgetary constraints, however, the Army should place more
emphasis on readily executable and less controversial efforts in the near term.

Cognitive Software Upgrades – A Direct Approach
Revisiting our computer analogy helps illustrate that enhanced cognitive
software—how we use our minds—provides a direct approach to cognitive
performance enhancement. While indirect steps can improve cognitive
hardware, better hardware alone may not enhance performance. New
hardware often requires upgraded software and greater user proficiency to
maximize its potential. Therefore, direct and indirect approaches—upgraded
hardware and software—are necessary to achieve the highest levels of
cognitive performance. Brain education, cognitive science-based learning
techniques, and methods of managing information overload offer practical
software upgrades for minimal investment.

Brain Education and Self Awareness
Many cognitive psychologists and neurologists agree the optimization
of individual cognitive performance starts with understanding the brain.79
A basic understanding of brain function sets the stage for metacognition,
or “thinking about thinking.” Army doctrine values metacognition for
complex problem-solving and adaptive thinking but provides little insight
into how to develop and improve metacognitive processes.80 Moreover,
the scant writing on metacognition in Army doctrine focuses entirely
on leaders in a complex problem-solving context and fails to account
for broader application across the force. In his 2011 thesis on
applying neuroscience to enhance cognitive performance in the Army,
77. Scharre and Fish, Human Performance Enhancement, 9.
78. Gareth W., “Hacking Brains: Enhancing Soldier Cognitive Performance,” Wavell Room: Contemporary
British Military Thought (website), June 25, 2020, https://wavellroom.com/2020/06/25/hacking-brains
-enhancing-soldier-cognitive-performance/.
79. Peter C. Brown, Henry L. Roediger III, and Mark A. McDaniel, Make It Stick: The Science of Successful
Learning (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2014), 7; Rock, Your Brain at Work, 1.
80. Department of the Army, Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Leader Development (Washington, DC:
Government Publishing Office, 2015), 5-2.
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Andrew Steadman observes, “metacognition has not [yet] descended to the
tactical level as a desirable leader trait and training concept.”81
Universal training and education of service members on basic brain
science and metacognition can create the foundation for peak cognitive
performance when complemented by an individual’s ability to observe brain
processes in real time.82 Metacognition is accomplished through mindfulness,
or paying close attention to the present moment “on purpose and without
judgment.”83 Multiple neuroscience and psychology studies reveal significant
benefits from practicing mindfulness, including improved cognitive control
and decision making.84 The Army incorporates mindfulness training as part
of the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program and recognizes
the concepts of mindfulness and mindful awareness in Army H2F doctrine
and coaching.85 The concepts of mindfulness and mindful awareness, however,
lack a widespread understanding and adoption across the force.
Brain science, metacognition, and mindful awareness must be integrated
into professional military education to optimize soldier cognitive performance
across the Army. The Applied Critical Thinking course offered by the US
Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies offers baseline
curriculum content for field grade pre-command courses and the Army
Strategic Education Program.86 These topics should also be taught across
all initial entry training pipelines, tailored to skill and experience level, and
customized based on career-long assessment results. This approach is similar
in many ways to the Navy’s Warrior Toughness program, which focuses
on the development of sailor spiritual, mental, and physical strength and has
seen promising initial results.87
The Navy implemented the Warrior Toughness curriculum across all
enlisted and officer accessions programs in 2018 after reviewing recent
accidents aboard USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain.88 It uses
mindfulness and the sports psychology techniques of goal setting, self-talk,
visualization, and energy management to improve emotional regulation and
81. Steadman, Cognitive Performance in Combat, 24.
82. Rock, Your Brain at Work, 87.
83. HQDA, FM 7-22, 13-3; and Rock, Your Brain at Work, 89–90.
84. Elizabeth A. Stanley and Amishi P. Jha, “Mind Fitness: Improving Operational Effectiveness and Building
Warrior Resilience,” Joint Force Quarterly 55, no. 4 (2009): 147–48; and Rock, Your Brain at Work, 86–89.
85. Brunyé et al., “Cognitive Enhancement in Military Contexts”: 6; and HQDA, FM 7-22, 13-3.
86. “Red Team Education,” United States Army Combined Arms Center (website), https://usacac.army.mil
/organizations/ufmcs-red-teaming.
87. Michael Bernacchi, Stephen Drum, Jennifer Anderson, and Kathleen Saul, “Warrior Toughness: Making
the Mind, Body, Soul Connection,” Proceedings 145, no. 7 (July 2019), https://www.usni.org/magazines
/proceedings/2019/july/warrior-toughness-making-mind-body-soul-connection; and Melissa D. Hiller Lauby,
“Navy Warrior Toughness Program” (Microsoft Teams presentation, 2020 Performance Psychology Summit,
Microsoft Teams, November 12, 2020).
88. Lauby, “Navy Warrior Toughness Program.”
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cognitive performance.89 The implementation of Warrior Toughness marks
a significant investment in cultural change across the Navy, the results
of which are thus far difficult to quantify. Anecdotally, US Navy clinical
psychologist Captain Melissa D. Hiller Lauby notes sailors successfully
responding to the fire aboard USS Bonhomme Richard in July 2020 referenced
the benefits of Warrior Toughness training on multiple occasions during
after-action debriefings. Specifically, the use of self-talk and emotional
regulation helped some sailors respond more calmly in the face of extreme
stress.90 Additional time and analysis are required to judge the effectiveness
of the program, but Warrior Toughness could inform Army efforts to change
its cognitive performance culture.

Cognitive Science–Based Learning
Training is ubiquitous in the Army, but recent cognitive science research
demonstrates how many of the Army’s training techniques may fail
to produce long-term comprehension. Cognitive science shows repetitive
drills, rote memorization, and rereading are not as effective as many believe.91
Research in academic situations and with athletes attempting to master
motor skills, such as hitting a baseball, reveal that changing how instruction
and training are provided greatly influences the quality and durability
of learning.92 Adoption of cognitive science-based learning methods such
as spaced practice, interleaving, and adaptive tutoring can provide the Army
with low-cost opportunities to maximize the effectiveness of education and
training to improve cognitive performance.
Furthermore, Army Field Manual (FM) 7-22, Holistic Health and Fitness,
states cognitive science-based learning strategies, which control the learning
environment, limit interruptions, and tailor instruction to soldier learning
preferences, can result in more effective task mastery.93 Wade Elmore,
an applied cognitive and brain science expert at Army University, sees the
opportunity for adaptive tutoring technology to increase durable learning.94
Studies indicate intelligent tutoring platforms using machine learning and
computer algorithms to deliver customized instruction outperform all other

89. Bernacchi et al., “Warrior Toughness.”
90. Lauby, “Navy Warrior Toughness Program.”
91. Brown, Roediger, and McDaniel, Make It Stick, 9.
92. Sarma and Yoquinto, “Cramming May Help for Next-Day Exams, but for Long-Term Memory, Spacing
Out Study Is What Works,” Washington Post, November 30, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/health
/memory-and-cramming-for-exams/2020/11/27/d395a838-29bd-11eb-8fa2-06e7cbb145c0_story.html.
93. HQDA, FM 7-22, 9-3.
94. Elmore, discussion with author, December 9, 2020.
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methods, including human tutors.95 Although intelligent tutoring may not
directly enhance decision-making and critical thinking skills, increasing
soldier tacit knowledge through a tailored approach to enhanced learning
provides a basis for subsequent mastery of related cognitive tasks.96 Cognitive
science-based learning methods and technology must be adopted throughout
Army training, incorporated into Army training doctrine, and integrated
into Army training culture. Increasing the quantity and quality of durable
knowledge and skills embedded in soldier long-term memory is a powerful
way to optimize cognitive software for peak performance.

Managing Information Overload
While cognitive science-based learning methods and technologies can
assist with optimizing learning, improving soldier short-term working
memory requires a different approach. Army doctrine recognizes this and
asserts in FM 7-22, Holistic Health and Fitness, that soldiers who optimize
their short-term working memory can process and complete complex tasks
more effectively.97 The manual goes on to offer task simplification, learning
cues, and memory cues as ways to boost performance but stops short
of a more comprehensive approach and misses an opportunity to influence
Army culture in this critical area.
Offsetting the effects of information overload requires a fundamental
change to the Army’s “always on” culture of communication and information
management. The expectation that leaders in particular are always available
for instantaneous communication degrades cognitive performance through
frequent interruptions, distractions, and emotional arousal.98 Education on the
effects of multitasking, distraction, frequent interruption, and information
overload as part of an Army-wide brain science education initiative could
provide an important first step in driving change.
Effective time management provides another opportunity to reduce
mental friction and boost cognitive performance.99 The demands of daily
operations often test leader time-management skills. Yet, effective timemanagement techniques are not taught systematically in professional military
education below the senior service college level. Consequently, many leaders
95. James A. Kulik and J. D. Fletcher, “Effectiveness of Intelligent Tutoring Systems: A Meta-Analytic
Review,” Review of Educational Research 86, no. 1 (March 2016): 67, https://journals.sagepub.com
/doi/10.3102/0034654315581420.
96. Brown, Roediger, and McDaniel, Make It Stick, 18–19.
97. Alan Baddeley, “Working Memory,” Science 255, no. 5044 (January 1992): 559, http://psych.colorado
.edu/~kimlab/baddeley.1992.pdf; and HQDA, FM 7-22, 9-3.
98. Rock, Your Brain at Work, 131.
99. Levitin, The Organized Mind, 175–76.
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are unaware of cognitive science-based best practices for time management
and execute daily schedules that guarantee suboptimal cognitive performance.
Increased education in this area could help leaders create daily schedules that
avoid distractions during creative times, provide opportunities for focused
work, and support adequate sleep and nutrition.

Conclusion
Cognitive capability is the foundation of individual and collective
performance in all domains. As the US Army prepares for multi-domain
operations, establishing the culture and behaviors that promote cognitive
dominance is essential to compete successfully with near-peer adversaries
seeking asymmetric advantages across multiple domains. To succeed,
the Army must replace its “always on” culture of multitasking and connectivity
with a culture of cognitive performance optimization and enhancement
to dominate and win in the Information Age. It is only through a deliberate
approach rooted in education, training, technology, and hard work that the
US Army can establish a lasting culture of cognitive dominance.
While it is tempting to bet solely on technological advances to achieve
cognitive dominance, a diversified approach across the doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policies
(DOTMLPF-P) framework is required to reduce risk in a time of budgetary
and operational uncertainty. The Army must incorporate both indirect and
direct approaches to cognitive performance enhancement while engaging
in the ethical debates associated with these methods. America’s future
adversaries will continue to seek an asymmetric advantage in the cognitive
domain. We must force them to try to overcome the determination, creativity,
and grit of the American soldier to achieve it.
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Leader Perspectives on Managing
Suicide-related Events in Garrison
Thomas H. Nassif, George A. Mesias, and Amy B. Adler

ABSTRACT: Leaders who have personally experienced the aftermath of a suiciderelated event can provide important lessons and recommendations for military
leadership and policymakers. This paper executes a thematic analysis of interviews
with leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers who responded to garrison
suicide-related events and explores leader decision making related to memorials,
investigations, and readiness.
Keywords: suicide postvention, garrison, military leader, chaplain, behavioral
health provider

S

uicide is a significant threat to military readiness and is a preventable form
of death. In the last decade, suicide has become a leading cause of death
for service members, claiming more lives than combat and transportation
accidents.1 The suicide rate among active-duty service members increased
from 20.3 members per 100,000 in 2015 to 28.7 members per 100,000 in 2020.2
Collectively referred to as suicide-related events, suicides, suicide attempts, and
suicidal thoughts requiring intervention have ripple effects extending beyond any one
individual. Researchers estimate every death by suicide impacts 135 people.3
Clearly, these disturbing and tragic events reverberate across the
community, from leaders and unit personnel to friends and family members.
Supporting those affected in the wake of a suicide-related event is called
postvention. Suicide postvention targets those potentially affected by the event
to help mitigate behavioral health concerns in the aftermath. 4 Postvention refers
to support in response to suicide but may also apply to support in response
to a suicide attempt or other suicide-related event. Postvention responses are
shared by a team of unit leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers.
This team is further supplemented by civilian nonmedical counselors (military
and family life counselors). Leaders faced with managing these events must
sustain the morale and readiness of their troops while acknowledging each
1. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, “Surveillance Snapshot: Manner and Cause of Death, Active
Component, U.S. Armed Forces, 1998–2013,” Medical Surveillance Monthly Report (MSMR) 21, no. 10
(October 2014): 21.
2. Department of Defense (DoD), Annual Suicide Report (Washington, DC: DoD, 2020), 6.
3. Julie Cerel et al., “How Many People Are Exposed to Suicide? Not Six,” Suicide and Life‐Threatening Behavior 49,
no. 2 (April 2019): 529–34.
4. John Deheegher, “Suicide of a Service Member: How to Organize Support for the Bereaved Service Members
in the Emotional Aftermath,” in Lowering Suicide Risk in Returning Troops: Wounds of War, ed. Brenda K. Wiederhold,
(Fairfax, VA: IOS Press, 2008), 149.
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event. Despite its importance, little has been written about how to respond
to the aftermath of suicide-related events. In fact, a RAND report about
the Department of Defense identified the response to suicide-related events
as an area in critical need of study.5
In an effort to address this gap, the Defense Suicide Prevention Office
published a Postvention Toolkit in 2019. The Toolkit details postvention
procedures, roles, and responsibilities and includes checklists of immediate
actions for unit leaders, chaplains, behavioral health providers, and other
key players (for example, military investigators and casualty assistance
officers) involved in managing a suicide death.6 The Toolkit, however, does
not address situations involving nonlethal suicide-related events nor does
it provide nuances around managing suicide-related events and how these
decisions operate in a real-world context. Leaders have much to consider
in the aftermath of a suicide-related event, including their own emotional
responses, and may feel alone in navigating this process. The present article
expands upon the Postvention Toolkit by addressing these remaining gaps.
Building on a previous effort to study postvention practices during
deployment, we have summarized leader decision making following
a suicide-related event in garrison.7 The current garrison-focused study,
funded by the Military Operational Medicine Research Program and
coordinated with the Defense Suicide Prevention Office, conducted
16 semi-structured interviews with five leaders, six chaplains, and five
behavioral health providers, each of whom had responded to a garrison
suicide-related event in the past five years. The study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,
and participants provided informed consent. Leaders included Army officers
with nine to 24 years of military service who served as company, battalion,
and brigade commanders during these events. Chaplains included Army
officers with 11 to 30 years of military service who served at the battalion
and brigade levels and the state (National Guard) level. Behavioral health
providers included social workers and clinical psychologists comprised
of Army officers with two to 17 years of military service. Officers in each

5. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “Suicide Postvention in the Department of Defense: Evidence, Policies and
Procedures, and Perspectives of Loss Survivors,” Rand Health Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2015).
6. Department of Defense (DoD) and Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO), “Postvention Toolkit
for a Military Suicide Loss” (Washington, DC: DoD, 2019), https://www.dspo.mil/Portals/113/Documents
/PostventionToolkit.pdf.
7. Abby Adler et al., “A Qualitative Analysis of Strategies for Managing Suicide-Related Events during Deployment from the Perspective of Army Behavioral Health Providers, Chaplains, and Leaders,”
Military Psychology 30, no. 2 (April 2018): 87–97.
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category ranged in rank from captain to colonel, and there was one Army
civilian behavioral health provider.
This paper reports on results from a thematic analysis of these interviews,
provides brief case studies, and highlights lessons learned. Quotes were
edited for clarity and to preserve anonymity. By leveraging the experience
of leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers, we aim to offer
a real-world perspective on navigating the challenges of suicide postvention.
Themes are not presented in any particular order. Our intent is for this
information to better equip leaders to respond to suicide-related events and
mitigate the potentially negative impact on themselves, their units, and the
wider community.

Confronting Personal Emotions about Suicide
The first theme that emerged from the interviews was how leaders
described the aftermath of the suicide-related event in terms of their own
emotional experience. Leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers
who participated in the interviews experienced a range of emotions
in response to suicide-related events. Many reported initial shock and
disbelief, particularly because many thought the affected soldiers were doing
well. Interviewees also mentioned feeling disappointment that the affected
soldier did not reach out for help and self-doubt as to whether there was
something they could have done differently. Finally, some experienced anger
and frustration with themselves, the affected soldier, and the unit for not
foreseeing and preventing the suicide.
Interviewees recognized the importance of being aware of their emotions
and identifying ways to manage them. Some reported that taking leave from
work provided a tactical pause to refocus on the tasks at hand. For others,
the experience of a unit member’s death by suicide led them to realize certain
behaviors such as turning to alcohol were less productive, whereas other
coping strategies such as connecting with family for support or engaging
in recreational activities were more productive. As one leader mentioned:
“I turned to that six-pack of beer, and did that very heavily, which was
not helpful. I soon realized that talking with professionals and having
open conversations with my wife about why I’m feeling that way, and taking
breaks to do things I love, like travelling, hunting, and fishing, was what
I needed most.”
Leaders reported that suicide-related events negatively impacted their
lives at home. One leader mentioned his high level of stress in response
to the event made time with his wife and child more stressful than at any
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other time in his career. Another leader expressed a similar experience
of stress but discussed how they found it helpful to take the long way back
from work or go for a run before returning home to readjust to family life
after a stressful day.
General consensus emerged among respondents that the process
of handling difficult personal emotions and learning about the issue
of suicide offered an opportunity to develop as a leader. For example,
one respondent reported that learning about suicide was professionally
enlightening and helped him perform more effectively. Another leader
reflected: “If you disregard the issue of suicide and say, ‘that can’t happen
to me,’ you risk losing credibility as a leader. These experiences have helped
my personal growth and allowed me to evaluate my own priorities and move
through life with purpose. Seeing through a different lens helped suspend
my assumptions and embrace the reality of suicide.”
For others, personal discomfort with the topic of suicide and avoidance
of candid discussions served as barriers to unit cohesion: “I stayed positive
around those soldiers, but I was uncomfortable talking about the subject.
I had to put that behind me and ask the hard questions, otherwise I was
going to miss something and wouldn’t be able to help them.” As this leader
noted, engaging in genuine conversations with soldiers who were grappling
with suicide-related issues was more productive than putting on a positive
facade or ignoring the suicide.
By recognizing rather than avoiding personal emotions in response
to a suicide-related event, leaders appear better able to respond effectively.
Additionally, leaders reported the utility of engaging in productive
coping strategies such as connecting with family for support or partaking
in enjoyable activities outside of work.

Managing Stress around Blame
Besides their own emotions, leaders may also have to manage blamerelated stressors. Despite leader efforts to prevent suicides, many respondents
felt leaders often shouldered the blame for suicide-related events provoked
by circumstances outside of their control. 8 In one case, a soldier was using
illicit drugs, receiving addiction treatment, and being chaptered out of the
Army. The soldier met with a behavioral health specialist who cleared him
as “low risk.” A week after the meeting, the soldier fatally stabbed himself.
The soldier’s parent called his commander in the middle of the night,
8.

Pak et al., “Suicide Postvention,” 189, 195.
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accusing him of killing their son. In another case, a soldier had received
multiple DUIs, failed an Army Physical Fitness Test, and had marital issues.
The soldier’s parent blamed their son’s leader for the suicide, which occurred
shortly after the leader took command. In both cases, intense family grief
and accusations exacerbated the emotional toll on leaders and made it more
difficult for leaders to manage the aftermath effectively.
In addition to stress from grieving family members, leaders faced
stress related to the completion of procedural requirements such
as 15-6 investigations and the Department of Defense Suicide Event Report.
Furthermore, leaders reported being confused about what actions to take
in response to the suicide-related event. They indicated the investigations
following a suicide appeared bureaucratic, burdensome, and focused
on finding a scapegoat for the suicide. Personnel responsible for completing
these procedural requirements may not be familiar with the principles
of postvention and are not expected to play a role in postvention activities.
Nevertheless, leaders wished a team would help them proactively work
toward the next steps in managing the event and preventing a recurrence.
Generally, investigations were described as centering on uncovering
the cause of the suicide rather than providing postvention guidance.
For example, one investigation focused on determining whether barriers
to seeking behavioral health services could have contributed to the suicide.
Nonetheless, respondents expressed concern that the investigation process
appeared to emphasize blame. Respondents also reported the investigation
process detracted from other priorities such as checking in with those
who may have been affected by the event and providing emotional support
to subordinate leaders.
Whether being blamed by family members or experiencing the strain
of an investigation, leaders may find themselves juggling additional sources
of stress during this difficult time. Furthermore, while those affected
by a suicide may seek answers to why it occurred, it is not always possible to
identify a root cause.

Caring for Individual Soldiers and Sustaining Unit Readiness
Emotional support was a key theme across interviews, and several
leaders reflected on the challenge of striking a balance between individual
and unit needs. One observed that when navigating suicide-related events
“making sure [soldiers] get the help they need but also holding them
accountable was a hard balance—one that I haven’t completely figured out.”
Although unit readiness was a priority, several leaders felt it was important
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to consider the needs of individual soldiers when setting training expectations
following a suicide in their unit. Considering the nature and culture
of the organization was regarded as helpful in striking this balance
between empathy and discipline. For example, leaders discussed the need
to set aside time to mourn, reflect, and understand and then to move
forward as a unit to refocus on the mission. Explicitly acknowledging this
balance helped send a message to the unit that people come first and that
their leadership cares. Not all respondents, however, felt this balance was
supported: “First Sergeant said this is not a way to get out of training.
You signed the dotted line. If you are having issues, get help, but if not,
put your best effort forth. This is tough love.”
This balance between empathy and discipline is a challenge for leaders.
Resuming training too soon after a suicidal event could be jarring.
Responses indicated moving from the period of mourning to refocusing
on training has to be carefully timed. Shifting training by a week and
reengaging in unit tasks could help morale and maintain discipline.
One leader feared if his unit remained too engrossed in a suicide-related
event, rather than getting “on the beat” and moving, it could damage
unit morale and lead to suicide contagion.9 This leader emphasized
moving forward: “We’re not going to delay our field training next week—
it’s going to run its course. We’ll honor the individual’s service, but then
we’re going back out to train.”
Leaders reported the health of an organization’s climate and
culture determined the effectiveness of the organization’s response
to a suicide-related event. One leader felt it was important to be a selfless
leader, mentor, and peer: “If you’re not visible, present, and compassionate,
you’re going to have problems in the organization.” Leaders emphasized
caring for their soldiers and ensuring everyone received the support needed.
According to one commander, “Leaders don’t want to be considered callous.
Some might argue that if you weren’t caring about the individual, then you
were a cause of the suicide.”
Leaders reported simple acts can go a long way toward showing soldiers
that leadership cares about their well-being. One leader noted the importance
of “letting your walls down, allowing your emotions to show, taking off
your rank, and being human and compassionate.” The same leader added,

9. For additional information on suicide contagion, see Pak et al., “Suicide Postvention”; and Robert J.
Ursano et al., “Risk of Suicide Attempt among Soldiers in Army Units with a History of Suicide Attempts,”
JAMA Psychiatry 74, no. 9 (2017): 924–31.
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“If a soldier is in quarters, go visit them. It’s not just the care you show
to that individual, it’s the care you have for the organization.”
In addition, senior leaders found an open-door policy helped boost unit
morale, foster trust, and increase awareness of personal problems insolvable
at junior levels of leadership. One leader noted: “When I first assumed
command, morale was very low. My First Sergeant and I were the gatekeepers
of all that was going on in the unit. After the suicide, soldiers came
to me with marital problems and other issues they couldn’t solve
with subordinate leadership.” Despite efforts to build unit morale and
support, soldiers may not always experience this support. According to the
observation of one chaplain, soldiers feel they are “not more important than
the materiel we manage in our unit—a tank, a Humvee, or their M16.”
The health of an organization’s climate and culture begins with a leader’s
commitment to being visible to, open with, and compassionate toward
soldiers. By striking a balance between empathy and discipline—and carefully
timing unit tasks and training events in the aftermath of a suicide—leaders
can both support the needs of individual soldiers and maintain unit morale.

Leveraging Communication Channels
Another prominent theme was the importance of empowering subordinate
leaders to help soldiers struggling with work or personal problems.
This empowerment is intended to alleviate subordinate leaders’ concern that
suicidal events occurred on their watch. Leaders emphasized the importance
of subordinate leaders knowing their soldiers, tracking their soldiers’ actions,
and keenly observing circumstances that could negatively impact well-being.
Following one suicide-related event, a battalion commander set the
expectation that the immediate level of leadership within each company
and platoon would monitor its soldiers and mitigate potential stressors.
Consequently, lines of communication improved, enabling soldiers to feel
more comfortable with speaking up if something was bothering them.
Similarly, another commander, following a suicide-related event, reported
explicitly holding his subordinate leaders accountable for providing engaged
leadership, which helped identify unit members in need of additional
support. This commander also communicated directly with chaplains and
behavioral health providers to identify unit members struggling to cope
with the suicide-related event. In another interview, a leader noticed his
mid-level NCOs were shouldering a great deal of stress looking out for
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their junior enlisted soldiers, which prompted him to coach his E7s and E8s
to mentor and support these mid-level NCOs.
As these examples demonstrate, leaders play a critical role in assessing
soldier risk, mitigating that risk, and creating a network of support.
To help leaders in this role, the Army has developed and evaluated tools
to support leaders with monitoring suicide risk in their respective units.
The Behavioral Health Readiness and Suicide Risk Reduction Review
(R4) was designed to help unit leaders review unit members in terms
of (1) risk factors (for example, suicide-related thoughts and behaviors),
(2) behavioral health profiles, (3) loss (for example, death of a close
family member, a breakup, injury, financial hardship, or career transition),
(4) social and psychological isolation, and (5) high-risk comments
(for
example, statements
indicating
suicide
is
acceptable). 10
Additionally, R4 provides recommendations for leaders depending
on their level of responsibility, with tailored versions for platoon and
company leaders.11 Although it is difficult to determine empirically if R4
is effective, there is potential benefit from R4 when it comes to strengthening
leaders’ assessment and management of risk.12
While the interviews were conducted prior to the release of the R4 tool,
respondents emphasized the need for all levels of leadership to continue
fostering open communication channels following the immediate aftermath
of a suicide. Even after regular training resumes, leaders may need to continue
providing targeted support. A behavioral health provider reflected on the
importance of communication with the affected unit: “We determined the
unit needs and talked to the guys in the affected unit to get a pulse of how

10. Justin M. Curley et al., “Development of the U.S. Army’s Suicide Prevention Leadership Tool:
The Behavioral Health Readiness and Suicide Risk Reduction Review (R4),” Military Medicine 185,
no. 5-6 (2020): e668–77.
11. Curley et al., “R4,” e673–76.
12. Justin M. Curley et al., “Suicide Behavior Results from the U.S. Army’s Suicide Prevention Leadership
Tool Study: The Behavioral Health Readiness and Suicide Risk Reduction Review (R4),” Military Medicine
00 (2022): 1–9.
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they were feeling. And then [we] followed up with the unit periodically.”
A chaplain emphasized the need to follow up with soldiers long-term.
Following a suicidal event, people are stunned, and then things
appear to return to normal. Weeks later, many experience a shift
in thoughts and emotions and a sense of unfinished business.
It’s important to give it some time because you will likely need
to address behavioral health challenges later on. Follow-ups are
an extremely important source of new information.

Leaders also reported that open communication with the chaplains
assigned to their unit provided invaluable information following
a suicide-related event. Although some leaders felt the rules around
confidentiality might impede the identification of additional at-risk
soldiers, other leaders reported that chaplains were able to check on
potentially worrisome issues within units (for example, suicidal thoughts,
marital problems, and social isolation) and help mitigate the risk of future
suicide-related events.
One leader asked their chaplain to provide weekly anonymous statistics
to the command on the overall health of the unit (for example, marital
problems, and suicidal ideations). They believed reporting the number
of suicidal ideations each month provided a useful way of highlighting the
overall risk facing the unit. Thus, chaplains could communicate risk levels
to leadership while maintaining confidentiality. As one chaplain noted:
“Confidentiality in the Chaplain Corps allows us to approach individuals
who seem to be struggling, and when they report feeling better, that’s a
win. If we didn’t have that confidentiality, there would be even more stigma
and hiding of issues.”
Chaplains and behavioral health providers can support a leader’s
efforts in fostering open communication channels following a suicide.
In addition, empowering subordinate leaders to monitor soldiers for potential
behavioral health concerns can help leaders identify unit members in need
of additional support. Army tools such as R4 can help monitor suicide risk
by tailoring recommendations to leaders at different levels of responsibility.

Planning the Postvention Response
Respondents noted the importance of taking the risk of suicide seriously
while acknowledging sometimes the nature of the risk is only identified
after the leader is confronted with a suicide-related event in their own
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unit. As one leader noted, his past experience with suicide attuned him
to the topic.
After going to a funeral of a soldier from my first command,
it made me react faster the next time. In my second command,
I was more reflective and responded quicker when I saw someone
going down the road of suicidal thoughts and made them go see
someone. I had a better sense of when someone was truly stressed
and wasn’t saying anything about it.

Besides taking the risk of suicide seriously, leaders also talked about the
importance of developing a plan for accessing behavioral health resources,
though such a plan should be in place prior to a suicide-related event.
Pairing servicemembers with appropriate resources can be facilitated
by adapting leader tools like the R4 for the postvention phase.13
A net of behavioral health resources following a suicide can help improve
unit coordination, ensure soldiers receive adequate support, and provide
a safe environment. For example, leaders reported that, following a suicide,
behavioral health providers supporting unit members with information
on the grieving process and survivor’s guilt were helpful. One chaplain
suggested the Warrior Ethos (for example, “never leave a fallen comrade”)
supported the commitment of unit members to escort fellow soldiers
to get help from a chaplain or behavioral health professional. As one chaplain
noted, whenever he met with a soldier who was having a difficult time
in response to a suicide-related event, the chaplain would routinely
ask a battle buddy to accompany them as part of an extended safety net.
Respondents concurred when a soldier expresses suicidal ideation or intent
the immediate response should be to assign a trusted peer or leader to escort
that soldier to the emergency department or behavioral health clinic for an
evaluation and remain with the soldier until discharge or admission to an
inpatient treatment facility. Consistent with the Army ACE (Ask, Care, and
Escort) Suicide Intervention model, leaders described the need to ensure
their subordinate leaders and soldiers were familiar with procedures for
referring to medical and behavioral health care.14
Respondents commented on the importance of counteracting the
stigma of seeking professional help through positive messaging amongst
leadership and through leading by example. Following a suicide in his unit,
one leader worked with his subordinate leaders to generate positive messaging
13. Curley et al., “R4,” e672–73.
14. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the US Military,” Rand Health
Quarterly 1 (Spring 2011): 128.
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across the chain of command to normalize help-seeking behavior as an act
of strength and courage rather than a sign of weakness and to emphasize
sustaining physical and mental wellness. As this leader observed: “We have
physical rehab for knees and backs that are broken, but when your mind
is broken, you have rehab for that too. . . . And if Sergeant Major goes there,
it sets the example to the unit that it’s okay to go to the clinic for support.”
In this context, “broken” refers to mental health problems from which
soldiers can recover much like physical injuries.
One behavioral health provider commented: “When the commander
asked us to be there, he needed to know that they could depend on us.
After the suicide happened, the whole brigade rallied with resources.”
These behavioral health professionals offered formal and informal approaches
such as one-on-one counseling or small group sessions to provide a forum
for soldiers to discuss their feelings. Following the discussions, behavioral
health providers remained behind for informal closed-door sessions
and made themselves available at morning sick call to provide additional
nonclinical support. As one provider stated: “We were there to help, not
clinically, but instead we put on a different hat temporarily and made them
feel more comfortable to speak freely.” Behavioral health providers can put
on different hats and offer formal clinical and informal nonclinical support.
For soldiers who might not feel comfortable seeking support from their
unit leadership, chaplain, or behavioral health services, leaders reported the
benefit of making their soldiers aware of alternative postvention resources
such as Army Community Services, Military OneSource, and Military and
Family Life Counselors (MFLCs). For example, the MFLC Program offers
short-term, nonmedical counseling support for a number of issues such
as relationships, crisis intervention, stress management, grief, and
occupational issues.15 Since sessions are not documented and are treated
less formally than therapy, soldiers may feel more comfortable engaging
MFLC services. As one chaplain noted, “Some soldiers are disenchanted
with chaplains because they are religious in nature. Others will not
go to behavioral health because the visits are annotated in their records.
The third option makes up the trifecta. MFLCs are generally older,
more experienced practitioners who work in civilian clothes.”
Respondents also described how during the postvention phase they
chose to coordinate suicide awareness and prevention training events that
generated awareness of high-risk categories (for example, relationship
problems, legal or financial difficulties, or substance misuse) and reinforced
15. Thomas E. Trail et al., “An Evaluation of U.S. Military Non-Medical Counseling Programs,”Rand Health
Quarterly 8, no. 2 (2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/health-quarterly/issues/v8/n2/06.html.
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a supportive and caring culture to help mitigate the risk of future
suicide-related events. The concern about mitigating future suicide-related
events was a priority for leaders even as they were trying to manage the
postvention phase.
Each of these leader responses—from taking future suicide risk
seriously to building a net of resources, normalizing help-seeking behavior,
offering a variety of behavioral health services, and coordinating suicide
awareness and prevention training events—reflects the desire to reduce
the risk of additional suicide-related events and to establish a culture that
proactively supports the behavioral health of unit members.

Building a Supportive Climate to
Reintegrate At-Risk Soldiers
During the interviews, leaders described taking a number of actions
to build a safe and supportive climate to help reintegrate at-risk soldiers
after an evaluation or hospitalization. Leaders mentioned the degree
to which the affected soldier believed the unit genuinely cared influenced
the effectiveness of unit support. For instance, leaders mentioned that
encouraging their squad leaders to set aside their rank periodically to listen
actively to the affected soldier could show the individual leadership cares.
Leaders and chaplains also commented on the importance of reintegrating
soldiers who appeared socially isolated by encouraging them to connect
with specific unit members and engaging them in group activities such
as basketball or watching a movie. Such activities helped foster a sense
of unit connection and belongingness for at-risk soldiers.
For soldiers deemed high-risk in terms of behavioral health problems,
unit commanders received helpful guidance from behavioral health
providers regarding the soldier’s profile (for example, duty limitations
and recommended command actions). In an effort to facilitate decision
making among behavioral health providers, the Army developed the
Behavioral Health Readiness Evaluation and Decision-Making Instrument.
This tool standardizes the behavioral health provider’s understanding
of policies and procedures and clarifies under what circumstances a soldier
should be profiled based on regulations.16
Although interviewees did not mention the Decision-Making Instrument,
respondents shared the following recommendations to foster a safe
16. Justin M. Curley et al., “Results of the Behavioral Health Readiness Evaluation and Decision-Making
Instrument Study.,”Military Medicine 186, no. S1 (January/February 2021): S142–52.
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environment, offer unit support, and strengthen camaraderie. These actions
should be conducted based on consultation with the behavioral health
provider (see table 1).
Table 1: Recommendation for unit support of at-risk soldiers after suicide-related events

Recommendation

Implementation Considerations

Restrict access to lethal means.17

Lethal means may include medications, personal firearms,
or sharp objects.
Request soldiers secure their weapon or ammunition
voluntarily at another location such as a trusted friend’s
house or the unit arms room.
Restrictions should be made in coordination with behavioral health providers for the duration the soldier is considered at-risk.

Engage in upstream prevention.18

Ensure consistent leadership
involvement.

Ensure the soldier has the support needed to manage
stressors that contributed to the suicide-related events.
Some potential stressors include financial issues, legal
problems, and relationship problems.
Ensure first line leaders (team or squad leader) periodically
check in on the soldier.
During check-ins, leaders should engage the soldier with
empathy and active listening.
Assign the soldier a battle buddy for social support.

Engage social support and
reintegrate soldiers to unit.19

Facilitate behavioral health
appointments.20

Encourage involvement in unit-led or soldier-led group activities.
Discourage social isolation within the unit and foster a
culture of inclusion.
Ensure the soldier is aware of appointments, and ensure
leaders allow sufficient time for the soldier to attend them.
Remove potential barriers to utilization of behavioral
health or other support systems, such as transportation
limitations or scheduling conflicts.

Determining which actions to take to support at-risk soldiers can
be difficult. Leaders may find it helpful to assess risk factors in their unit
by using the Leader Suicide Risk Assessment Tool. This tool assesses
suicide risk factors through seven risk areas. These risk areas include
legal and discipline problems, occupational problems, access to firearms,
17. “Lethal Means Safety for Military Service Members and Their Families,” DSPO (website), n.d.,
https://www.dspo.mil/Tools/Download-Library/LethalMeansSafety/; and Craig J. Bryan, Rethinking Suicide:
Why Prevention Fails, and How We Can Do Better (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 165–71.
18. Tim Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool for Assessing and Mitigating Suicide Risk Factors,”
Military Medicine 185, no. S1 (January/February 2020): S334–41.
19. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “War Within.”
20. Hoyt et al., “Leader Tool,” 336.
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relationship problems, financial problems, substance misuse, and psychiatric
hospitalization or suicide attempts. This tool also prescribes concrete
mitigation responses.21 By assessing risk factors, leaders can monitor their
unit’s behavioral health, foster a sense of unit connection, strengthen
camaraderie, and take appropriate actions to build a safe and supportive
climate. Collectively these actions can help leaders successfully reintegrate
at-risk soldiers in their unit.

Honoring the Life of a Soldier, Not the Suicidal Act
Within the first 15 days of a suicide, it is customary for unit leaders
to conduct a memorial service. 22 There was general agreement across the
interviews that the memorial service was one of the most difficult and
potentially contentious parts of postvention. Several leaders were concerned
a formal service would encourage their soldiers to perceive the suicide
as an honorable act rather than a tragedy. Many leaders and chaplains
expressed reservations about holding the same type of memorial event
for a soldier who died by suicide as they would for a soldier who died
during combat or training.
Rituals can play an integral role in providing closure for unit members and
family grappling with a significant loss. Respondents agreed that if planned
carefully to recognize the life and the service of the soldier rather than honor
the suicidal act, then memorial services could help surviving unit members,
family, and friends cope with grief. A behavioral health provider remarked,
“There’s always a service member who needs that closure—it’s more
for us and less for the service member who [died by] . . . suicide. It’s helpful
for the provider who offered the services to deal with grief and find closure.
And it’s a way to honor them.”
Memorial services may also help demystify suicide and discourage future
suicidal events. One Army leader reported, “We do a memorial to honor
their service, not the decision they made. I want every leader to see that
this was a tragic end state. It really crushed people. It’s how you approach

21. Hoyt et al., “Leader Tool,” 335–40.
22. DoD and DSPO, Postvention Toolkit, 27.
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suicide and educate people at memorial services. I did not have any suicides
in the brigade after this.”
One leader modified the ceremony to emphasize that suicide was wrong
and should not be “rewarded,” in order to discourage future suicides.
This leader said:
[The Army conducts] . . . memorial ceremonies like a soldier
is a hero, with the boot and rifle. We salute him like he was killed
in action. Following back-to-back suicides, I worked with my
chaplain on his ceremony speech. I gave a coin to his son as a token
of his father’s service. But by following other traditions of memorial
etiquette to this soldier who [died by] . . . suicide we are covering
up the issue. . . . My chain of command was very nervous when
I wanted to change the ceremony. I didn’t want to treat him like
a hero killed by enemy fire. I didn’t change everything I wanted.
They still fired the volleys. The chaplain said we were grateful
for his service.

Several respondents shared the sentiment that, though there may
be a tendency to cast blame, prudence should be exercised in what is said
at the service. Unit members can respond with anger and frustration when
they hear a commander speak disrespectfully about a fellow soldier who
died by suicide. 23 Even so, leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers
remarked that their perspectives about suicide and memorial services evolved
over time. A chaplain reflected on his shift in thinking regarding these
issues: “Thinking about it, I have become more empathetic with people who
have gone down that road alone and can understand the circumstances that
brought them there. For memorial services, I went from ‘no, we’re good’ and
‘suck it up’ to ‘it’s vitally important to honor these people.’ ”
In summary, leaders emphasized the importance of carefully planning
memorial ceremonies to recognize the life and the service of the soldier
rather than honor the suicidal act. In this way, memorial services can
support surviving unit members, family, and friends in the coping process,
provide a sense of closure for those affected by the suicide, and discourage
future suicide-related events.

23.

Pak et al., “Suicide Postvention,” 189.
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Integrating Lessons Learned
Based on the results from the study interviews, we offer several
recommendations for units following suicide-related events (see table 2).
First, suicide postvention may be best conducted through prioritizing
preparation before the suicide-related event. Leaders, chaplains, and
behavioral health providers should build strong relationships through
frequent interactions. They should also prepare for worst-case scenarios
by discussing how they would respond and work as a team.
In another form of preparation, leader training on suicide postvention
could incorporate frank discussions on personal feelings and biases regarding
suicide, including how much time is needed to mourn, when military
training should resume, how to handle memorial services, how to manage
attitudes about blame, and ways to engage in self-care. The goal of these
discussions should be to emphasize the potential ripple effects of such events
in a community, prepare leaders to be adaptive, attuned, and responsive
to unit members, and foster a nonjudgmental culture in the aftermath.
Leader professional development may offer a venue for the inclusion
of these topics.
Additionally, the interviews revealed how suicide-related events can place
a heavy burden on leaders. Division or brigade command groups should
identify leaders with experience in managing such events to serve as mentors
for other unit leaders in the context of postvention. By leveraging their
experience, these mentors can help validate the challenges of postvention and
provide practical guidance to leaders following a suicide in their unit, which
may complement support from behavioral health providers and chaplains.
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Table 2: Summary of recommendations based on findings

Recommendation
Maintain regular interactions between
unit leaders, chaplains, and behavioral
health providers.

Adapt leader trainings to incorporate
frank discussions on personal feelings
and biases related to suicide.

Goals
Build stronger relationships prior to events.
Clarify roles and expectations.
Prepare coordinated responses for various scenarios.
Promote awareness of the ripple effects of suicide
in a community.
Prepare leaders to be adaptive, attuned, and responsive
to unit members.
Foster a non-blame culture.

Identify division or brigade level leaders
with prior experience in managing
suicide-related events to serve
as mentors for subordinate unit leaders.

Provide practical postvention guidance to subordinate
leaders following a suicide in their unit.
Support and validate junior leaders’ challenges
during postvention.
Complement support from behavioral health providers
and chaplains.

Conclusion
Many gray areas exist in the suicide postvention decision-making process,
and leaders can choose from a number of strategies to mitigate potentially
negative impact on themselves, their unit, and the wider community
affected. The data reported here is not exhaustive—every leader has unique
experiences and thoughts about how postvention can be better managed.
The present study was designed to report on frank conversations with key
community members: leaders, chaplains, and behavioral health providers.
Together, their views aid in identifying themes that define aspects
of postvention. We hope the results from this thematic analysis can help
prioritize leader actions during the postvention process and support leader
decision making following suicide-related events.
As the field of postvention evolves and our understanding of suicide
changes, we may need a better approach to postvention. Craig J. Bryan
contends we should rethink the prevailing notion of suicide as the result
of mental illness accompanied by warning signs and instead acknowledge
the dynamic and shifting risks associated with suicide and the degree
to which it occurs when individuals do not appear to be struggling
with mental health and there are few to no warning signs.
In addition, suicide may be better understood as a consequence
of decision-making processes influenced by environmental and social
stressors (for example, legal concerns, financial pressures, or relationship
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problems) rather than a result of individual characteristics or mental illness.24
Such an approach broadens our view of suicide prevention and may be useful
in shaping postvention practices focused on improving the social context
rather than identifying other at-risk soldiers.
For leaders confronted with managing a suicide-related event,
there is no simple checklist of actions to ensure optimal healing and eliminate
risk among unit members. The data presented here illustrate some of the
challenges leaders have faced in navigating the nuances of suicide postvention.
Despite confronting a number of challenging emotions and circumstances,
leaders reported various coping strategies to handle their emotions, myriad
perspectives on leadership strategies to bolster the behavioral health of
their unit, and significant shifts in their thinking about how to approach
suicide risk. There are, however, other options to be considered, and there
is an enterprise-wide team to help move the unit forward in a positive
direction. Leaders emphasized the importance of empowering subordinate
leaders to care for soldiers and of leveraging communication channels
with the chain of command, chaplaincy, and behavioral health professionals
to sense their unit’s behavioral health, identify behavioral health problems
before they become more serious, and help affected soldiers receive help
in recovering. Finally, leaders grappled with the role of memorial services
in honoring the soldier while acknowledging the reality of the loss to friends
and family. The collective experiences of leaders, chaplains, and behavioral
health providers offer a real-world perspective for navigating the challenges
of suicide postvention on the wider community.

24.

Bryan, Rethinking Suicide, 7, 32–34, and 47–50.
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Why Do Senior Officers Sometimes Fail in Character?
The Leaky Character Reservoir
Everett S. P. Spain, Katie E. Matthew, and Andrew L. Hagemaster

ABSTRACT: This article argues senior officers may fail in character because
their rate of character development throughout their careers typically decreases
as environmental stressors rise. It conceptualizes character as an open system
with both gains and leaks over time and integrates existing scholarship
on personality and ethical development to create the Leaky Character
Reservoir framework, which it then applies to Army off icers’ careers.
Military leaders will gain a new understanding of character and find specific
actions leaders, units, and the US Army can undertake to strengthen the
character of its senior officers.
Key words: character, ethics, personality, conditioning history, adult
development, moral development

G

ulf War hero General Norman Schwarzkopf argued that
in addition to competence, effective leaders must also have
character.1 Appropriately, character is one of three competencies
of the US Army’s Leadership Requirement Model and one of three lanes
for the US Navy’s Leader Development Framework, though both stop short
of defining character. 2 Some define character as “[doing] the right thing
when no one is watching,” “choosing the harder right over the easier wrong,”
or “having a priority concern for executing one’s duties and responsibilities
while conforming to moral codes of behavior.” 3 For the purpose of
understanding senior officers’ ethical (or unethical) decision making,
we define character as, “the propensity to take ethical and selfless actions
when facing temptation to act unethically or selfishly.” Character-based
leadership suggests character serves as a mooring for leaders, tethering the
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the reviewers, officers, and leaders who have
contributed their valuable expertise and experience to this article. We are grateful for the collective
suggestions across several organizations that improved our work overall. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Katie Matthew, Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership,
Thayer Hall, West Point, NY 10996, or by e-mail to katie.matthew@westpoint.edu.

1. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “Address to the Corps of Cadets, United States Military Academy”
(West Point, NY, May 1, 1991), YouTube video, 25:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uGfrMzqNZqc.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Leadership and the Profession, Army Doctrinal
Publication (ADP) 6-22 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2019) and US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
Navy Leader Development Framework: Version 3.0 (Washington, DC: CNO, May 2019).
3. Miguel Alzola, “Even When No One Is Watching: The Moral Psychology of Corporate Reputation,”
Business & Society 58, no. 6 (2019): 1277; Robert L. Caslen Jr. and Michael D. Matthews, The Character Edge:
Leading and Winning with Integrity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 208; and Walter Ulmer, personal
communication (e-mail) with author, March 8, 2021.
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criteria for leader decisions to something unmoving, such as an organization’s
espoused values.

Although the Army requires its leaders to have competence and
character, the relative importance of these virtues to the Army may
have changed over time. For example, in just six months during
World War II, the US Army’s 90th Infantry Division had 20 battalion
commanders and senior officers relieved, primarily for incompetent battlefield
leadership. 4 Unfortunately, this crisis of competence was not isolated to the
90th division. At least 16 US World War II–era division commanders and
five corps commanders were similarly removed for battlefield ineffectiveness.5
Yet, this stands in stark contrast to the causes of today’s reliefs. In one year
in Iraq (2010–11), Major General Robert Caslen, then commander of the
25th Infantry Division, adjudicated the alleged misconduct of 78 officers
and senior enlisted personnel (master sergeant/first sergeant and above)
for character failures (such as improper relationships, inappropriate use of
government resources, larceny, toxicity, making false statements, alcohol
abuse, and drug abuse). In 2021’s first five months, at least three US Army
brigade commanders were relieved: one for personal misconduct, one after
allegations of misconduct, and one after allegations of counterproductive
leadership behaviors.6 Notably, we are unaware of any active-duty US Army
battalion commander, brigade commander, or general officer being formally
relieved for tactical, operational, or strategic incompetence since 2001.
Instead, perceived character failures have been the leading factor in most
modern-day officer reliefs.
Historically, commentators have considered competence and character
independently, but this may prove a false distinction since they influence
the same outcome: organizational effectiveness. Professor Don Snider
observes a leader’s character sets, or fails to set, “the culture/climate of trust
that facilitates cohesive teams, and thus military effectiveness.” 7 Similarly,
Caslen acknowledged the negative organizational ripple effects generated
by his subordinate leaders’ aforementioned misconduct. 8 Former US Army
Chief of Staff General H. K. Johnson summarized how leaders’ personal
character failures can hurt organizational effectiveness when he lamented,
“If you will cheat on your wife, you will cheat on me!”9 Additionally, senior
4. Henry G. Gole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lexington University Press
of Kentucky, 2008).
5. Thomas E. Ricks, “General Failure,” Atlantic (website), November 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/.
6. Davis Winkie and Kyle Rempfer, multiple articles published from April–May 2021, Army Times (website).
7. Don Snider, “Will Army 2025 Be a Military Profession?” Parameters 45, no.4, (Winter 2015–16),
https:www.press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol45/iss4/6/.
8. Robert L. Caslen Jr., personal communication (e-mail) with author, November 6, 2020.
9. Walter Ulmer, personal communication (e-mail) with author, March 28, 2021.
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leaders’ public failures can consume significant organizational energy
by diverting focus and resources from the primary mission.10 When leaders
fail, employees might be less proud to belong to the military and less likely
to remain voluntarily in the service. 11 If a platoon leader makes a significant
character mistake that becomes known, the 35 soldiers in the platoon are
negatively affected. If a battalion commander makes a character mistake that
becomes known, the 500 soldiers in the battalion are negatively affected.
Thus, the more senior leaders are, the more their character failures adversely
affect others.
Concerned about these implications, we wanted to better understand
what is driving poor decision making and what the Army can
do about it. A review of the literature shows character is a function of one’s
personality, conditioning history, and positive and negative environmental
influences. Integrating these functions with the concepts of less visible
ethical fading and erosion, we conceptualize an Army officer’s ability
to do the right thing in the face of temptation is the result of an open system
that experiences both character gains and losses over time. We illustrate this
idea with the leaky character reservoir (LCR) framework, which models
an officer’s available character as a dynamic quantity of liquid “potential
character” stored in a reservoir inside each officer.
We hypothesize the rate of character education and development
typically decreases over an Army officer’s career, while character-related
environmental stressors increase over the same period, placing senior officers
at an increased risk to experience a character gap, or shortage of character
needed to meet the demand for ethical behavior, and subsequent character
failure. Alternatively, the leaky character reservoir predicts that if the Army
increases mid-grade and senior officers’ deliberate character development
and education while mitigating character-related environmental stressors,
more senior officers will do the right thing when faced with temptation,
providing Army units with the leadership they deserve while reducing
senior-leader reliefs.
To build a shared understanding of the issue, we first present two
vignettes of character failures by hypothetical senior US Army officers.
Next, we look to theory to understand what factors determine the level
of potential character available in any officer’s reservoir. Subsequently,
10. Caslen and Matthews, Character Edge, 245.
11. Arto Lindblom, Sam Kajalo, and Lasse Mitronen, “Exploring the Links between Ethical Leadership,
Customer Orientation and Employee Outcomes in the Context of Retailing,” Management Decision 53, no. 7
(July 2015): 1642–58, https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-04-2015-0126; and Jonathan Doh, Stephen Stumpf,
and Walter G. Tymon Jr., “Responsible Leadership Helps Retain Talent in India,” Journal of Business Ethics 98
(2011): 85–100.
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we graphically illustrate the LCR framework to predict how senior officers
may end up with a character gap that can lead to character failure and
use the character reservoir to explain poor decision making by two senior
officers described in the earlier case studies. Finally, we suggest actions
individuals, units, and the Army can take to turn the senior officer character
gap into a senior officer character surplus.

Cases of Failed Character
Colonel A. A. and Personal Temptation
Although Colonel A. A. was a battle-hardened officer who had successfully
commanded a battalion task force in Syria, he was less familiar with the
nuances of commanding a separate brigade. As he prepared to deploy the
brigade to Korea, he augmented the traditional brigade staff with a handful
of additional officers from across the brigade’s battalions. One of these
officers was a junior lieutenant, initially assigned for a two-month period
to assist with key leader engagements. After two months, the colonel
extended the lieutenant’s temporary assignment and started spending time
alone with her off duty. They began a sexual affair that would last throughout
the deployment and beyond.
After redeployment, during a skit at a social gathering with family
members present, active-duty actors jokingly portrayed a junior officer
and colonel engaging in a sexual relationship. Even after the skit, no one
strongly intervened into the situation, and the relationship continued
over a three-year period until the junior officer—then a captain—
formally reported the situation. During the following court-martial,
the former brigade commander pled guilty to adultery.
Colonel B. B. and Professional Ambition
Shortly after assuming command, Colonel B. B. was excited to learn
his separate brigade combat team would be able to prove itself in an
upcoming rotation to the National Training Center (NTC). He believed his
unit’s success at NTC would be influential on his future upward mobility
in the Army. He described his leadership style as deliberate and passionate,
but he told his battalion commanders, in the stress of his brigade’s NTC
train-up, he would take a pencil and jam it into their eyes if they were not
loyal. He had public, disrespectful confrontations with his command sergeant
major and expected the spouses of his subordinate leaders to attend all events
his wife attended. Many of his subordinates felt he disregarded any voices
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other than his own or those of his few favorite officers. These behaviors
soon created five isolated battalions that shared the same unit patch but
with different priorities and cultures.
Many soldiers did not want to follow B. B. in battle, and several battalion
commanders and command sergeants major said he produced a negative
command climate and routinely threatened the future of subordinate
commanders and staff. After a formal investigation, B. B. was relieved
of command.

Four Drivers of Potential Character
To understand what led these otherwise successful senior Army officers
to make poor character choices, we must consider what influences potential
character levels and the likelihood of making an ethically sound decision(s)
in the face of strong temptation(s). Drawing on Professor Kurt Lewin’s
seminal theory that posits human behavior is a function of personality and
environment, we examine how officers’ personalities and environments drive
their ethical choices before and after joining the Army.12
Driver 1: Heredity and Experiences Growing Up
Research shows approximately 40–60 percent of personality is innate,
likely derived from heredity.13 Examples of personality traits include the “Big
Five” categories of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness,
and agreeableness. 14 When considering character, a multitude of additional
personality traits come into play (such as resilience, judgment, integrity,
and perseverance).15 Various studies using the Big Five categories and
character strengths as antecedents for ethical decision making illustrate how
personality influences behaviors, and thus ethical decision making.16
In addition to heredity, much of the balance of officer candidates’
character levels at entry into their pre-commissioning programs can
12. Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality: Selected Papers, trans. Donald Adams and Karl Zener
(London: Read Books Ltd., 2013).
13. Kerry Jang, John Livesley, and Philip Vernon, “Heritability of the Big Five Personality Dimensions and
Their Facets: A Twin Study,” Journal of Personality 64 (1996): 577–91.
14. Christopher Soto, “Big Five Personality Traits,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Lifespan Human Development,
ed. Mark. H. Bornstein (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2018), 240–41.
15. Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and
Classification (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).
16. Virginia Bratton and Connie Strittmatter, “To Cheat or Not to Cheat: The Role of Personality in Academic
and Business Ethics,” Ethics & Behavior 23 (2013): 427–44; Mary Crossan, Daina Mazutis, and Gerard Seijts,
“In Search of Virtue: The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths in Ethical Decision Making,” Journal
of Business Ethics 113, no. 4 (April 2013): 567–81, doi:113. 10.1007/s10551-013-1680–88; and Tamara L. Giluk
and Bennett E. Postlethwaite, “Big Five Personality and Academic Dishonesty: A Meta-Analytic Review.”
Personality and Individual Differences 72 (2015): 59–67.
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be attributed to their conditioning histories.17 For example, families,
coaches, peers, education, socioeconomic situations, and communities all
potentially influence character. These influences and experiences affect
young peoples’ personalities until young adulthood, when most scholars
argue personality becomes relatively fixed, though a minority of scholars
argue personality remains malleable longer. 18 The conditioning history
while growing up likely influences the future officer candidates’ character
by providing thousands of experiences that serve as lenses for how to view,
interpret, and behave in future similar situations. These ethical experiences
move the future officers into successive stages of adult or moral development.
Robert Kegan’s adult development theory and Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral
development theory imply that the ethically-sound conditioning from life’s
lessons will likely enable future officers to progress to a more advantaged
stage of adult identity and a higher stage of moral development, respectively.
It follows that Army officers who have reached more advanced stages of adult
or moral development should be more likely to make ethical decisions.19
Since heredity and conditioning history influence character, Army
officer candidates will have different levels of character upon starting
pre-commissioning programs. To ensure these candidates have a minimal
level of character prior to joining their programs, the Army typically requires
all candidates to pass baseline character assessments, including criminal
background checks, letters of recommendation, and face-to-face interviews.
Driver 2: Army’s Deliberate Character Development
Deliberate conditioning includes formal interventions designed
to develop character positively.20 For Army officers, this conditioning
incorporates mandatory institutional character curricula, which is part
of pre-commissioning programs, officer education schools (OES),

17. Thomas Bouchard Jr. and Matt McGue, “Genetic and Environmental Influences on Human Psychological
Differences,” Journal of Neurobiology 54 (2003): 4–45.
18. Avshalom Caspi and Brent W. Roberts, “Personality Development across the Life Course: The Argument
for Change and Continuity,” Psychological Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2001): 49–66; and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark
and Stefanie Schurer, “The Stability of Big-Five Personality Traits,” Economics Letters 115, no. 1 (2012):
11–15; and Carol S. Dweck, “Can Personality Be Changed? The Role of Beliefs in Personality and Change,”
Current Directions in Psychological Science 17, no. 6 (2008): 391–94.
19. Robert Kegan, In Over our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 1998); and Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development: The Philosophy of Moral Development
(New York: Harper & Row, 1981).
20. Matthew Erickson, Kevin Cooper, and Anthony Miccolis, “On Becoming Virtuous,” Journal of
Management Education 43, no. 6 (December 2019): 630–50, doi: 10.1177/1052562919866885.
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pre-command courses (PCC), unit-level development (LPDs/OPDs), and
self-development.
Each of the Army’s pre-commissioning programs includes deliberate
institutional curricula in character-related topics. We define deliberate
institutional character development as hours of education where character is the
primary learning objective and the curriculum is testable (papers, exams, and
exercises). Examples include teaching the Army Ethic, the Seven Army Core
Values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal
courage), and the character component of the Army Leadership Requirements
Model. Practical exercises that require students to apply these character models
and frameworks to various ethical challenges are often part of the curriculum.
As of 2021, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) two- to four-year
program includes 32 hours of deliberate institutional character development, the
United States Military Academy (USMA) four-year program includes 72 hours,
and the Officer Candidate School (OCS) 12-week program includes 18 hours.
After commissioning, officers receive six hours of character education at
the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) and three-and-a-half hours
at the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). Notably, deliberate institutional
character development does not occur again until intermediate-level
education (ILE), typically the Command and General Staff College
(CGSC), at approximately the 11th year of service, where students
receive 16 hours of development. 21 Officers also receive three hours
of character development at the lieutenant colonel–level pre-command
course and three hours at the colonel-level pre-command course.
Most officers selected for the rank of colonel attend the Army War
College (AWC) or an equivalent school, where they receive 27 hours
of direct character development. Lastly, brigadier generals attend a short
capstone course that includes an hour of deliberate character instruction.
Table 1 shows how the Army provides most brigadier generals
with approximately 100 cumulative hours of deliberate institutional
character development during their careers.

21. TRADOC program of instruction based on Army Leadership, ADP 6-22.
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Table 1. Army’s deliberate institutional character development
Second Lieutenant

Captain

Major

Pre-Commissioning
Programa

Basic Officer
Leadership Course
(BOLC)

Captain’s
Career Course
(CCC)

Intermediate-Level
Education
(ILE)b

Year Officer
Service
Development Is
Received

-4 to 0

1

5

12

Hours of Direct
Character/
Ethics
Educationc

40
(weighted average)
USMA = 72
ROTC = 32
OCS = 18

6

3.5

16

Cumulative
Hours

40

46

49.5

65.5

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel (P)

Colonel

Brigadier General

Pre-Command
Course
(PCC)

Army War College
(AWC)

Pre-Command
Course
(PCC)

Capstone

Year Officer
Service
Development Is
Received

17

21

22

26

Hours of Direct
Character/
Ethics
Educationc

3

27

3

1

Cumulative
Hours

68.5

95.5

98.5

99.5

b

Source: The authors received each of these statistics via a personal communication from
an instructor/professor who either taught or oversaw the character/ethics curriculum at
that organization. For ROTC and USMA, personal communication received December 23,
2020; for OCS, personal communication received, January 4, 2021; for BOLC, CCC, and
ILE, personal communication received August 11, 2020; for PCC, personal communication
received January 25, 2022; for AWC, personal communications received April 1 and 2, 2021;
and for Capstone, personal communication received May 11, 2021.
a. The weighted average for pre-commissioning is based on the number of officers from each
source per year. For example, while USMA cadets receive a greater number of hours, USMA
commissions about 21 percent of officers (~1,000) in a given year.
b. This does not include the 40-hour culminating exercises that include a dimension of ethical
decision making because ethics is not the primary focus of the exercises.
c. Data for all OES directly collected from course directors and instructors responsible for
curricula from 2020–21 at USMA, ROTC, OCS, Maneuver OES for BOLC/CCC, CGSC (ILE),
and PCC at Fort Leavenworth, and AWC/Capstone at Carlisle Barracks.
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Yet, when we consider deliberate character development as a rate
rather than a total quantity, an interesting trend emerges. Although
the rate (hours/year) of the Army’s deliberate character development
starts high early in officers’ careers, it decreases significantly over time.22
In sum, the Army currently provides junior officers a higher rate of deliberate
character development per year of service (in both pre-commissioning
programs and as an officer) than it provides senior officers, as illustrated
in figure 1.

Total Hours of Deliberate Character-Focused Hours/Total Years of Officer Service
Figure 1. Rate of deliberate character development for US Army officers over a career
(Note: The rate is calculated by dividing the cumulative hours of deliberate development by the total
years of off icer service, including pre-commissioning programs. For example, new captains have
an average of 49.5 hours of deliberate character development over the four years of their
pre-commissioning program and f ive years as an off icer, resulting in a deliberate institutional character
development rate of (49.5 hours/9 years=) 5.5 hours/year.)

In addition to formal character development through the officer
education schools (OES) and pre-command course (PCC) curricula,
many brigade, battalion, and company commanders institute unit-level
character development sessions and programs for subordinate officers,
including leader/officer professional development events (such as leader/
officer professional development sessions [LPDs/OPDs] and characterfocused guest speakers, book clubs, and formal mentorship programs).
Additionally, some unit leaders assign unit members who are character
exemplars to onboard new officers instead of letting the sponsor-newcomer
22. Paul Robinson, “Ethics Training and Development in the Military,” Parameters 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007):
23–36, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol37/iss1/8/.
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matching process happen by chance. Finally, motivated officers can embark
on deliberate character self-development by studying character-related
theory and ideas; reading about leaders who displayed strong character;
spending time with virtuous institutions, mentors, and friends while off duty;
and regularly and deeply reflecting on their own character and values.
Driver 3: Army Life’s Environmental Influences
In addition to an officer’s personality and deliberate character
development, Lewin’s theory notes that officers’ environments can
significantly influence their character-related behaviors. The components
of Army life’s environmental influences include checks and balances from
supervisors; virtuous (or unvirtuous) climates set by one’s institution,
boss(es), peers, and subordinates; and life’s lessons while off duty.
The Toxic Triangle framework posits that leaders need adequate checks
and balances from bosses and peers to ensure they maintain their character.
Yet, as officers gain seniority, their bosses also have more responsibility
and correspondingly less time to check subordinates.23 As leaders increase
in rank, their supervisory role often necessitates travel to cover a larger
footprint and reduces face-to-face interactions with individual subordinate
leaders. Concurrently, the emphasis on peer support and accountability
from the Army’s “battle buddy” system during the summer training portion
of pre-commissioning programs is not facilitated during officers’ subsequent
careers. As leaders advance in the Army, they have fewer interactions
with boss(es) who would notice if something character-related were offtrack
and with peers who can help prevent them from making poor character
decisions. This two-pronged lack of relational accountability over time may
become a major contributor to the ethical shortcomings of our senior leaders.
The ethical climate created by bosses, peers, subordinates, and the
Army influences character. Supervisors set, through personal example and
official/unofficial policies, a command culture (the accepted and unaccepted
character behaviors for leaders in their organization) that influences
subordinates’ behavior. Colleagues also shape the work environment
by exerting peer pressure—both intended and implied. Typically viewed
as responsive to their leader’s character, subordinates can also influence
a leader’s character. People often act like those they spend the most time

23. Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, and Robert Kaiser, “The Toxic Triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible
Followers, and Conducive Environments,” Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007): 176–94.
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with, and subordinates far outnumber leaders in hierarchical organizations.24
Finally, when leaders perceive the institution does not enact the values
it espouses, they may feel less loyal to the institution and be less likely
to make difficult character-based decisions aligned with those values.
Just as an officer’s behavior may conform to the character level of the
work environment over time, the off-duty environment can also impact the
officer’s behavior. These off-duty influences can be positive or negative, and
will likely change over time as the officer develops relationships through
hobbies, recreation, and family. In summary, each environmental factor may
lead to stronger character, conceptualized as a character gain, or weaker
character, conceptualized as a character leak.
Driver 4: Ethical Fading/Erosion
The psychological concept of ethical fading states that ethical
standards may deteriorate over time, implying character gains are not
permanent.25 This fading, also known as ethical erosion, may include factors
such as ethical drift, an incremental deviation from ethical practice that
goes unnoticed by individuals who justify the deviations as acceptable
and who believe themselves to be maintaining their ethical boundaries
and ethical fatigue, the lessoning of one’s ethical standards due to the
fatigue of having to fight ethical battles regularly. 26 There is a strong
likelihood many senior Army leaders also have less visible and persistent leaks
of potential character.
This ethical fatigue is related to stress, and while a moderate level
of stress is known to increase performance, increased span of control and
seniority can raise Army officers’ stress and lead to unhealthy conditions.
The diathesis-stress model posits when a preexisting vulnerability
undergoes prolonged stress, the individual is far more likely to develop
a disorder.27 On average, battalion commanders experience five times
the responsibility of company commanders, and brigade commanders
experience five times the responsibility of battalion commanders. The
increased stress is likely exacerbated during periods of extended or repeated
24. Jing Qian et al., “Ethical Leadership, Leader-Member Exchange and Feedback Seeking:
A Double-Moderated Mediation Model of Emotional Intelligence and Work-Unit Structure.” Frontiers
Psychology 8 (2017): 1174, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01174.
25. Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick, “Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-deception in Unethical Behavior,”
Social Justice Research 17, no. 2 (2004): 223–36.
26. Carole Kleinman, “Ethical Drift: When Good People Do Bad Things,” JONA’s HealthCare Law, Ethics and
Regulations 8, no. 3 (2006): 72–76; and Cannon et. al., “Ethical Erosion: How Far from Center Are You? You May
Be Further Than You Think,” Journal of Health Care Compliance 17, no. 5 (2015): 11–64.
27. “APA Dictionary of Psychology – Diathesis-Stress Model,” American Psychological Association (website),
n.d., accessed October 31, 2021, https://dictionary.apa.org/diathesis-stress-model.
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collective training cycles and deployments. Over time, these stressful
events can lead to physical, emotional, and mental exhaustion, burnout,
and an increased likelihood of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. 28
Senior officers may also compensate for increased responsibilities (both
emotional and operational) by reducing sleep time, which further affects
stress levels, resulting in the propensity to engage in unethical conduct.29
Finally, senior officers often change duty stations more frequently than
junior officers, and moving is one of the largest stressors on individuals
and families.30 Author Wade Goodall notes that “many leaders [who] have
become involved in an adulterous encounter have been overtired, stressed
out, and/or have a feeling of emptiness.” 31 A senior officer’s likelihood
of acting in an irrational way increases with the presence of stress.
Along with the probable increase in unhealthy stress comes an increase
in external temptation. As a leader’s seniority and power increase, some
individuals seek to develop access to those leaders for less-than-honorable
purposes. Additionally, increasing seniority gives leaders more control
over personnel decisions, organizational budgets, and strategic direction,
often without a parallel increase in oversight; therefore the level
of temptation typically increases with seniority.
Yet, these same Army leaders are likely overconfident in their ability
to manage this increased stress and temptation. A facilitator of senior
officer education recently shared that most “[senior officers] know right
from wrong. What stuns me is the number who think they are the ones
that won’t get caught.”32 Since senior officers have been successful for
so long (without being found with a major character failure), they are
at risk of developing a perception of invulnerability, which could lead
to decision making that further stresses their character, making the officer
even more vulnerable.33 When this perceived invulnerability parallels the rise

28. Christopher M. Barnes et al., “Leader Sleep Devaluation, Employee Sleep, and Unethical Behavior,”
Sleep Health 6, no. 3 (2020): 411–17; and Oronzo Parlangeli et al., “Perceptions of Work-Related Stress and
Ethical Misconduct amongst Non-Tenured Researchers in Italy,” Science and Engineering Ethics 26, no. 1 (2019):
159–81.
29. Christopher M. Barnes, John Schaubroeck, Megan Huth, and Sonia Ghumman, “Lack of Sleep and
Unethical Conduct,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 115, no. 2 (2011): 169–80, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.01.009.
30. Sarah Kershaw, “The Psychology of Moving,” New York Times, February 28, 2010.
31. Wayde Goodall, Why Great Men Fall: 15 Winning Strategies to Rise Above It All (New York: New Leaf
Press, 2005), 56.
32. Personal communication with author, May 11, 2021.
33. Dean Ludwig and Clinton Longenecker, “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful
Leaders,” Journal of Business Ethics 12, no. 4 (1993): 265–73.
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in the senior leader’s influence, larger organizations can experience immense
negative consequences if their leader fails in character.34

Integrating the Four Drivers of Character:
The Leaky Character Reservoir
To integrate and illustrate the four drivers of character, we present
character as an open system called the Leaky Character Reservoir (LCR).
Imagine each person has a hypothetical internal reservoir that stores
potential character in liquid form. Every time the officer exhibits a positive
character influence from the drivers, the amount of potential character
in the reservoir increases by at least a drop. Alternatively, every instance
of unethical character-related influence from the drivers causes the reservoir
to leak. The potential for ethical fading and erosion is always present,
resulting in persistent, but less-noticeable leaks.
The reservoir stores potential character. When a character challenge
(temptation) appears, we posit an officer with the necessary levels
of potential character in his or her reservoir will have the strength to choose
the harder right over the easier wrong and take the more ethical action.
Conversely, if the officer does not have the requisite amount of potential
character to meet the ethical challenges, the officer is unlikely to make
ethically sound decisions, and character failure may result.

34. Jim Detert, Choosing Courage: The Everyday Guide to Being Brave at Work (Boston: Harvard Business
Press, 2021).
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Figure 2. Leaky Character Reservoir

Modeling the LCR over Time: Senior Officer Character Gap
By examining how the drivers of character change over a typical officer’s
career, it becomes clear that seniority brings more temptation, often through
stress and privileged access to objects, information, and people.35 Yet, over the
same period, senior officers experience a lower rate of deliberate character
development, deal with increased stress, and are less likely to receive adequate
checks and balances from their peers and bosses. Since other influences vary
widely across people and time (unit-level development, self-development,
character of those around the leader, and off-duty life’s curriculum), the net
result is the senior officer character gap. Simply put, some senior officers

35. Ludwig and Longenecker, “Bathsheba Syndrome.”
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may not have enough potential character in their reservoir to confront the
increasing temptations to be selfish.

Figure 3. Current senior officer character gap

Leaky Character Reservoir Applied to Colonels A. A. and B. B.
Colonels A. A. and B. B. passed the character screening to enter
pre-commissioning sources, where they received a baseline level of deliberate
character education. They then attended officer basic courses, where they
received additional deliberate character instruction. At that point, the rate
of deliberate character education began to decrease over their
remaining careers.
Colonels A. A. and B. B. led geographically separate brigade combat
teams; therefore, neither had a co-located peer with whom they interacted
frequently. Consequently, there was no one to notice and initiate the difficult
conversation with A. A. about his potential inappropriate relationship
or B. B. about his increasing perceived toxicity with subordinates.
The geographically isolated environment led to both receiving less than
adequate checks and balances from their bosses. Both experienced ethical
fading and erosion, as they had participated in multiple deployments prior
to their brigade commands. As they were leading a unit approximately
five times larger than before, each likely dealt with a proportional increase
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in serious problems and were under the heightened stress of preparing units
for deployment to combat or to a major training center rotation. Both may
have felt an inaccurate perception of invulnerability, as their poor choices
were not isolated incidents but a continuation of choices without being held
responsible over years (A. A.) or months (B. B.). At the critical moment,
neither had the potential character available to match the temptations they
faced. Judging from the number of reliefs for character across today’s senior
officer corps, other senior officers likely suffer from a similar character gap.

Moving from a Character Gap to a Character Surplus
Collectively, the US Army’s current character development programs
assume character gains are permanent. Unlike the one hour of daily physical
fitness training required by most Army units, few units have regular
character training, and while the Army tests everyone’s fitness level twice
a year, it rarely conducts character assessments. This character training and
testing may not be needed if leaders’ character gains are permanent. Yet, the
LCR framework argues that an Army officer’s level of potential character
is conceptually similar to his or her level of physical fitness. Both are likely
to atrophy if neglected over time.
The Army should address the problem by acknowledging that character
gains are not permanent. While the Army can do little to increase the
rate of character at entry or eliminate ethical erosion, military leadership
can increase deliberate character development and mitigate environmental
influences, with the intent of closing the senior officer character gap and
creating a character surplus.

Mechanisms to Increase Deliberate Character Conditioning
The Army can increase the quantity (rate) of deliberate character
conditioning across the officer education schools (OES). Since the rate
of character education decreases significantly as seniority increases,
the Army can increase and/or tailor the amount of character education
in mid- and senior-level education programs (intermediate level education
[ILE], Army War College [AWC], pre-command courses [PCCs],
and Capstone) to reverse this trend. Special emphasis on the character
demands of senior officers should be a part of deliberate conditioning later
in an officer’s career. Naturally, the character education’s quality matters and
should also be a priority. Part of this education should be self-awareness
generated by studying the LCR framework, especially the concept that
the level of one’s potential character can shift over time. During these
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educational experiences, the Army should require officers to study numerous
recent case studies of senior officers who failed in character in tandem
with case studies where officers chose the harder right. Additionally, the
Army should require mid-grade and senior officers to engage in deliberate
reflection designed to examine character weaknesses and risks honestly
by having operational psychologists administer confidential psychometric
assessments of self-awareness, empathy, self-regulation, compulsive behavior,
and narcissism.
Organization leaders should be incentivized and enabled to enact
quality unit-level character development. They should ask institutional
organizations (such as the Center for Army Leadership, the Army War
College, the United States Military Academy, and the Combined Arms
Center) to provide, and regularly update, character-focused officer and
leader professional development programs (OPDs/LPDs) so they can
be easily accessed and implemented by unit leaders. Additionally, units
should be required to implement local character-development programs,
including onboarding programs, to be briefed to bosses at quarterly
training briefings.
Senior officers should be required to attend Army-sponsored resiliencybuilding programs/counseling that include a secular or religious-based
spiritual wellness component. Character and moral growth are often
developed through spiritual practice and can provide a constant during
periods of change during an officer’s career.36 The value of workplace
spirituality, characterized by a sense of community and alignment with
the organization’s espoused values, can positively impact an individual’s
moral judgment and an organization’s ethical climate. 37 Army leadership
can reach out to organizations that can host resiliency-building programs,
including the Army’s Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation; Army
Community Service offices; chaplains; Army medical providers; and others.
The Army should incentivize individual mid-grade and senior officers
to invest in character development. By providing officers with an annual
stipend of up to $5,000 to invest in individual character development efforts
(such as book purchases, civilian character workshops and academic courses,
and executive coaching with a character focus), Army leadership could create
36. Peterson and Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues.
37. Badrinarayan Shankar Pawar, “Individual Spirituality, Workplace Spirituality and Work Attitudes:
An Empirical Test of Direct and Interaction Effects,” Leadership & Organization Development Journal 30,
no. 8 (2009): 759–77; and Lilian Otaye-Ebede, Samah Shaffakat, and Scott Foster, “A Multilevel Model
Examining the Relationships between Workplace Spirituality, Ethical Climate and Outcomes: A Social Cognitive
Theory Perspective,” Journal of Business Ethics 166, no. 3 (2019): 611–26.
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a positive environment for character development, and encourage raters and
senior raters to document and reward self-improvement efforts positively.
Additionally, the Army must ensure all officers, especially isolated
commanders, have an adequate level of checks and balances. Senior
leaders must prioritize regular time spent with subordinate commanders
in a deliberate coaching/developmental mode. Creating a healthy culture
requires being present and getting to know subordinate commanders and
their organizations. When interacting with subordinate commanders, senior
officers should discuss and recognize acts of character as much, or more
than, they talk about and reward organizational fitness, marksmanship,
reenlistment, readiness, and other traditional unit-level accomplishments.
In addition to requiring the regular review of subordinates’ climate
assessments (Commander 360, Defense Organizational Climate Survey,
etc.), superior officers should host thoughtful, realistic discussions with
subordinate commanders on practical daily actions that demonstrate
an ethical life and ethical climate while recommending and resourcing steps,
events, and courses that can build character along the way.
Army leaders should increase checks and balances through fostering
values-based friendships in the form of peer-accountability groups.
Each year, after officers are selected and slated as principal lieutenant
colonel- or colonel-level commanders at command assessment programs,
the Army should assign groups of four-to-six to peer-accountability
groups (PAGs) based on professional and personal preferences, interests,
and future command locations. When possible, officers who have different
senior raters should be put together to reduce the chance of competition.
In their article on best practices of peer support groups, Boris Groysberg
and Robert Halperin explain, “Members also build camaraderie and form
connections that help them feel safe, grounded, and capable in a volatile
and uncertain world. The support they receive in forums sustains them
through their toughest professional (and personal) challenges and
fosters their long-term success.”38 With the help of an Army-funded
civilian executive coach, these PAGs would meet (virtually or in person)
for 90 minutes every other month to check in with a series of structured
questions, including sharing character challenges and successes and allowing
open time for free-flow discussion. Annually, each member should assess the
PAG’s effectiveness, with the Army switching members as needed to ensure

38. Boris Groysberg and Robert Halperin, “How to Get the Most out of Peer Support Groups,”
Harvard Business Review (May–June 2022).
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the PAGs build positive, peer-accountability groups built on trust, values,
and fit.

Mechanisms to Mitigate Character Losses
from Army Life’s Environmental Influences
The Army can reduce stress by creating five years of predictability
for battalion command selects. The period after selection for battalion
command can be extremely unpredictable and stressful for senior officers and
their families, including up to four moves over five years. Military leadership
could provide the Army’s new command-assessment program principal
selectees with the ability to choose a command location, senior service
college, and follow-on job locations and timing of moves. Additionally,
senior officers could be stabilized at locations by changing the implicit career
expectation that general officers hold two jobs at each level to holding one
job for twice as long.
The Army could also reduce stress through sabbaticals. Giving senior
officers six- to 12-month sabbaticals between major assignments without
other work responsibilities would provide them time to reduce stress levels,
prioritize health and relationships, and recharge.39 During sabbaticals,
officers would participate in required guided reflection with assigned
mentors. Periods of education (for example, OES and advanced civilian
schooling) are good for this, but senior officers would still have full-time
responsibilities during educational assignments. With periods of reduced
responsibilities, officers can learn new hobbies, regularly spend quality time
with children, travel recreationally, and take better care of themselves.40
The Army can decrease the risk of stress by providing senior officers
regular emotional/mental health assessment and tools. Since emotional and
mental health can affect decision making, implementing in-depth health
screenings as part of lieutenant colonel- and colonel-level PCCs will help
prevent mental and emotional states that could lead to unethical decisions.
Battalion commanders and above should be issued health-tracking smart
devices, like smart rings that measure and give reliable feedback on sleep
and exercise quantity and quality, so they can monitor and improve health.
39. Melissa Servier, “The Healthy Practice of Pastoral Sabbaticals,” Presbyterian Outlook 199, no. 9 (June 2017):
32; Mohammad Yarmohammadian, Patricia Davidson, and Chao Yeh, “Sabbatical as a Part of the Academic
Excellence Journey: A Narrative Qualitative Study,” Journal of Education and Health Promotion 7, no. 1 (2018):
119; and Gabrielle Simionato, Susan Simpson, and Corinne Reid, “Burnout as an Ethical Issue in Psychotherapy,”
Psychotherapy 56, no. 4 (2019): 470–82.
40. Lee Tobin McClain, “A Sabbatical Ends,” Chronicle of Higher Education 53, no. 7 (October 2006).
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent the US
the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
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Taking a holistic approach to sustaining the character of senior officers may
not fully prevent a character failure, but it can slow the leaks and reinforce
the character reserves built over a lifetime.

Conclusion
The Leaky Character Reservoir framework conceptualizes a person’s
potential character as a resource stored in an open system, with gains
and leaks over time. When modeled across a senior Army officer’s career,
the rate of formal character development typically decreases. In contrast,
environmental character stressors increase, leading to slow leaks from the
reservoir and, eventually, the potential for a character gap. To address this
problem, the Army and unit leaders should recognize that character gains
are not permanent and increase the rate of deliberate character development
across formal and unit- and individual-level initiatives and promote positive
environmental influences while mitigating negative ones. By taking these
recommendations and other thoughtful actions, the Army can ensure
future senior officers develop enough potential character to make selfless
choices and take positive actions when faced with significant temptations,
resulting in higher-quality leadership, better-developed subordinates,
more-ready units, and a stronger Army.
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espite the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s repeated threats to employ nuclear
weapons, the gravest threat to global security remains the potential
for war over Taiwan. Were the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt to
forcibly overthrow the government of Taiwan and seize the island nation, the
resulting US-led military operation to defend Taiwan could spark a much wider
international war. The world’s two largest economic powers with arguably the most
powerful nuclear-armed militaries engaging in open war would be a catastrophic
first in human history. Both the United States and the PRC would suffer huge
military casualties and lose significant portions of combat power, rendering both
nations vulnerable to other threats. The homelands for both countries would be
subject to nuclear attacks, which would kill and wound many thousands of civilians
and lay waste to vast areas. Security commitments and allegiances would likely
draw nations in Asia, especially Japan, North and South Korea, the Philippines,
Russia, and Singapore, into the conflict. The United States, the PRC, and most of
the world would suffer economically as US-PRC trade and the regional maritime
shipping that drives much of the global economy slams to a halt. Some would
argue US-PRC economic ties alone would prevent war. It is worth remembering
wars large and small have jumped the firebreak of economic entanglement many
times in history.
Especially worrying today is the threat of conflict over Taiwan seems to be
growing and drawing nearer. In what some have called the “Fourth Taiwan Strait
Crisis,” the visit to Taiwan earlier this year by the US Speaker of the House of
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Representatives sparked an angry response from the PRC. Beijing employed its
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aggressively against the main island of Taiwan
with unprecedented scale. The deployment of PLA air and maritime forces and the
firing of missiles around Taiwan was a significant expansion over what the PRC
did during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, a response to concern that Taiwan’s
first democratic presidential elections could lead to a referendum on independence
for the island. Both in terms of the scale and extent, the PLA demonstrated a
much expanded capacity to isolate Taiwan by force.
Additionally, the overt US military response this time was substantially more
muted. In December 1995 and March 1996, the United States sent two Naval
carrier groups (the USS Nimitz and Independence, respectively) near Taiwan. This
strong US response is widely seen today as a large part of the impetus behind the
PRC’s rapid acceleration of efforts to build a large, modern military. In 2022, the
United States seems content to continue only with what it calls “routine” transits
of the Taiwan Strait with smaller US Navy warships. While the lack of a clear
military response might be a wise step to de-escalate tensions today, the effect on
PRC thinking and actions in the future is potentially unfavorable for the United
States and Taiwan should Beijing perceive the United States as unwilling to
defend the island. Indeed, as reported by the government of Taiwan, the PRC has
increasingly sent its maritime and air forces across the median line of the Taiwan
Strait to challenge Taiwan’s military and shift the norm for where the PLA can
operate in proximity to Taiwan.
Understanding the contentious and violent history
of cross-strait relations between the PRC and Taiwan is
important to dealing with the problem today and in the
future. Bruce A. Elleman’s Taiwan Straits Standoff is vital
reading to this end. This short book was published in 2021
prior to the strait crisis of 2022, and provides the right depth
of background to today’s issues. Throughout the historical
narratives describing the previous three strait crises, the
consistency across time in policy perspectives, strategic
factors, and military operations is remarkable. Several of
New York: Anthem Press, 2021
184 pages
these are worth special mention because they are suggestive
$125
of potential problems and strategies the United States and
Taiwan must understand today.
First, Elleman reminds us of the critical role Taiwan can play to influence PRC
behavior elsewhere. He mentions how US military operations in the Taiwan Strait
helped bring the PRC to the negotiating table for armistice talks in Korea in
1953. Further, once the armistice was signed, the PRC immediately began pulling
forces from Korea to reinforce its posture across from Taiwan (30). The connection
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between deep-seated PRC security concerns on or near its borders (especially with
India, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) must be accounted for and leveraged as pressure
points to shape Beijing’s decision making and actions. Similarly, we must be
mindful that the PRC could use the same stratagem of generating a military crisis
in one location to draw in US forces and reduce its ability to respond elsewhere.
Second, the PRC harbors a misconception that aggressive action against
Taiwan will somehow cause the United States to split from Taiwan. Elleman notes
this was the PRC’s expectation when it attacked the Taiwan-held offshore island
Quemoy in 1954–55 during the first strait crisis (55). The PRC routinely seems
to misperceive a US reluctance to fight a war with it as a sign of fundamental
weakness in the US-Taiwan relationship or in US resolve to support Taiwan. Yet,
in each instance of PRC aggression against Taiwan, the United States has taken
concrete measures to reaffirm and even strengthen its relations with the island
nation. Recognizing this blind spot in Beijing’s thinking is important when
working through the potentials for escalation and off-ramps in the next crisis.
Perhaps the United States can defuse an emerging crisis and moderate PRC
behavior by clearly communicating that escalation is a dead end and will only
strengthen US-Taiwan ties.
Additionally, history points to other possibilities for PRC military attacks
against Taiwan that do not always receive much attention today. In 1958, the PRC
ended its shelling of Quemoy after 44 days and the wounding or killing of nearly
3,000 soldiers and 500 civilians. But occasional artillery fire would take place for
the next 20 years—the longest sustained artillery campaign in history (105). While
it is well known that the PRC has planned firepower strike operations against
Taiwan, less appreciated perhaps is the PRC’s will to sustain these operations
(even if at low volumes) for years and even decades. Given the PRC’s presentday rocket and missile capabilities and inventories, we must account for the real
possibility of a sustained fires campaign against the main island of Taiwan that
would generate far more casualties and destruction today.
Conventional strikes against Taiwan suggest the issue of nuclear weapons.
Elleman dedicates an entire chapter to the history of US threats to use nuclear
weapons in the context of a Taiwan Strait conflict and briefly tracks the evolution
of US nuclear use policy given the advent of PRC nuclear weapons, the dissolution
of the PRC-USSR alliance, and Taiwan ending its nuclear weapons program. The
specter of nuclear war between two global powers hangs heavily over any Taiwan
conflict. Nonetheless, US strategists must thoroughly investigate all the potentials
of the nuclear factor. On the surface, it might seem the PRC enjoys a strong
first-mover advantage in conducting military operations against Taiwan because
the United States would not want to risk a response escalating the situation to
a nuclear war. Yet, the PRC faces the same dilemma should the United States

142

Parameters 52(4) Winter 2022–23

choose either to deter with forward-postured forces or counterattack to defend
Taiwan. The US second-strike capability is something Beijing cannot ignore and
carries serious deterrent weight.
Another historical Taiwan conflict dynamic Elleman illuminates is the
complexity of the PRC-USSR relationship and past US efforts to undermine that
relationship. In simple terms, the United States sought to push the USSR and
the PRC closer together so they could then be split apart (125). He argues the
United States let the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominate China so the
PRC would become dependent on the USSR for support. This closer, dependent
relationship exacerbated the animosities and tensions between them and made it
easier to fracture the relationship. A key mechanism in fracturing the relationship
was the threat of a Taiwan conflict potentially escalating into a broader conflict
in which the USSR would be vulnerable to a US attack. As the PRC pressed
forward aggressively during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the USSR fears of a
wider conflict helped drive it to withdraw support from the PRC and ultimately
collapsed the relationship (131–34). With a much closer PRC-Russian relationship
developing today, strategists must consider what tensions exist in PRC relations
that might be vulnerable in the context of a Taiwan conflict. These weak points
may offer pressure points that deter or constrain military action.
Finally, the book reminds us that for much of cross-strait history the PRC has
judged war with the United States over Taiwan “pointless,” since they believed
they could ultimately gain control of the island through propaganda and other
subversive means (147). If winning without fighting is still a core tenet of Chinese
military thinking, then the United States must seek to encourage this idea and
leverage its deterrent value. The most troubling trend in the military balance across
the strait may not be the growth of PRC military power but rather the growth of
nationalism and impatience in the CCP such that they decide it is worth fighting
to seize Taiwan.
In The Trouble with Taiwan, Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu
Tzu-hui delve deeper into PRC perceptions and attitudes
toward Taiwan. The book centers on questions of identity
and the powerful effects this has on thinking and actions,
especially those of the PRC. This welcome find provides
fresh perspectives and ideas on the cross-strait problem from
British and Taiwan points of view. Distressingly, the authors
identify multiple factors that seem to suggest future conflict
is becoming more likely.
New York: Bloomsbury, 2021
231 pages
$17.95

They first provide a very clear explanation of the
importance of Taiwan to the PRC. Taiwan’s symbolic value
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is bound up with the PRC’s notions of its historical legitimacy and the very idea
of the Chinese nation they claim ownership of. For Beijing, compromising on the
status of Taiwan would mean forfeiting its claimed historical and cultural right to
controlling it and would thus call into question its right to every other territorial
and maritime claim, such as the South China Sea, Tibet, and Xinjiang (55–56).
The CCP has based its legitimacy in the restoration of the Chinese nation. Ceding
any of these claims would mean the literal breaking up of this Chinese nation—an
action irreconcilable with the CCP’s stated purpose. As US President Abraham
Lincoln asserted in his first inaugural address in 1861, no government proper ever
permits its own termination.
Additionally, the authors argue nationalism is on the march in the PRC and, for
President Xi Jinping and the CCP, it is now a “core source of legitimacy” (111). Along
with this shift is a burgeoning sense of urgency in resolving the Taiwan problem.
While the PRC has for decades been clear it views Taiwan as one of its provinces,
the authors convincingly illustrate how the PRC under Xi has been much more
assertive in enforcing this claim internationally as well as at home (112). Further,
Brown and Tzu-hui argue the pervasive nationalist messaging and quashing of
dissenting views have created an insular and dangerous orthodoxy on Taiwan
such that the CCP decisionmakers have outdated views. The authors suggest
Xi’s inner circle of advisers—much like with Putin and his misguided war
on Ukraine—is out of touch and dares not challenge convention or present
new ideas anyway (117).
Finally, the authors contend the real reason today the PRC wants control
of Taiwan owes to status and face. As the PRC has grown wealthier and more
powerful, its view of its status has increased. With its growth in power the PRC
now has more means at its disposal today to compel “reunification” with Taiwan
than at any other time in its history. These trends elevate the desire and urgency
of taking control of Taiwan (220). Also, harkening back to historical notions of
China as a “civilizational force” and “mother culture,” today the PRC has the
strong Confucian sense of being an elder sibling to Taiwan and deserving of its
respect (221). This dynamic means Taiwan cannot be sovereign in the eyes of
the PRC and hence there is no room to consider any sort of relationship that
would afford Taiwan equality. The PRC expects to have senior status (222). As
the authors summarize: “That Taiwan has become so tied up with the PRC’s own
identity and definition of its self [sic], and feelings about itself, creates an almost
intractable problem. To be fully China, to have the status it wants, to rank as a
great global power, the PRC needs Taiwan to be part of it” (223).
Despite this bleak assessment, the authors offer some hopeful ideas. They
suggest Taiwan’s democracy is its best defense against PRC aggression (68).
Like many other observers of Taiwan society, the authors note that increasingly
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the people of Taiwan, especially younger generations, view themselves as being
uniquely Taiwanese and not Chinese. While this dynamic would seem to make
the possibility of a peaceful reconciliation with the mainland more remote, it does
have two potentially useful effects. First, democracy holds with it the possibility
that the people could chose to reunify with the PRC. This permits Taiwan to say
it is not ruling out that possibility (98). Second, the unique Taiwanese identity
suggests to the PRC that Taiwan has a strong will to resist. This identity raises
the stakes and potential threat to the CCP’s legitimacy should it fail to subdue
Taiwan. No matter how confident the PRC becomes in its military power, it will
have to account for the real possibility that Taiwan will resist with all means, even
without US intervention.
Returning to the worst-case scenario of a US-PRC war described earlier,
this presumes the United States would defend Taiwan. A great many questions
have been raised concerning the likelihood of the United States risking war with
the PRC over an island the size of Maryland. While the Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979 does not require the United States to defend Taiwan, it is nonetheless
a strong statement of US commitment to supporting Taiwan militarily and
in other ways. Additionally, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 greatly expands
US security assistance over the next four years. Most compelling have been
seemingly resolute statements by President Joe Biden, twice last year and
twice again this year, that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a
PRC attack to seize the island.
These recent assurances of US commitment seem to be shifting the
long-standing US policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the question of US military
intervention in a Taiwan conflict. In decades past, when the United States enjoyed
clear military superiority over the PLA, maintaining strategic ambiguity was a
sensible approach to checking the PRC’s aggressive ambitions towards Taiwan
while also not encouraging Taiwan to declare independence. As the military
balance across the strait no longer seems to favor the United States (or Taiwan), the
utility of strategic ambiguity has arguably worn thin. Critics charge that dropping
strategic ambiguity is dangerous because it hardens US and PRC positions and
ripens the potential for war. This is a valid but manageable concern so long as the
United States can maintain a credible capability to deny the PRC achieving its
objective by force. This deterrence mission very much remains viable so long as the
United States makes the necessary investments in posture, will, relationships, and
capabilities in the region and beyond.
Yet, the valid question remains: are such massive investments worth it? Or, put
another way, is Taiwan worth it? The clear answer is yes. Economically, Taiwan
and the United States enjoy robust trade relations, particularly in goods, services,
and agriculture. In the past few years, US foreign direct investment in Taiwan has
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doubled to over $31 billion, especially due to the vital semiconductor industry as
Taiwan is the world’s top producer of computer chips. Further, Taiwan sits astride
some of the world’s busiest maritime shipping lanes. Nearly 90 percent of the
largest container ships transit through the Taiwan Strait ever year as they connect
East Asia with the Middle East and Europe.
Taiwan’s geographic location also matters deeply from a military perspective. It
is noted frequently that Taiwan is the central link in the island chain that sits just
offshore of mainland China and effectively bounds Beijing’s ability to project the
PLA eastward. This island chain runs from the Russian-controlled Kuril Islands
(claimed in part by Japan) in the north through the Japanese archipelago, the
Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan, and the northwestern Philippine islands and ends
with Borneo in the South China Sea. Less often elaborated is the military maritime
advantage the PRC would gain if it controlled Taiwan. The PRC would be able to
expand significantly the reach of its maritime surveillance and submarine warfare
capabilities. This would leave US naval forces far more vulnerable even at great
distances east of Taiwan as the PRC could significantly upgrade its long-range fires
capabilities. This, in turn, would greatly complicate US naval operations and war
planning generally and leave the United States with fewer practical contingency
response options in the region. Also, PLA Navy and Air Force operations out
of Taiwan would present a much greater direct, flanking threat to Japan and the
Philippines, especially, and would open a direct attack route to Guam.
The most serious interest the United States has in preserving Taiwan is
political. The United States had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan for nearly
25 years (from 1955–79). Although the United States switched diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 1979, it replaced that treaty with a set of
laws mandating the sale of defensive arms to Taiwan and enshrining a range of
other business and cultural ties with the island. Were the United States to choose
not to defend Taiwan with military force, the clear signal to allies and partners in
the region would be that the United States is unwilling to defend anyone from
the PRC military threat. Additionally, the United States would be standing by as
the PRC snuffed out a democratic government and locked its nearly 24 million
people in an industrial-sized police state. The democratic experiment in Taiwan
and US leadership in the region would end (to say nothing of the damage done
to US leadership worldwide). In essence, the United States would be permitting
the PRC to control the region. This would immeasurably hurt the region and the
United States—immediately and in the long run. It is hard to imagine the expense
and suffering that would have to be borne to reverse this situation and recover US
position and influence.
Preventing this outcome requires careful study of the PRC and the development
of a firm understanding of its thinking. What does the PRC fear more: loss of
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legitimacy from not “liberating” and “reunifying” Taiwan with mainland China or
loss of legitimacy from losing a war with the United States over Taiwan? This
is the critical question framing PRC decision making. If the CCP increasingly
perceives that its so-called China Dream of national rejuvenation is threatened
by failing to absorb Taiwan and that the United States is unwilling or unable to
defend Taiwan, then Beijing might choose to use force to seize the island. This is
the question and problem the United States must commit to solving.

George Shatzer
Colonel George Shatzer is the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis
Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.
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Reviewed by Jeffrey Caton, colonel, US Air Force (retired),
president, Kepler Strategies LLC

A

ndrew Futter and Herbert Lin have written recent and similarly
titled books—which, for clarity, I will refer to as Hacking the
Bomb and Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, respectively—
aimed at helping senior government policymakers confront the complex
interactions between modern cyberspace operations and nuclear operations.
The outstanding sources both authors identify reflect their seriousness
and credibility as researchers. But—remarkably—their books are tepid
in content and offer little new information for the cyber-nuclear dialogue.
Andrew Futter, a professor of international politics at the University
of Leicester, has published an impressive list of publications on nuclear
weapons, missile defense, and cyberspace. In Hacking the Bomb, he aims
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“to assess, examine, and explore what this new global [cyber-nuclear] context
means” for nuclear weapons, forces, and strategy (4). He posits this task
is based on two dynamics: increasing use of information technology in nuclear
weapons management and emerging new cyber capabilities. He organizes his
treatise into four parts addressing the nature of the cyber-nuclear challenge,
what hackers might do to nuclear systems, the cyber-nuclear nexus at the
strategic level, and challenges for the cyber-nuclear future.
Part I of Hacking the Bomb begins with an abridged historical
contextualization of the “cyber challenge,” as Futter calls it, “involving four
different domains of analysis: physical/mechanical, logical, informational,
and human/cognitive” (23). Futter rails against the imprecise language
that clouds ongoing cyber debate, but he uses imprecise and inconsistent
terminology. With his context established, Futter explores the vulnerabilities
of nuclear systems and their implications for the goal of ensuring
weapons are always available when properly initiated but never available
to unauthorized users. He emphasizes the increasing complexity of such
command-and-control processes and suggests “a key part of the cyber
challenge for nuclear systems security will be intrinsic, and not involve any
attackers at all”—that is, normal accidents may be more likely to occur (45).
Part II opens with a concise summary of information breaches at the
Departments of Defense and Energy with implications for nuclear weapon
development. He surmises the cyber-espionage threat “probably represents
more than 90 percent of the cyber challenge that we currently face in the nuclear
realm” (69). Such statements are indicative of Futter’s cavalier prioritization
within his analysis that undermines the credibility of his synthesis.
After all, are readers to believe the other material in this book addresses less than
10 percent of the cyber challenge? The remaining chapter of Part II explores
how cyberattacks could lead to the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons
or the disruption of authorized use. It largely rehashes well-known historical
cases of cyberattack of nonnuclear systems and includes another account
of Stuxnet.
Part III focuses on the strategic level of nuclear weapons and cyber
deterrence with a discussion marred by simplifications and debatable
assertions. Futter reveals his implicit bias of viewing cyber operations
in Clausewitzian terms while treating nuclear operations as Jominian.
To wit, Futter declares, “though we have come to understand just how
powerful and destructive nuclear weapons are during the past seventy years,
the same cannot yet be said for the diverse range of threats posed by the
much newer cyber challenge” (95). Unlike atomic bombs, thermonuclear
weapons have never been used in combat. Thus, while the immediate
effects of nuclear warheads may be characterized by tests and analyses, the
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strategic effects of actual nuclear conflict remain unknown. To his credit,
Futter raises the topic of a US declaratory nuclear policy with regard
to potential aggression in cyberspace, citing the foundational 2011
International Strategy for Cyberspace. Yet, his narrative on how cyber
operations may affect nuclear escalation is an unbalanced collage of existing
issues surrounding an emerging “cyber-nuclear security dilemma”—a term
he fails to define (119). Fixed on the negative implications of cyberspace,
he fails to consider how information provided through cyberspace may
enhance lucid decision making.
In Part IV, Futter examines nuclear weapon modernization and advanced
conventional weapons through the lens of technological determinism
where “technology drives social and societal change” (132). He tackles this
broad topic by describing potential military capabilities with vague cybernuclear connections. The chapter concludes with unfounded speculation
about a potential revolution in nuclear affairs and the third nuclear
age. Hacking the Bomb ends with a whimper, its final chapter laden
with adages and conjecture about the cyber-nuclear future. Despite his
preceding insights, Futter can muster only three trifling recommendations:
develop a consensus on what the term cyber means; protect nuclear systems
against direct cyberattacks; and include cyber operations in other emerging
strategic dynamics, such as nuclear arms control.
Hacking the Bomb promises a fecund discussion with a propitious
opportunity to expand the dialogue surrounding the strategic use of cyber
and nuclear capabilities. But its delivery is often repetitive and wordy
with a diluted sense of priority in analysis—Futter identifies too many
issues as the central concern. Certainly, much serious work went into the
research of the book—to which its impressive, well-documented array of
authoritative references attest. But its lack of a congruent lexicon or balanced
analyses facilitates an ambiguous and unilateral discussion neither favorable
to educate novices nor to inform serious decisionmakers.
Herbert Lin holds research positions at Stanford University’s Center
for International Security and Cooperation and Hoover Institution.
A recognized expert on policy-related aspects of cybersecurity with a list
of publications on par with Futter, Lin has little discernable experience
with nuclear weapons. His version of Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons
walks readers through background material and cyber-nuclear context,
cybersecurity lessons for nuclear modernization, nuclear scenarios
with cyber risks, and imperatives for the future. His target audience
is White House and congressional policymakers who will influence the next
Nuclear Posture Review. Lin claims “[t]his book addresses the relationship
to and possible impact of cyber technology on all aspects on U.S. nuclear
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forces and operations” (ix). With this statement, Lin establishes a vast—
but ultimately unachieved—scope of effort.
The first two chapters of the book provide very basic information
on cyberspace and nuclear operations. Although the use of artificial
intelligence is increasing in many cyberspace applications, Lin wisely defers
any related discussions to other venues. While he notes the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review includes strategically significant language “to indicate that
the United States might contemplate a nuclear response to certain kinds
of cyber attack” he explicitly decides not to address it in the book (27).
His examples of cyberattacks—such as those on Sony Pictures, the Office
of Personnel Management, and US election media sites—have no direct
connection to nuclear operations.
While Lin’s third chapter on the US nuclear enterprise is the longest
chapter, it is far from comprehensive. Its content reveals Lin’s forte
is cyberspace, and that his aptitude for strategic nuclear affairs is questionable.
A major portion of the chapter rehashes a 2019 report by the US Government
Accountability Office that explored cyber vulnerabilities for weapon systems.
Inexplicably, Lin completely ignores the 2019 version of Joint Publication
3-72, Nuclear Operations—a document that should be mandatory for anyone
exploring an authoritative model of the nuclear enterprise.
The fourth chapter, “Cybersecurity Lessons for Nuclear Modernization,”
is short and forgettable. Its content has little direct relevance to anything
nuclear, with only examples of mundane issues, such as physical security,
Internet service outages, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The next chapter
presents six scenarios designed to highlight cyber risks in nuclear crises, the
first four of which are predictable and basic. The other two scenarios do not
involve direct cyberattack on nuclear systems but deal instead with the use of
social media to influence decisionmakers. Unfortunately, Lin does not discuss
the concepts of information warfare and strategic communication that would
contextualize such indirect attacks facilitated by means of cyberspace.
The sixth chapter is the book’s intended core contribution to the
cyber-nuclear dialogue and offers six observations and eight imperatives.
None of the observations are original, and most involve cyber risks
applicable to all modern weapons systems. The fourth observation,
“[t]he legacy NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications]
has not failed catastrophically since 1985,” is notable in that Lin neglects
to give readers any clue as to what happened in 1985 (134). The companion
eight imperatives are equally unremarkable—neither new nor unique to the
nuclear enterprise. Like Futter, Lin’s final chapter attempts to convince readers
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that the book provides a novel way ahead for decisionmakers to address
cybersecurity in ongoing nuclear modernization efforts.
The back cover of Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons declares the work is
“the first book to consider cyber risks across the entire nuclear enterprise.”
Clearly, this claim is erroneous, considering Lin cites Futter’s Hacking the
Bomb and fails to address significant portions of the nuclear enterprise. Like
Futter, Lin often repeats himself and does not apply consistent terms and
logic in his analysis. In fact, the unique and topical material in Lin’s tome
likely could be reduced to the length of a Parameters article. Such a concise
and focused piece might better draw the attention of busy staffers in any
presidential administration.
Both books suffer from at least three fatal flaws: scope, context,
and military operations. First, Futter and Lin opt to tackle a research
scope far too broad for a single book. The lack of systematic approaches
for their analyses as well as blurring of the tactical, operational, and strategic
aspects of both cyber and nuclear operations further hamper their work.
In each book, nuclear war theory is simplified as a consensus dialogue
vice a nuanced and evolving debate, though, to be fair, any detailed
discussion of cyber or nuclear operations quickly enters the realm
of classified information.
One could reduce the book’s shared central themes to: cyber operations are
dangerous; nuclear operations are dangerous; and mixing cyber and nuclear
operations makes both more dangerous. Yet, neither author clearly defines
the term cyber threat nor even risk. They do not consider the customary
model of military risk as a function of the consequences for a given event
and the probability of its occurrence. Including such context would help the
authors add sorely needed objective priority to their musings. Finally, like
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Futter and Lin claim to consider the global
environment of US nuclear weapons but provide only cursory treatment
of other nuclear powers.
For military operations, neither book mentions the evolving mission
of US Strategic Command, which, in addition to its current missions
of nuclear strike and integrated missile defense, was the birthplace
of US Cyber Command. Futter and Lin foster the latent impression that
military nuclear planners are unaware of the challenges and complexities
hawked in their books—a great disservice to those leaders who made the
current multibillion-dollar upgrade of the nuclear enterprise possible.
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In summary, Futter and Lin do not fulfill their self-assigned goals.
Both books are too convoluted for casual readers and too imprecise
for an informed audience. Of the two works, Hacking the Bomb is the better
by far. Prospective readers would do well to read the last chapter of either
book first to decide if the authors’ destinations are worth the arduous
journeys through their prose.

Book Reviews
Nuclear Considerations

Negotiating the New START Treaty
by Rose Gottemoeller
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Seth A. Johnston, PhD,
chief of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency – Europe, US Army foreign area
officer, and visiting professor of political science at Universität Heidelberg

N

egotiating the New START Treaty is an instant classic.
This firsthand account by the treaty’s chief US negotiator
is at once a memoir, case study in international negotiation,
primer on arms control, guidebook for domestic government
process and politics, and compendium of lessons for national
security leaders at all levels. Its author, Rose Gottemoeller,
writes with the authority and perspective of a deeply informed
Cambria Press,
and groundbreaking stateswoman who later served as Under Amherst, NY:2021
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
244 pages
$34.99
then Deputy Secretary General of NATO. Its pages exemplify
clear and engaging writing, illuminating a complex topic with
relatable personal reflection and humor. Its timeliness cannot be overstated,
as Russia issues nuclear threats in the course of its war in Ukraine, and the treaty
will expire in just over three years. I would highly recommend this book to arms
control specialists and general readers alike.
Your reviewer has known the author and her family for the better part of three
decades. But you may judge the fairness of this review insofar as its conclusions
reinforce the wide-ranging acclaim the book has already attracted. Its cover alone
features strong endorsements from six of the most highly respected and senior
international security practitioners, including three former cabinet secretaries.
Henry Kissinger calls the treaty “the most significant arms control agreement of
recent decades.” The book also earned the 2021 Douglas Dillon Award for a Book
of Distinction on the Practice of American Diplomacy.
Negotiating the New START Treaty follows a chronological structure, with
most of the action focusing on the twelve-month period beginning April 2009,
when the US and Russian presidents agreed in London to begin negotiations
for a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and ending
with their signing the new treaty in Prague in April 2010. Encounters in Rome,
Geneva, and Moscow during this period are the essence of the work’s focus on
negotiation. The book also contains three other important sections. Chapters on
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the Senate ratification process in Washington after the treaty’s signing are essential
to the overall story of how the New START Treaty came into force, as well as the
larger strategic and political context in which the treaty was considered. A final
chapter on “Lessons Learned” explicitly aims to be “food for thought for future
negotiators” and could serve as a standalone reference for practitioners (171). The
opening prologue and introductory chapter provide important framing facts about
arms control and US-Russian relations, as well as the author’s individual career
experience in both areas. That individual history not only serves to underscore the
author’s expertise, but also aims to “inspire new negotiators to enter the game” and
“maintain a clear-eyed sense of where U.S. national interest lies” ( xxii).
Several themes and arguments throughout Negotiating the New START Treaty
are especially relevant to senior members of the defense community.
First, the New START Treaty is one of a diminishing number of arms control
agreements. Many of the Cold War-era arms control agreements negotiated with
the Soviet Union have either lapsed or been withdrawn. The urgency to complete
New START more quickly than previous agreements owed to the demise of the
original START treaty in 2009. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, and Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe Treaty are among those from which countries have withdrawn formally
or suspended participation. The war in Ukraine and COVID-19 pandemic have
frustrated implementation of those that remain. Despite all that, Russia and
the United States agreed to a one-time five-year extension of the New START
Treaty in 2021, such that it will remain in force until February 4, 2026. Such facts
contribute to the notion of New START as the “Gold Standard Treaty” ( vii).
Second, Gottemoeller argues consistently in this book for a vision of arms
control not as something to do for its own sake but rather as a means to serve
the national interest and strengthen national security. This view is increasingly
prominent, as both the 2022 National Security Strategy and NATO’s 2022
Strategic Concept describe arms control in terms of its connection to effective
deterrence and defense.
Third, arms control negotiation requires interagency participation and
defense expertise. For expertise on US weapons systems and capabilities, there
is no substitute for the actual operators of those systems. For expertise on
implementation and verification, experienced arms control inspectors “knew what
had worked and what had not in previous nuclear arms control regimes” and
“how to make the most of the time that would be available on inspections” ( 177).
To demonstrate a coherent and coordinated interagency position, the book
repeatedly features the importance of the so-called backstopping process
for developing instructions.
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Fourth, related to the above, knowledge of how to negotiate arms control
agreements has atrophied as their number has dwindled. This dynamic has
increased the value of expertise where it remains and argues for efforts to preserve
that expertise and sustain relevant capabilities for the future. Most relevant
expertise, whether technical or weapons related, language skills, or procedural and
political understanding, takes time to develop. The original START treaty was
negotiated over a decade, compared to a year for New START. Shorter negotiation
timelines further increase the value of preexisting expertise.
Fifth, Negotiating the New START Treaty teaches ample lessons on leadership.
Some lessons, such as detailed reflections on entertaining for Thanksgiving
(75–78) and Easter (135–38), may reflect norms or practices specific to a diplomatic
environment. But the underlying issues in those lessons—morale, motivation,
leader engagement, and team cohesion—are widely applicable. Other lessons,
such as “define your security objective and stick with it” (171), should resonate
directly with national security professionals in any environment. Throughout the
book, Gottemoeller commonly attributes successes to others or to the team, while
treating setbacks either as her own responsibility or as lessons that can be learned
without naming names. Negotiating the New START Treaty is therefore not a
memoir of gossip or score settling but rather of conveying practical knowledge and
wisdom. This constructive, results-oriented emphasis makes Negotiating the New
START Treaty itself an honorable public service.

Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age:
Between Disarmament and Armageddon
by David A. Cooper
Reviewed by Amy F. Woolf, nuclear weapons policy specialist,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress

D

avid A. Cooper, in Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age,
argues “the transition to a fundamentally different nuclear
landscape will require significant adjustments to long-standing
post-Cold War approaches to U.S. nuclear policy and diplomacy”
(6). Cooper distinguishes between Cold War arms control built
on a “mutual deterrence paradigm” designed to mitigate
nuclear risks and post-Cold War arms control based
on a “denuclearization paradigm” designed to bolster
disarmament and nonproliferation (6). He argues the United
States should return to the former model because the

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press 2021
248 pages
$36.95

158

Parameters 52(4) Winter 2022–23

“post-Cold War system of multilateral nonproliferation and bilateral disarmament
arrangements was never designed to manage a great-power nuclear arms race” (26).
Cooper notes, as nuclear deterrence theory developed in the late 1950s and
1960s, arms control was a “tough-minded and pragmatic national security tool”
(40) designed to manage and reduce incentives for nuclear threat (41). The goal
was to find and preserve a “stable strategic nuclear balance” (51), which required
maintaining first strike stability, crisis stability, and escalation stability (54). The
United States and Soviet Union needed forces that could survive and retaliate
after a nuclear attack; thus, arms control measures should favor forces better suited
for a retaliatory strike rather than a first strike (54).
Cooper demonstrates this approach with an overview of the
US-Soviet/Russian arms control process in what he admits “is not a history
in any proper sense” (78). He aims, instead, to “show how classic arms control
theory evolved through real-world experience” (78) and to demonstrate
Cold War “nuclear arms control was pursued . . . with strategic stability
as its topmost goal” (76). The treaties supported deterrence by ensuring the
United States could maintain a secure retaliatory force (79). He highlights the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’s limitation of systems able to intercept
second strike missiles and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’s (START)
limitation of systems vulnerable to preemptive attack and therefore more useful
for a first strike.
Cooper asserts arms control makes several lessons evident—such as the premise
the United States should “arms race toward arms control” by building up its forces
to provide incentives for adversaries to negotiate limits (108). He also argues this
history shows the comparative ease of negotiating preemptive controls on weapons
in development rather than cutting deployed systems (88). Although analysts
often cite these lessons in arms control assessments, neither is fully supported by
the facts.
Cooper’s understanding of the relationship between arms control theory
and Cold War-era agreements would benefit from a fulsome review of arms
control history. His analysis contains numerous errors about these agreements:
he misunderstands the Congressional debates for some, offers faulty summaries
of the provisions in others, and identifies inaccurate negotiation goals for
many. These faults appear to stem from his reliance on single-source interviews
rather than official documents or detailed reviews of the negotiating process.
In one case, he claims the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) failed
in the Senate because members were concerned about the US ability to verify
Soviet compliance. SALT II failed for a number of reasons—key among them the
campaign by critics who highlighted concerns about the Soviet advantage in large,
multiple-warhead land-based missiles. These concerns, which evolved into the

Book Reviews: Nuclear Considerations

159

notorious “window of vulnerability,” advised the Reagan-era proposals for START,
and their absence from Cooper’s review of SALT II is a surprise.
Cooper argues the links between deterrence, stability, and arms control
receded in the 1990s when “Washington [pivoted] . . . to a denuclearization
paradigm built on the tandem pillars of nonproliferation and disarmament”
(118). He finds evidence of this in the program cancellations and deep reductions
supported by the Bush administration and in the Clinton administration’s
effort to implement further reductions through the START II and potential
START III treaty. Yet, he never mentions that the demise of the Warsaw Pact
and collapse of the Soviet Union had sharply reduced the numbers of targets the
United States would seek to destroy in a conflict; thus, the United States could
eliminate thousands of warheads without undermining deterrence or stability.
Military planning—not a theory of arms control—produced the changes he cites
in the US nuclear force posture.
Cooper notes the emerging arms race is technological—not numerical—
and asymmetric with multiple countries pursuing a range of new capabilities (163).
Consequently, he argues, strategic stability “is at real and imminent risk” (163).
In this vein, Cooper identifies emerging technologies likely to undermine
stability—in particular, hypersonic glide vehicles capable of carrying nuclear
warheads to intercontinental range—and evaluates arms control measures capable
of addressing these weapon types.
Cooper argues the United States should invest in destabilizing technologies—
thus arms racing toward arms control—and pursue limits to constrain
them early, as success would be more difficult after their deployment. This
contradictory advice is inconsistent with the history of US-Soviet arms control.
US-Soviet treaties have addressed weapons not yet deployed in great
numbers, and the two nations agreed to limit these weapons only when they
lacked military capabilities that would justify the costs of their deployment.
Arms control did not impede the deployment of weapons the parties considered
essential to national security. Thus, military requirements informed US and Soviet
negotiating positions. In addition, a proposal for the United States “to procure
weapons without military requirements to “arms race toward arms control” runs
counter to the weapons acquisition process and represents a potential diversion of
defense funding from high priority programs.
Cooper’s central thesis of arms control’s ability to serve national security
by bolstering deterrence and helping to maintain strategic stability is sound.
Looking back, he sees evidence of deterrence theories and models of strategic
stability affecting the terms of agreements signed during the Cold War.
Yet, he fails to recognize the role military planning and targeting requirements
played in determining the size and structure of the US nuclear arsenal and
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in crafting acceptable arms control proposals. Although political leaders can cite
theories of deterrence when describing why the United States chose its force
structure and arms control positions, history shows these theories played a far
smaller role than Cooper portrays. Recognizing the improbability of arms control
limiting weapons nations view as essential to their national security would provide
Cooper a stronger tool to assess whether arms control can mitigate emerging
threats to strategic stability.
Russia

The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace,
1941–1992
by Richard W. Harrison
Reviewed by Dr. Robert Hamilton, research professor, Eurasian Studies,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

R

ichard W. Harrison’s book The Soviet Army’s High
Commands in War and Peace chronicles the development
and operational record of the High Commands, a peculiar
formation in the Soviet Army that sat—often uneasily—
between fronts comprised of several armies, and the supreme
political-military authority in Moscow. The first thing readers
if this book might ask is whether it needed to be written.
By the author’s own admission, the role of the High
Havertown, PA: Casemate
Academic, 2022
Commands in the Second World War was limited in scope
480 pages
and mostly undistinguished in achievement, and the post-war
$45.00
High Commands never saw combat. Notable wartime
commanders such as Giorgi Zhukov and Aleksandr Vasilevsky give short shrift
to the High Commands in their memoirs. Fortunately, the book’s title is modest:
it is about far more than the High Commands.
The book tackles the development of Red Army doctrine and strategy,
the problems of military geography (matching forces to terrain and enemy),
command-and-control arrangements, and civil-military relations in the
Soviet Union. Extensive primary source research allows Harrison to delve
deeply into the topics he covers. The book provides a fascinating look inside the
Red Army as it fought a war for national survival and as it later navigated the
Cold War, where it faced less immediate but no less existential threats. As a bonus,
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Harrison intersperses dozens of short biographies of major Soviet military figures
throughout the book.
Harrison lays the foundation for his examination of the High Commands
with the first two chapters. Chapter 1 examines the development of Russian
thinking on military geography, doctrine, and strategy against the backdrops
of World War I, the Russo-Polish War, and the Russian Civil War.
Harrison notes Russia’s extended borders and multiplicity of threats have
conditioned the Russian military mind “to think in broad strategic terms,
involving the movement of large armies over broad fronts” (1). The arrangement
and control of these armies bedeviled Soviet planners, who worked to
establish a common doctrinal lexicon to define and differentiate the terms
theater of war, theater of military activities, front, and strategic direction.
Chapter 2 reviews how the Red Army applied these theoretical concepts
in its system of strategic command and control. Joseph Stalin’s government
formed a State Defense Committee to run the war against Germany.
While this concentrated immense power in the hands of a small group,
it gave the Soviet war effort focus and agility it would have lacked otherwise.
A State Defense Committee decree of July 10, 1941—shortly after Nazi Germany
attacked the Soviet Union—mandated the establishment of the first three
High Commands: Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern. Harrison notes
the “enormous scope of the conflict and the deep inroads made by the German
armored spearheads increased considerably the problems of troop control”
for Soviet leadership (76). The Soviet Union created the High Commands
as “intermediate control [mechanisms] between the fronts and the central
military apparatus” to relieve the center of some of its operational and
organizational functions.
Chapters 3 through 7 examine the performance of the High Commands
in World War II. Each High Command united several fronts, and each front
controlled several Soviet armies. Aside from the Far Eastern High Command—
formed in 1945 to prosecute the Soviet Union’s war on Japan—the record
of the High Commands lacks distinction. The four High Commands
formed to fight Nazi Germany—the Northwestern, Western, Southwestern,
and North Caucasus—struggled and mostly failed to stem the German onslaught.
Harrison attributes some of their failures to their inheritance of a “disastrous
. . . strategic situation,” but he notes even their rare successes would have been
possible with a competent front command in place of the High Command (322).
The Far Eastern command inherited a much more positive strategic situation.
It reaped the advantages of lessons learned over four years of war against
a formidable opponent, faced a depleted enemy, and suffered less “trivial
interference from the center” (351). As an added benefit, Vasilevsky, its commander,
enjoyed Stalin’s trust and empowered his own subordinate commanders.
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A clear theme of micromanagement from Moscow emerges from
Harrison’s examination of the High Commands in the western theater.
Sometimes this micromanagement manifested as direct communication
from the Stavka (the high command of the Soviet military) with front
commands or even armies, leaving the High Command out of the picture.
Other times, micromanagement took the form of Stalin himself admonishing
a High Command and exhorting it to fight with more grit and zeal.
Given the fact that every senior Red Army officer had lived through the purges of
1937–38, this personal attention from Stalin was unwelcome, to say the least.
Harrison concludes his book by tracing the postwar arc of the High Commands.
Their association with Stalin, who had a “weakness” for them, resulted in their
dissolution after Stalin’s death in 1953 (351). In the 1970s, when “the possibility
of a major conventional war involving broad fronts and several strategic directions
simultaneously” began to dominate Soviet military thought again, a debate
over reviving them began (371). The accession of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov,
who had served in the Far Eastern High Command from 1949–53, settled that
debate in the High Commands’ favor: starting in 1979, one High Command
in the east and two in the west existed until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The book’s lively and colorful but precise style suits its highly technical and
theoretical subject matter. Livelier and more variegated language might have
resulted in inaccuracies; more precise language would have made the book too
dry for all but the most dedicated readers. Although the book does contain some
maps, its detailed descriptions of the many campaigns the Red Army fought,
especially from its founding through the end of World War II, will often leave
readers wishing it had more maps—a minor flaw in an otherwise excellent book.
Although not for the casual reader, The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War
and Peace provides an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the
Soviet military.
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Stalin’s War:
A New History of World War II
by Sean McMeekin
Reviewed by Dr. Reina Pennington,
Charles A. Dana Professor of History, Norwich University

S

talin’s War displays little that is new and much that is
reminiscent of Cold War Soviet-bashing. The history of
the Second World War and in particular the Eastern Front
has already been carefully reappraised by authors utilizing the
wealth of newly declassified materials and archival sources that
only became available in the post-Soviet years—sources and
analyses that are not used in Stalin’s War. Sean McMeekin, a
respected scholar of the First World War, not only displays a
lack of expertise in tackling the Second World War, but also
abandons scholarly conventions such as objectivity and reasoned
argument. Instead, we are presented with an ideological work
that is more diatribe than monograph.

New York: Basic Books,
2021
864 pages
$40.00

The title is a statement of the author’s argument that the Second World
War “was not Hitler’s war at all” but Joseph Stalin’s war (2). The author spends
670 pages bashing the Soviet Union. Even the photographs amount to a tirade.
Of 50 photographs in the book, 18 show American or British equipment used
by the Soviets, with only six photos of Soviet-produced equipment; 12 photos
show Soviet invasions and atrocities while one shows Soviet defensive actions; and
two photos show German atrocities.
In McMeekin’s view, the Western Allies were bullied by Stalin.
McMeekin continually suggests that the Lend-Lease Act was the
main factor in the Soviet military victory. He even suggests that the
United States and United Kingdom should have attacked the Soviet Union rather
than aiding it. Far from a being a new interpretation of history, this idea simply
dusts off the tired conspiracy theories of the Cold War.
There are more errors, exaggerations, and counterfactuals in this book than I
can begin to delineate in this brief space, some of which have been examined in
more lengthy reviews. One of those reviewers, Omer Bartov, sums up Stalin’s War
as riddled with “bizarre assertions and outlandish speculations, held together
under a well-weathered ideological umbrella masquerading as a daring new
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interpretation of the past” (Times Literary Supplement 6174, July 30, 2021).
I cannot put it any better than that.
Chapter 24, “Lend-Lease and Stalingrad,” exemplifies the weaknesses of this
work. The chapter opens with a line about the “stupendous” amount of goods that
“Stalin’s agents were able to requisition” from the United States before Stalingrad
and goes on to state that “the Russians had blown through the first $1 billion
already” (403). Lend-Lease aircraft amounted to roughly 12 percent of what the
Soviets produced during the entire war, and most arrived after Stalingrad, so it
is hard to conclude that Lend-Lease aircraft were a major factor in 1942. In the
book When Titans Clashed (University of Kansas Press, 1995), David M. Glantz
notes that “Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the
difference between defeat and victory in 1941–1942” (Glantz, 285). The same
chapter concludes with the statement that “it is an imperishable historical fact that
Anglo-American capitalism helped win the battle of Stalingrad” (432). Given that
the Red Army was tying down the vast majority of the Wehrmacht from 1941
to 1944, it would be just as accurate to say that “it is an imperishable historical
fact that Soviet communism helped win the battle of North Africa”—or D-Day,
or any battle in Europe throughout the war, for that matter.
There is no context of the big picture of Lend-Lease: of roughly 50 billion dollars
spent by the United States, 63 percent went to the United Kingdom and only
23 percent to the USSR. Since the United Kingdom received nearly three times
as much Lend-Lease aid as the Soviet Union, it is incongruous to portray Stalin
as a greedy bully with “exorbitant military and war-industrial needs” (404–5).
It is also absurd to describe Lend-Lease as “unreciprocated American generosity,”
(publisher’s blurb) given the horrendous price paid in blood by the Soviet people
in absorbing the main efforts of the Wehrmacht. Millions of German soldiers
and dozens of divisions were eliminated that the United States might otherwise
have had to face.
John Barber and Mark Harrison in The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945
(Longman, 1991) provide a far more balanced and accurate view of Lend-Lease.
All this was supplied free of charge to the Soviet Union, but it was
never an act of charity. Both the British and Americans understood that
the main thing was to encompass the defeat of Germany . . . the only
people engaged in direct combat with the German ground forces were
Russians, and it was in the western Allies’ own interests to help them (189).

Stalin was a reprehensible dictator responsible for the deaths of millions.
Soviet-American relations were difficult at best. How does one treat this
subject with proper objectivity? Many authors have done so. Serhii Plokhy’s
excellent Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front (Oxford University Press, 2019)
offers an in-depth, balanced treatment of Americans and Soviets involved
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in Operation Frantic. Mark Stoler offers a superior critical analysis of diplomatic
relations in Allies in War (Bloomsbury Academic, 2007) and Allies and Adversaries
(University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
I cannot recommend this book. Readers should turn instead to Evan
Mawdsley’s World War II (second edition, Cambridge University Press, 2020),
to Michael Jones for credible popular history, and to anything written by Robert
M. Citino, C. J. Dick, David Stahel, and, of course, the inimitable David Glantz.
China

The Avoidable War:
The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict
between the US and Xi Jinping’s China
by Kevin Rudd
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, distinguished fellow,
United States Institute of Peace

T

his is a mistitled book. The volume holds much promise
and great insights, but readers may be disappointed
because the contents do not match the cover. Kevin Rudd,
the author, is a high-profile influencer and prominent former
government official with a significant academic background
in Chinese studies and extensive real-world experience with
China. Rudd studied China and Chinese at the university
level and went to have a distinguished public service career in
New York: PublicAffairs,
2022
his native Australia where he rose to the pinnacle of power—
432 pages
first as foreign minister and later as prime minister. He is
$32.00
currently president of the Asia Society and based in New
York. The book’s title is an attention grabber, raising reader expectations that the
volume will focus on the specter of war between the United States and China and
concentrate on how the two sides might avert such a frightening conflagration.
On balance, the book is well worth a gander. Rudd’s central argument is the
“best chance of avoiding war is to better understand the other side’s strategic
thinking and to conceptualize a world where both the [United States] and China
are able to competitively coexist” (18). In this reviewer’s judgment, the volume
has three key takeaways. First, Xi Jinping will likely remain China’s senior leader
“well into the 2030s,” and he has an ambitious set of goals—“ten concentric
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circles of interests”—placing his country on a potential collision course with the
United States (11–12). Second, as a result of Xi’s ambitions, the 2020s will be,
in Rudd’s view, “the decade of living dangerously” for the United States and
China (331). Third, despite the very real threat of war, the two countries can avert
military conflict if both make concerted efforts to understand the other’s
interests and priorities and choose the path of what Rudd dubs “managed
strategic competition” (13ff ).
While all three key takeaways are worth delving into, the latter two require
less page turning—each is contained in a single chapter—but more reader
reflection. In Chapter 16, Rudd usefully sketches out ten scenarios for the future,
most of which involve either direct conflict or military confrontation between
China and the United States. These scenarios underscore three insights regarding
the potential for conflict often overlooked in the current overarching rubric
embraced inside the Beltway of long-term China-United States competition.
The first insight is war between the United States and China, though increasingly
conceivable, is not inevitable—at least not with the kinds of conventional
military campaigns studied in US institutions of professional military education.
The conflict could start in or be confined to the non-kinetic realm of cyberspace or
other gray zones. Second, any war is not likely to be instigated by the two countries
in a vacuum or to unfold as a two-player contest. Other countries and actors have
agency and can spark or complicate a war for one or both of the main protagonists.
Third, Taiwan is not the only potential location or trigger for a China-United
States military conflict. Although the Taiwan Strait is the most plausible scenario
for a war and Taiwan has long been the most contentious issue in China-United
States relations, other flashpoints and hot button issues could escalate and bring
Washington and Beijing to the brink of avoidable war.
While readers are treated to a thoughtful and fluid discourse about China,
the volume does not zero in on a China-United States military conflict—how
it might start, how it might be fought and how it might end—nor does it give
much attention to how the two sides might avoid it until 330 pages in. Indeed,
much of the book—11 of 17 chapters—concentrates on providing the reader
with a cogent and absorbing account of how China’s senior-most leader sees
the world. Moreover, given the author’s wealth of life and work experience
in China, and, most relevantly—given the true focus of the book—his multiple
interactions and conversations with Xi over the years, readers will look
in vain for citations and sources for Rudd’s insights and observations.
This is unfortunate, since one is left to wonder whether a particular judgment or
comment is the author’s “best guess” expert opinion based upon years of experience
or grounded in a specific primary or secondary source.
Rudd insists he did not set out to write an academic tome, and hence, has
deliberately eschewed footnotes or even a bibliography in an effort to reach
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a wider audience. Yet, the “intelligent general reader” is precisely the person
likely to hunger for more and wonder where to look for authoritative and
accessible writings on a host of China-related topics (17). It is a pity Rudd did
not decide to tack on a shortlist of sources or recommended readings at the end
of each chapter.
Nevertheless, there is so much to like about and learn from this book.
Readers almost certainly will be left wanting more—but will probably be unsure
of where to look for it.
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